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VOL. XXIII · JANUARY 1971 · No. 2

CONTENTS

Strategies for SALT — *Jerome H. Kahan* — 171

The Profession of Arms in Postwar Canada, 1945-1970 — *Adrian Preston* — 189

The Politics of International Currencies — *Susan Strange* — 215

Three Dimensions of Ethnic Politics — *Donald L. Horowitz* — 232

The Political Economics of Population Growth: The Case of China — *Pi-chao Chen* — 245

REVIEW ARTICLES

Science, Technology, and Public Policy — *Richard A. Rettig* — 273

Chinese Studies in Crisis — *Richard W. Wilson* — 295

The Contributors — ii

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STRATEGIES FOR SALT

By JEROME H. KAHAN

I. Introduction

ON November 17, 1969, after a three-year delay, the United States and the Soviet Union initiated Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Involving strategic systems and policies vital to the security of both superpowers, their allies, and the world, these talks have the potential of becoming the most important series of United States-Soviet negotiations since World War II. They can affect not only the military-technical aspects of the strategic balance but United States-Soviet political relations and the future role of nuclear weapons. Given the complexity and sensitivity of the subject, it is not surprising that negotiations are still continuing. Even if an early, limited agreement is reached, SALT meetings can be expected to span a period of many years.

The goal of SALT can be simply stated: to enhance the security of the United States and the Soviet Union by reducing the risks and costs of the strategic arms competition. But how might both sides actually go about accomplishing this objective? Two ways have been suggested: (1) a United States-Soviet dialogue on matters related to strategic arms—which could, in itself, have a stabilizing effect on the strategic balance; (2) some form of agreed limitations—whether by treaty or informal arrangements short of a treaty.

Discussions and limitations thus are the two components of a SALT strategy. The issue is to establish a balance between them. This balance or mixture will be instrumental in determining the outcome of SALT.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the optimum blend by addressing two broad questions:

First, what purposes might be served through a strategic dialogue between the two nations, how might the dialogue be organized to achieve maximum benefits, and what results are likely?

Second, how important are bilateral limitation agreements to the success of SALT, what approaches might be followed to achieve this end, and what are the alternative forms such agreements might take?

II. Value of a Strategic Dialogue

In one form or another, the United States and the Soviet Union constantly hold a "strategic dialogue." Through words and deeds, both

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sides convey to each other information regarding their strategic programs, policies, and perceptions. Speeches by government leaders, diplomatic contacts, and weapons testing and deployment are activities common to both sides. The United States reveals a good deal to the Soviets, deliberately and as an outgrowth of our system: consider the visible and often volatile domestic debate centering on the annual congressional review of the defense budget and the associated yearly Posture Statements of the Secretary of Defense. By contrast, only bits and pieces of Soviet strategic policies have emerged over the years, and these small samples are often misleading to the West.

Although incomplete as well as imperfect, this dialogue has benefits. But its value has been, and will continue to be, severely limited because of its unstructured and unbalanced nature.

SALT offers more promise. It has already provided a forum for direct, sustained official and private bilateral discussions of strategic issues and will probably continue to do so. This makes SALT unique. Discussions of strategic issues could occur for their own sake, as a prelude to presenting specific limitation proposals, during negotiation of an agreement—or in all three contexts. Thus far in the course of SALT, a considerable amount of discussion has taken place officially as well as unofficially between United States and Soviet representatives.

With this setting in mind, let us ask: What particular purposes might be served by such discussions? How might these discussions be organized? And what could they realistically be expected to accomplish?

PURPOSES OF DISCUSSIONS

Well-structured discussions can improve understanding—general as well as specific, technical as well as political—between the United States and the Soviet Union on strategic issues and thus reduce the many uncertainties on each side as to the intentions and capabilities of the other. Unilateral strategic force and policy decisions by both nations could then be made on the basis of less conservative planning factors, overcompensation could be avoided, the need for premature deployments minimized, and the action-reaction consequences of particular decisions better appreciated. Such a pattern of restrained and rational weapons decisions on both sides could ultimately lead to a dampening of the arms competition.

Thus, even if a weapons-limitation agreement were not obtained, a successful strategic dialogue could contribute significantly to the attainment of strategic arms control objectives. Institutionalizing SALT, in order to provide a continuing framework for both sides to exchange

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views on strategic matters and thus moderate unilateral actions, would serve this goal.

Another purpose of the dialogue would be to help insure that productive bilateral agreements were actually reached. Exploratory discussions of strategic issues could establish a common foundation of understanding upon which to build such agreements. Because of the complexities and uncertainties inherent in the problem and the differences between United States and Soviet strategic postures and policies, it may prove extremely difficult, without prior discussions of issues and objectives, to negotiate an agreement politically palatable to both parties and consistent with their security interests. They might, instead, be forced to settle for a constricted agreement representing the least common denominator. At best, an opportunity would have been missed. At worst, an agreement would have been concluded that could—through inadvertence, incompetence, or faulty communication—*increase*, rather than decrease, instabilities, tensions, and costs. The Nixon Administration's SALT tactic of stressing discussion and using a "building-block" approach during early phases has apparently been designed in order to evade these pitfalls.[1]

The process of exchanging views on strategic issues and probing positions in an exploratory fashion would help to avoid this outcome by enabling each side to test the overall climate and to probe the other side's intentions without commitment. If specific proposals were presented without such a prior process, responses could be distorted through a misunderstanding of their purpose. This misunderstanding might be based upon incorrect judgments of an adversary's views on strategic matters; or an initial position, introduced merely as a bargaining ploy, could be misconstrued as representing the minimum acceptable measure. It is possible, therefore, that specific proposals presented prematurely could fuel suspicions, lead to polemics, or even end by scuttling the talks.

Emphasizing discussion, rather than early proposals, also has merit in terms of bureaucratic politics. Any negotiating proposal for SALT has to be coordinated within each government, and requires the approval of key officials and agencies. In the final analysis, the President—and in the Soviet Union, not only the Premier but other high leaders—must make the decision, probably against the recommendation of some major group. Regardless of the outcome, the battle to fix the elements

[1] An explanation of the Administration's approach can be found in *United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A New Strategy for Peace*, Message from the President of the United States, February 18, 1970. House Document No. 91-258. Preparations for SALT: pp. 143-147.

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of a particular proposal may create severe conflicts within the governmental structure on each side. Such divisiveness can work to the detriment of constructive, cohesive, and responsive support of negotiations as they proceed. Discussing issues and exploring views in a flexible fashion may delay, and perhaps mitigate, these potentially adverse consequences.

Once an agreement had been reached, the broad base of understanding developed during the discussion phase would help insure that it remained viable, with a minimum of misunderstanding and a common appreciation of those modifications that might eventually be needed. Indeed, SALT could then be continued on a more or less permanent basis, with two negotiating teams constituting a commission whose task was to help provide assurance of compliance, clarify national strategic policy decisions and actions, and preserve the spirit as well as the letter of any agreement.

ORGANIZING THE DIALOGUE

The particular topics covered in the SALT discussions to date will not be fully known until and unless the official statements and transcripts are released. Rather than speculate on the basis of press reports, it seems more useful to describe what a potentially productive dialogue *might* be like, on the assumption that its main features have been or will be reflected in actuality.

A strategic dialogue might begin with an exchange of views on fundamental questions. This could provide both a solid foundation for limitation agreements and a common "wave-length" for communicating about strategic matters.

One of the issues to be discussed might be the purposes of strategic nuclear forces. This could encompass such questions as: Is their purpose to deter and, if so, what? Can either side hope to use its strategic forces to achieve political gains? Is deterrence accomplished only by maintaining a credible offensive retaliatory capability or by a mixture of offense and defense? If deterrence fails, can damage be limited? Can nuclear wars be "won"?

As a related matter, each side could explain in a general way how it plans its strategic forces. The elements of a "sufficient" posture might be conveyed in terms of force size, composition, and effectiveness. Discussions could encompass such force design issues as threat projections, lead-times, and the treatment of uncertainty.

Stability is another central issue for discussion. An attempt could be made to define and assess the stability of the present strategic balance.

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Both sides might seek to identify ongoing activities and future trends that are potentially destabilizing. The distinction between first-strike and second-strike capabilities and the ambiguity exhibited by many systems could be covered. This exchange of views, in turn, could lead to a discussion of the interplay between United States and Soviet strategic programs and the so-called "action-reaction" phenomenon.

At some point, the dialogue might deal with the principles and objectives of strategic arms control, starting with the obvious but important premise that each side's security interests must be satisfied under an agreement and that neither side should be able to gain an advantage. This discussion of the goals of SALT could open up any number of questions: Is the purpose of SALT to maintain and "codify" the present balance of mutual deterrence? Can SALT lessen the destruction that might result from a strategic exchange? Is the potential economic saving significant? Are agreed limitations on strategic weapons essential to SALT, or can its objectives be achieved without limitations? Finally, the parties could discuss what might reasonably be expected from the talks and how to judge their success, with particular attention to the notion that SALT need only *reduce* risks below the situation likely to arise in the absence of talks—not eliminate them entirely.

Both sides would also undoubtedly want to raise more detailed issues. One approach would be for each side to express its concern over certain activities being undertaken by the other side, indicating the responses it might be forced to take—or to continue—unless the patterns changed or a satisfactory explanation were given. The United States, for example, could question the Soviets about their reasons for the ongoing SS-9 ICBM program, and explain the Safeguard ABM as a countermeasure. The Soviets might highlight their concern over the potential growth of a United States ABM and the significant increase in United States offensive power that will result from installation of the MIRVed Minuteman III and Poseidon missiles. The United States might then relate this MIRV program to its fears of the potential future growth of Soviet ABM capabilities. And so on.

Another category of specific issues could involve a closer look at weapons and activities that might be considered for limitation. Although many of these might be touched upon during discussions of the strategic balance, a discussion that focused explicitly on limitation options would permit the introduction of additional questions unique to these possibilities. Both sides might, for example, debate the criteria that should be applied in selecting candidates for limitation, with each

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side giving examples of the *quid pro quo* it might demand for accepting particular limitations on its programs.

A discussion of verification requirements and capabilities could not be avoided. This is a topic with significant political as well as technical content, and should probably receive considerable attention on a more general level as well. Specifically, attempts might be made to identify the kinds of limitations most suitable if reliance is to be placed on national means of verification and those that might require additional verification. Alternative ways of obtaining such further assurance could be explored.

During consideration of candidates for weapons limitations and verification, both sides might discuss the relative advantages of comprehensive and restricted agreements, the use of a "building-block" technique for designing measures, and the alternative forms—for example, treaty or informal arrangement—an agreement might take.

All these issues could be related to each other and made more understandable if, at some stage, both sides discussed "model" agreements. Such an agreement could be presented by one side as representative of the type that might be acceptable; the other side might respond with its own "model." Or both sides could come together—perhaps in a small technical working group—to try to design one or more possible models.

THE LIMITS OF DISCUSSIONS

The agenda outlined above suggests the wealth of issues that could, at least in theory, be included in a United States-Soviet strategic dialogue. But the crucial question centers less on composition of the agenda than on what might realistically be expected to occur if any of these items were discussed. How intelligent, substantive a dialogue could actually take place between two adversary nations with different attitudes, policies, and force postures? On what level and with what degree of specificity might the discussions be held? What areas of explicit agreement—or even tacit understanding—might be found?

Thus far, SALT has demonstrated that serious and substantive discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union are feasible. The Soviets display a considerable degree of sophistication in addressing strategic issues, and seem to have learned some of the ways in which United States analysts think about the problem. Discussions reached the stage this past August at which the United States put forward the "outline" of a limitation proposal.[2]

[2] Although there are no official detailed descriptions of the United States proposals presented on July 24, 1970, in Vienna, news reports refer to "a general outline" of a

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Lack of public information makes it difficult to assess the extent to which discussions have been contributing to any progress at SALT: it is even more futile to attempt to predict the future.

What can be done is to identify considerations that, taken together, place outer limits on the degree of progress to be expected from joint discussions of strategic issues. Some are inherent in the strategic arms problem; others relate to the pattern of negotiations. Six such considerations can be isolated:

(1) The fact that the level of discussion of many SALT issues may well be rather general places some limit on their utility. Not only do generalities suffer from unclear interpretation, but they may have little direct and short-term effect on unilateral policies or the prospects for arms agreements. To take one example, let us assume that both sides came to an understanding that "mutual deterrence" exists and that each side should retain a "sufficient" strategic posture under any arms control agreement. Each side might interpret the understanding very differently, since (a) the specific conditions for sufficiency can vary over wide ranges of strategic force capabilities, characteristics, and mixtures; and (b) deterrence is, itself, an elusive concept—encompassing not only strategic force policies and capabilities, but also political and psychological factors that are unique to both sides.

(2) It is unrealistic to expect highly detailed and technical discussions to be conducted, at least in the initial phases of SALT. It is difficult to conceive of the United States and Soviet delegates discussing such sensitive and classified information as the performance of their missile defense systems, missile accuracies, MIRV characteristics, or reconnaissance capabilities. Political, as well as national security, restrictions will severely constrain this level of discussion. Yet many of these questions are crucial to strategic arms policy.

(3) Asymmetries in United States and Soviet strategic postures and policies make the task of conducting an intelligent dialogue more difficult. The Soviets have more ICBMs and missiles of much larger payload; the United States has more sea-based ballistic missiles and leads in advanced missile technology such as MIRVs. The United States also has a large lead in strategic bombers. The Soviets have medium-range missiles and we have none. Technological and strategic idiosyncrasies existing on one side are absent on the other: The Soviets have tested a FOBS, for example, while the United States has shown no interest in

proposal. See New York *Times*, July 25, 1970 (*U.S. Offers Soviet Package Accord to Curb Missiles*) and *Washington Post*, August 1, 1970 (*American Plan at SALT sent to Committees*).

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this concept. Taken together, these many United States-Soviet asymmetries on strategic matters compound the problem of attempting to achieve a common understanding of fundamental questions in any dialogue.

(4) Ambiguities inherent in the subject create further complications. Many strategic systems are dual-purpose. Offensive missiles with MIRVs have characteristics that give them both stabilizing and destabilizing implications. They are capable of penetrating ABMs in support of second-strike deterrent policies, as well as launching first strikes against an adversary's forces. ABMs deployed to defend missile sites pose no threat in principle, but if their coverage is such that they happen to protect urban areas they can nonetheless stimulate offensive countermeasures. The effect of removing uncertainty is also mixed. While a goal of discussions is to dampen the arms race through improved understanding, some uncertainty over intentions and capabilities may be considered advantageous and stabilizing. These paradoxes inhibit progress in joint attempts to analyze the arms race.

(5) Each side will be inhibited in expressing the many justifications for strategic systems and programs that are not analytically based but stem from nonrational and bureaucratic factors. For example, the United States could not easily admit that one of the reasons behind deployment of three independent strategic deterrent systems is that its Air Force and Navy each has a vested interest in strategic forces. The Soviets could not be expected to explain that their large air defense programs arose more from bureaucratic pressures and momentum than from rational responses to estimated United States bomber threats. Yet these facts are bound to influence each side's strategic posture. That they cannot be frankly revealed tends to limit the value of a dialogue.

(6) Finally, although afforded some degree of tactical flexibility, United States as well as Soviet negotiators would almost surely be constrained, within fairly tight limits, in raising topics, let alone in taking substantive positions. Guidelines for discussions would have to be cleared by agencies and officials in each government; talking points, if not complete texts of prepared statements, would probably be prepared in or cleared with Washington and Moscow. The more tangible the issues and the closer both sides came in the dialogue to shaping the outlines of possible agreements, the more severe the constraints in that dialogue would likely become.

Despite these potential difficulties, the value of a serious strategic dialogue is clear. The problems identified merely suggest limits to the

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progress that might be expected from placing too much stock in this approach.

Two further points regarding the significance of a United States-Soviet dialogue deserve mention.

First, although a dialogue is valuable, it is not evident that both sides *must* acquire complete common understanding of purposes and premises in order to agree upon a set of specific limitations. It may not be necessary to agree upon or even discuss *why* certain limitations should or should not be sought, so long as both sides can strike a bargain that each side believes to be in its interest, for its own reasons. Therefore, if both sides encounter difficulties in developing a common understanding of strategic issues because of the complexities and asymmetries, more emphasis might be placed on straight bargaining for limitations. One side would offer a specific proposal and the other side would accept, reject, or modify it—and possibly introduce a counterproposal. A pattern of give and take would emerge, with the negotiating process possibly leading to an eventual convergence of positions on mutual limitations, even though it was not necessarily founded on common understanding. As we suggested earlier, however, the lack of understanding could limit the value of an agreement reached in this way.

Second, there were substantial preliminary United States-Soviet interchanges on strategic issues prior to SALT. The agreement in principle to hold talks was reached four years ago. Since then, private diplomatic contacts have taken place and high officials have had face-to-face discussions of the problem (at Glassboro, for example). For almost a decade, United States and Soviet scientists have exchanged views at the Pugwash Conferences and other scientific meetings; United States Posture Statements have been issued; and a wealth of scholarly literature has been generated about strategic arms and arms control. This considerable prior record may diminish the need for preparatory discussions of issues and objectives at SALT meetings, with both sides able to turn to negotiating specific measures at an early stage.

III. Negotiating Weapons Limitations

SALT cannot accomplish its goals unless some limitations, which would not have otherwise existed, are placed on both United States and Soviet strategic programs. Common understanding is useful chiefly as it results in such limitations. This is not meant to suggest that SALT will fail if no limitations are reached or that the success of SALT

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necessarily depends upon achieving a *particular* set of limitations. But it does suggest that limitations are an important goal of SALT—which leads directly to questions of how limitations might arise out of SALT, whether unilateral restraint would be likely to lead to such limitations, and what form a bilateral agreement for limitation might take.

THE NEED FOR EXPLICIT AGREEMENT

As we suggested earlier, limitations on strategic weapons could flow from a United States-Soviet dialogue if it led each side to exercise unilateral restraint. However, it is doubtful whether, in practice, either side would halt major strategic programs unilaterally simply on the basis of an exchange of views and a resulting hope that the other side might respond appropriately.

There have been ample opportunities for such steps during the past year. The United States could have temporarily suspended MIRV tests or halted the Safeguard ABM. The Soviets could have halted SS-9 missile constructions and multiple warhead tests. But neither side has made a move in this direction. Indeed, both sides have not only continued major strategic programs but, in some instances, have publicly justified them as providing a basis for "negotiating from strength" at SALT. It is difficult to see how strategic talks, alone, could be relied upon to reverse this common pattern of reluctance to initiate unilateral actions. If neither side makes the first move, parallel actions to restrain armaments cannot occur.

What seems to be needed to break the impasse is an *explicit bilateral agreement*—not necessarily formal or binding—that would limit strategic actions on *both* sides. To state it another way, a bilateral agreement can lead both sides to do together what they *ought* to do separately. Three factors lend weight to this contention.

First, an explicit bilateral agreement would remove the need for a particular program on one side by confidently taking away the threat it was supposed to counter. For example, if the Soviets agreed to freeze their ABM capability at its present stage, and the United States were able to verify this agreement, the United States MIRV testing and deployment program could presumably be halted. More broadly, as important elements of the Soviet posture were constrained under an agreement, United States forces could be designed at reduced levels to counter what could be dubbed a "less-than-expected" threat, rather than the so-called "greater-than-expected" threat used by the Department of Defense. The Soviets probably have a somewhat similar cal-

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culus. Thus, both sides, on the basis of explicit agreement, could accept limits on their forces that would be consistent with their strategic objectives and procedures and would not otherwise be feasible.

Second, unilateral actions offer less support to those seeking to resist bureaucratic pressures behind strategic programs than do explicit agreements. National strategic programs often develop technological and political momentum independent of security requirements, with the existence or potential of an adversary's programs often merely a rationalization to justify initiation or continuation of weapons programs. Bilateral agreements can create counterpressure and strengthen the hand of those in each government who support restraint. To take an important and timely example, it would be easier for the leaders on both sides to keep ABMs limited if there were an agreement that included *mutual* limitations on ABM levels.

Finally, on domestic political grounds, it is difficult for one nation to take actions unilaterally. There is little chance, in practice, that the United States would unilaterally phase out its fixed land-based ICBM force—a potentially cost-effective and strategically sound action for the mid-1970's—so long as the Soviets kept their land-based ICBMs. A variety of factors, from partisan opposition to public and congressional fears of Soviet superiority, would operate against this. A bilateral agreement to reduce ICBMs would be a different story.

INADEQUACIES OF FORMAL MEASURES

An explicit bilateral limitation agreement thus seems essential to the success of SALT. What form might it take?

A treaty is the proper and traditional form for arms control agreements. The Antarctic, Test Ban, Latin American Nuclear Free Zone, and Outer Space Agreements took this form during the last decade—as did the Nonproliferation Agreement. But several factors suggest that it may prove necessary and desirable to pursue other techniques for reaching strategic limitations at SALT.

To begin with, it may well take years to negotiate a treaty on a subject as complicated and important as strategic arms; ratification would add still more time. With strategic programs proceeding on both sides, there would be advantage in placing early constraints on selected strategic armaments, even if only as interim measures. Such an arrangement would preserve the range of options and permit the negotiators to work out a broader and more comprehensive agreement. Recognition of this need has already given rise in the Senate to a resolution

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calling on the Administration to propose to the Soviet Union an immediate suspension of offensive and defensive strategic weapons deployments.[8]

Moreover, strategic limitation agreements should be sufficiently flexible to accommodate changes in technology, problems raised by intentional or unintentional violations, unpredicted security needs arising from more rapid growth of Nth country nuclear capabilities, and other events that cannot be anticipated in advance. Although it is possible to build flexibility into a treaty, it may still be a more rigid vehicle than a nontreaty agreement.

Finally, the United States and the Soviet Union might not wish to commit themselves to the significant political, psychological, and military effect of a full-blown treaty. Strategic arms control—unlike other recent arms control arrangements—would go to the heart of each nation's security. Thus, both sides might prefer to enter into a more limited, looser, and lower-key arrangement as a means of gaining confidence while retaining freedom of action to terminate the agreement without having to provide the legal justification and bear the political odium associated with denouncing a treaty.

An executive agreement between the United States and Soviet governments could, in principle, be used instead of a treaty to implement bilateral strategic limitations. The Hot Line Agreement took this form. Such an agreement could be effected rapidly and, in this respect, could be preferable to a treaty. However, since an executive agreement would be as *legally binding* as a treaty, it might not be looked upon with favor by the United States or the Soviet Union, for many of the reasons indicated above. For the United States, attempts to reach an executive agreement would create special difficulties. The Congress, out of tradition and a growing concern over alleged abuse of Presidential power on national security policies, would expect to *authorize* an executive agreement, certainly after the fact and quite possibly in advance. By law, such authorization would require a majority of both houses, which might be more difficult to secure than the two-thirds of the Senate needed to ratify a treaty. The President would thus see no strong reason for seeking an executive agreement rather than a treaty.

Two conclusions emerge: (1) an alternative to a treaty is needed—at least as a temporary measure; and (2) an executive agreement may not be a feasible option.

[8] Senate Resolution 211: *Resolution Regarding Suspension of Further Deployment of Offensive & Defensive Nuclear Strategic Weapons Systems*, June 17, 1969, 91st Congress 1st Session.

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If neither a treaty nor an executive agreement is suitable, how might bilateral limitation arrangements be instituted at SALT? The answer seems to lie in pursuing *informal* but *explicit* arrangements. One approach to such arrangements is outlined below.

IV. Reciprocal Actions: Agreement Without Obligation

DESCRIPTION OF THE APPROACH

Under the reciprocal action procedure, both the United States and the Soviet Union would issue *statements* of each side's *intent* to take stipulated unilateral actions, on condition that the other side took certain specified and related actions. Each side would verify by its own means that the other party was living up to its declaration. There would be no legal obligations; each side would be free to reverse its decisions, recognizing that the other party could do the same. The final arrangement could be expressed through an exchange of *aides-memoire* or letters, with the actions announced separately or jointly.

Other elements could be usefully incorporated in the arrangement. Each side could, for example, indicate the anticipated time-lag between its announcing the intended actions and their taking effect. There could also be a specific duration, say one year, after which the arrangement would lapse unless renewed by both sides. A mechanism could be established for bilateral meetings to (1) clear up possible false alarms or other problems that might arise, in order to make the arrangements more stable, and (2) lead to modification or expansion of the reciprocal actions. Finally, there could be an understanding that advance notice would be given before one side abrogated its part of the arrangement.

Initially, reciprocal-action arrangements would probably affect only a few ongoing or imminent strategic weapons activities—for example, ABM construction or deployment of strategic missiles. However, because of the political as well as technical interrelation between United States and Soviet systems, eventual "packages" of reciprocal actions would be desirable and likely.

If successful, the concept could be broadened to include an exchange of declarations of intent regarding future plans for major strategic programs, perhaps over a multi-year period. The plans would not be binding, could be altered upon notice, and would be reviewed each year. Such an exchange would provide each side with a benchmark against which to assess the overall direction of the other's programs, and would create a framework for continuing effort by both sides to work out additional specific reciprocal actions on an annual basis.

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EXPLANATION AND EVALUATION

Reciprocal action arrangements—if verifiable, equitable, and stable—would be no different from a treaty in substantive impact. Under any agreement, the security of each nation would depend upon recognition that neither side could profit from abrogation or violation, given the monitoring and readiness capabilities of its adversary. In the final analysis, international agreements are held together more by self-interest than by the legal obligation attached to signed documents.

Nor does the reciprocal-action approach differ radically from what occurs in the normal course of unilateral planning. Without any SALT agreement, each side will make decisions related to present and potential programs of the other side and, at least in the United States' case, will explain why. But if both sides simultaneously convey to each other in the context of SALT specific conditions for refraining from taking actions, this communication would be more likely to contain the competition than would *unilateral* "parallel actions" that do not involve joint preparations, agreements, and articulated statements of intent.

Reciprocal-action arrangements are thus a course midway between unilateral actions and formal agreements.

There are precedents for informal arms control arrangements in the nuclear test moratorium (1958-61) and the Bombs-in-Orbit Resolution (1963-67), both of which were followed by treaties. There have been other attempts at even less structured means to induce restraint, such as the United States-Soviet "parallel announcements" of cutbacks in the production of fissionable material and reductions in defense budgets (1964). Historically, there have been many examples of bilateral and multilateral understandings affecting military matters that arose as preludes to negotiating treaties or as interim measures after negotiations but before treaties entered into force. None of these informal arrangements, however, had the precise features of the reciprocal-action technique described above. Moreover, they differed among themselves procedurally and in terms of substantive results.[4]

The overwhelming Senate endorsement of the resolution on SALT suggests that Congress might not resist an arrangement for reciprocal action, particularly if it arose as a temporary measure preceding a treaty. Although reciprocal actions would most likely develop in this

[4] For an excellent discussion of precedents for informal agreements, as well as an analysis of the alternative forms a SALT agreement might take and the role Congress might play, see George Bunn, "Missile Limitation: By Treaty or Otherwise," *Columbia Law Review*, LXX (January 1970), pp. 1-47.

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manner, they could continue to operate indefinitely if a treaty proved impossible to negotiate or if both sides eventually decided to avoid a formal agreement. And even if a treaty were eventually concluded, certain less formal arrangements might be instituted outside its scope.

To illustrate the possible content of reciprocal-action arrangements, it may be useful to suggest two criteria for choosing trade-offs and negotiating *quid pro quos* in seeking such arrangements:

(1) *Removal of threats to retaliatory capabilities and consequent elimination of the need for countermeasures.* For example, removal of the counterforce threat of large numbers of Soviet SS-9s with accurate MIRVs would eliminate the need for the United States Safeguard ABM to protect the Minuteman ICBMs, and removal of the prospect of a large Soviet ABM would eliminate the requirement for United States MIRVs. Conversely, if the option of a nationwide United States ABM system were foreclosed, the Soviets would not need additional offensive missiles or MIRVs for penetration.

(2) *Phase-down of systems that are no longer needed and that might be replaced by more cost-effective systems.* For example, there could be a joint reduction of existing fixed ICBM systems as one way of minimizing destabilizing trends resulting from the obsolescence of these systems (as technology inevitably improves accuracy and reliability of counterforce missile systems). The actions in this respect would not necessarily have to be symmetrical; the reduction might mean greater removals by one side or the other.

Reciprocal actions should be verifiable by national means, within acceptable tolerances. The Soviets would undoubtedly oppose on-site inspection under a treaty, and would be even less apt to agree to it under an informal arrangement. Reliance on national means would be facilitated if the agreed reciprocal actions dealt with *deployment* and *flight testing* programs.

V. The Goal of a Treaty

Some kind of informal United States-Soviet arrangement on strategic weapons—perhaps through reciprocal actions—may be the best initial approach to strategic arms limitation. Though such an arrangement could last for many years, there are a number of reasons why a treaty should be sought as a longer-term goal.

Although informal arrangements are easier to obtain than formal agreements, they are also easier to break. A treaty, on the other hand, represents a political commitment, with commensurate international and domestic effect—a fact tending both to inhibit violations and to

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diminish the propensity of a nation to abrogate on the basis of vague fears or suspicions of violation. Informality can also lead to misinterpretations over the "agreed" restrictions and to fears that the other side may not be living up to the understanding. Furthermore, it might be more difficult to broaden an initial informal SALT limitation to encompass wider and more complex restrictions. Thus, a formal agreement might be needed in order to maintain a stable relation over a period of many years.

Pursuit of a formal agreement is viewed by the international community as the obvious and anticipated course for SALT. Many nations even believe that a formal agreement is the only outcome implied by Article VI of the Non-proliferation Treaty, which "obligates" the United States and the Soviet Union to seek ways of controlling the strategic arms race. A strategic arms limitation treaty negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union, or at least the announcement of such a treaty as a goal, would have more dramatic and significant positive worldwide impact than would informal arrangements alone. The demonstration of a willingness to accept the legal restraints of a treaty, in the pursuit of a formal agreement, might help alleviate fears on the part of other nations—especially our Western European allies—that SALT is simply a device for establishing a condominium between the superpowers.

Internal forces might cause both the United States and Soviet governments eventually to negotiate a treaty.

On the United States side, Congress, though lending its support to informal measures as a *temporary* device, might become dissatisfied if such arrangements did not show signs of developing into a treaty, and might come to believe that its constitutional authority was being neglected. A treaty would also be less likely, once ratified, to become a political football in election years, since its continuing application would tend to be taken more for granted than would an informal arrangement that could more readily be questioned or opposed.

Despite the potential advantages of retaining maximum flexibility and freedom of action under an informal arrangement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military services would, on balance, consider a *formal* agreement to be the least objectionable vehicle for strategic arms control. Pursuit of a treaty may permit the military to play a more explicit role in the formulation of arms control policies, and the clearly defined boundaries of a formal accord would establish both the prohibited and the permitted areas of activity for planning purposes and for determining our preparedness posture under an agreement.

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The military would also tend to view the restrictions and provisions contained in a formal agreement as more readily enabling the United States to identify a possible Soviet violation, call it to the attention of the Soviet government, display necessary evidence, and take appropriate counteraction. Finally, those wishing to persuade the Soviets to accept some on-site inspection might see this as easier to achieve under a treaty than under an informal arrangement. For all these reasons, if an informal arrangement for reciprocal action is achieved, there will be pressure from the United States military to turn it into a treaty.

On the Soviet side, continuing an informal arrangement with the United States over a period of years might be difficult for the Soviet leadership, in the face of Chinese and other Communist-state allegations of collusion with the United States. Signing a treaty might be considered a less obviously friendly gesture than would continuing to work out and sustain informal arrangements; treaties can be signed between adversaries as a means of settling certain specific areas of common interest without so many overtones of changes in fundamental attitudes, good faith, or trust. Moreover, the Soviets seem traditionally to have preferred formal agreements, and their bureaucracy apparently operates best on the basis of well-defined obligations and issues. Therefore, the Soviet Government, probably finding an informal arrangement desirable as an initial measure, might ultimately prefer a treaty.

One final observation: the experience gained under an informal arrangement, if initially instituted, would make it more feasible to construct a treaty with modalities adequate to cope with the complexities of strategic limitations. Although never as flexible as informal arrangements, a well-designed treaty could nonetheless contain provisions for modification, procedures for replacement of obsolescent systems, a mechanism for consultation to deal with verification and other operational problems, a specified time limit, and a clause permitting withdrawal upon advance notice, for national security reasons.

VI. Conclusions

(1) A strategic dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union at SALT could lead to an eventual dampening of the strategic competition through unilateral restraint flowing from increased understanding. Even if no limitation agreement were reached, both sides could begin to adopt less conservative planning assumptions and the strategic competition could be contained by slowing down the intro-

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duction of new weapons and avoiding procurement of weapons that threaten the other side's deterrent.

(2) Progress along these lines would, however, be limited by the complexities inherent in the problem, differences between United States and Soviet postures and policies, and the constraints of a negotiating situation between adversaries. Neither general discussions nor common understandings can be *confidently* relied upon to produce limitations through restrained unilateral weapons decisions. An explicit bilateral limitation agreement that constrains the adversary's posture seems to be needed for political acceptance in each nation and as a means of removing security justifications for unilateral programs.

(3) Although the traditional form for such bilateral agreements is a treaty, attempts to negotiate one would be time-consuming and complicated. Therefore, less formal arrangements should be sought, at least initially, as a means of rapidly placing constraints on certain urgent programs, e.g., MIRVs, ABMs, and ICBMs. An informal approach would, moreover, be more flexible and adaptable to changing technological or political factors than would a formal agreement.

(4) One way of instituting explicit but informal bilateral limitations would be to follow a reciprocal-action procedure. As a result of discussions and negotiations in SALT, the United States and the Soviet Union would agree upon a declaration in which each side would state its intent to limit certain strategic-weapons activities, conditional on the other side's fulfillment of its stated intent. The arrangement would and should be designed so that it could be adequately verified through national means. The limitations would continue to operate as long as both sides found the arrangement to be in their own interests.

(5) Informal arms limitations are more likely to serve as interim than as long-term arrangements. The precision and built-in political, as well as legal, obligations of a treaty would appear best suited to durable and comprehensive limitations. While slowing down the competition in strategic arms through informal arrangements, we should maintain a strategic arms treaty as a long-term goal of SALT.

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THE PROFESSION OF ARMS IN POSTWAR CANADA, 1945-1970
Political Authority as a Military Problem

By ADRIAN PRESTON

MILITARY professionalism is a large and complicated subject that has been hitherto unconsidered by defense specialists and political scientists in Canada and about which the statistics necessary for proximate sociological conclusions are not readily available. Since 1945, discussion of defense problems in Canada has centered largely upon the effect of developments in military technology and international politics on Canada's military policies and organization, and not upon the nature and form of the professionalism that sustains and subordinates itself to them. The aim of this paper is primarily to discuss the place and role of the military profession in Canadian political society between 1945 and 1970 and to show how it might be affected by present trends in Canadian defense policy.

Introduction

The dialectic between military force and political government is a fundamental and inescapable condition of all organized society, whatever form or degree of complexity it may display. Since the breakdown of monarcho-feudal and ecclesiastical authority in the fifteenth century, the political structure of the nation-state has been largely determined, as Machiavelli decreed that it should, by the manner in which its military forces have been organized and controlled; and that authority gave rise to a force that was at once more efficient, cohesive, and obedient than any of the contractual armies of the classical period. The existence of such a force—whether military, militia, or police—and its potential role in domestic and international politics raises problems of profound social and professional importance. The degree of obedience and political accountability that the profession of arms should enjoy is of central concern to both soldier and citizen; for too much may, as Michael Howard points out, leave the door open to tyranny at home and irresponsible aggression abroad, and too little may result in Caesarism or civil war.[1] Moreover, if soldiers have a right to exercise their inde-

[1] Michael Howard, "The Armed Forces as a Political Problem," in Michael Howard, ed., *Soldiers and Governments* (London 1957), 12.

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pendent judgment they may well question how far political interference is allowable in matters of professional expertise; and they may often grumble or indeed resign when fiscal economies or bureaucratic consolidation threatens to emasculate the functions they are recruited to perform. The really vital problem of social organization—and the one that obsessed the political philosophers and constitutional theorists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—is therefore twofold: how, on the one hand, to develop armed forces necessary to external security without corroding internal liberties and how, on the other, to promote political economy and welfare without prejudice to the armed forces upon whose efficiency and valor that social order and prosperity ultimately rests.

Since the advent of political and ideological revolution in 1789 and of atomic and insurrectionary warfare in 1945, the problem has not changed, except in its nature and form. In the maturer industrialized states of the West, where orderly traditions of power and governance have long been established or, as in the case of Canada, successfully engrafted, armed forces now constitute only one element in the nation's total military power. The conscriptive "profession of arms" inaugurated in 1789, mobilized with all the coercive sanctions available to political government and bureaucracy, sustained by all developing means of communications and logistics, armed by all the nascent powers of engineering and industry, and deployed according to the principles of classical strategy, manifested itself in the two world wars of the first half of the twentieth century and transformed political society into a garrison state. Among great nations at least, military power has become the currency and criterion of international politics as never before, with inevitable effects upon domestic order and prosperity. Within these states the issue between soldiers and governments is one no longer of mere power but of complicated priorities: what percentage of the national budget should be allocated to defense; what form should that defense take; for what type of war should it prepare? At the same time, this militarization of national interests and resources has raised acute and by no means abstract questions of professional status and performance. Under the cruel pressures of specialization imposed by technological demands, by the complex variety of forms of organized violence, and by the interdependence of military, economic, scientific, and industrial power, is it possible—is it necessary—for a state to preserve the traditional integrity of its professional forces? Can the "profession of arms" any longer claim to be an essential, and distinctive, social institution?

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In attempting to answer these questions we must first struggle with the problem of definition.

The Problem of Definition

Professions are best defined—or at least identified—according to the functions they perform; Sir John Hackett has provided us with a prescriptive definition as good as any, and better than most: the ordered application of force in the resolution of a social problem.[2] Whether in an age of arms control, of disarmament and peace-keeping, of the containment of conflict, and of the elimination of military power as a necessary element in international politics, Lasswell's "management of violence" can any longer be accepted as an appropriate and precise definition may be a matter of some controversy. Yet it is this element of *force* that has traditionally distinguished the armed profession from the other purposeful activities of human welfare to which it bears its ascriptive and surrogate allegiance. To the extent that the armed profession rests on a distinguishable corpus of specific technical knowledge and doctrine, a more or less exclusive group coherence, a complex of institutions and codes peculiar to itself, an educational pattern adapted to its needs, a self-contained career structure, and a distinct place in the society that has brought it forth, it may claim strong points of resemblance to medicine, law, and divinity. Distinctions can be drawn among all professions, if by that term is meant the quality and degree of commitment to any occupation; and if we are to arrive at an understanding of the place of the armed profession in political society, an examination of those distinctions will be more fruitful than a satisfied acquiescence in their respectable similarities.

In its pristine form, professionalism was both a product and a function of the age of mercenaries—mercenaries who agreed among themselves upon the terms and duration of conflict and upon the codes of behavior by which it would be conducted. It was a form of professionalism appropriate to the continuous warfare and universal anarchy of Renaissance politics, demanding a high degree of expertise, dedication, and community, yet constrained by no obligations to political society higher than that of a commercial contract. But with the consolidation of the political authority of the nation-state in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the regularization of national armies recruited to protect—or extend—its sovereignty and interests, and the

[2] Sir John Hackett, *The Profession of Arms* (London 1963), 3.

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restraints of law and popular will exercised through a developing bureaucracy, the independent ethos of mercenary professionalism became suborned to a greater political will—the national government. It is this surrogate authority that chiefly distinguishes the armed profession, as it has developed over the past two hundred years and as it largely exists today, from its civilian counterparts.

Unlike medicine, law, or divinity, which serve inescapable human needs, the very existence of the armed profession is a matter of political decision. For in no other organized profession of comparable complexity is the size, structure, composition, and the purposes for which it exists determined by reaction to the dictates of electoral opinion and external politics. Whereas the civilian is constantly engaged, as was the mercenary, in the business of his profession, evolving on the basis of individual research and experiment a progressive and vital code of professional conduct, tested in open debate and adapted to social needs, the soldier, at least within the distinctions between war and peace provided for us by the international jurists and strategic theorists of the seventeenth century, spends most of his time *preparing* for a condition of service whose form, timing, and demands cannot be foreseen—and which in his own lifetime may never come—under circumstances of extreme secrecy. The armed profession is unique in that, since 1870, as warfare has become more destructive, wider in scope, and more exhaustive in its demands upon the resources of the state, it has been accompanied not only by an intensification of professional censorship but also by the rise of a specialized form of official historiography whose claims to objectivity and a dispassionate regard for truth may be doubted. If professionalism is a right function of active warfare, attaining its greatest expertise, sense of community, and political influence within it—the quintessence of state conduct—then peace must bring a necessary sense of its own diffusion as a political force. In such circumstances, the armed force reverts to a bureaucratic hierarchy anxious to preserve its ethos and identity and rooted in the academies. In the absence of political sympathy or control, it may revert still further to militarism, a form of professional apartheid, alien to society and often having the appearance of a dispossessed caste within it. Every advance of military power made possible by technology and industry is matched by an intensification of political authority. It is no real paradox to state that the advent of political accountability emasculated the professionalism of armed forces.

Since 1945, at least among the weaker powers of the West, it has been a necessary and inescapable condition of modern warfare and

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international politics that armed force and military power should be used not so much to promote and conduct organized violence within or without state boundaries as to deter or contain it. And this necessity has imposed upon the profession of arms a range of social tasks, quite unconnected to the management of violence, with which it has been traditionally ill-equipped and reluctant to deal. It has been a paradox of the modern revolutions in military technology and strategic theory that an increased necessity for specialized professional expertise has been accomplished by a relative decline in generalist military influence in the formulation of defense policy. If the principal application of armed force today is to military diplomacy abroad and order and prosperity at home, we can no more talk of a distinctive profession of arms than we can of the clear-cut and decisive victories of which it was traditionally capable. We may indeed wonder whether the "classical" profession of arms and the military academies that sustain it, as self-sufficient institutions, have any longer a valid claim to exist, and whether a more comprehensive and protean approach to the functions of professionalism and military education would not be more appropriate.

Much recent thinking about definitions of professionalism has been conditioned by the assumptions and criteria postulated by Huntington and Janowitz, deduced from studies of the great military powers of autocratic Europe. The application of such standards, therefore, to Canada's North American environment, social structure, and her unique international military position might be misleading and positively dangerous in any attempt to assess the nature and degree of professionalism that has been, or should be, appropriate to it. Canada's vast and vulnerable territories disposing of thinly grounded forces, her diversified and mobile population, her parliamentary traditions of political control and legal constraint, and her imperative sense of compromise and negotiation in all matters affecting her sovereign political power, would suggest that her armed profession has found it difficult and indeed unnecessary to conform to those criteria and functions of organized and uniformed force normally associated with and exercised by great powers. Yet because the Canadian military profession has traditionally been a subordinate group in larger military communities, it has often sought to rationalize the precepts of its behavior and existence precisely in those terms; recognition of this incongruity is crucial to an understanding of the confusion that has always surrounded the nature and characteristics of military professionalism in Canada. We should not, therefore, be surprised to discover that Canadian military professional-

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ism, as a unique and distinguishable phenomenon, is as elusive of definition as the ephemeral Canadian "identity." The armed profession in Canada, like the society that maintains it, is a blending, not always aesthetically achieved, of several military cultures—the *Ancien Regime* militia, British regimentalism, American technological and logistical power—whose adaptation has posed its own peculiar problems for Canadian development and security.

Traditional Characteristics of Canadian Military Professionalism

Military needs may not be decisive in shaping a community's political constitution, but their influence is little less than that of economic necessity. For illustration we need look no further than Canada herself. Defense against the conscriptive manpower of the Northern States was as important in the calculations of the architects of Confederation as were the advantages of an economic *zollverein*. Yet if Canada was an occupied country until 1867, the balance of military power in North America, revolutionized by the Civil War and the withdrawal of the British garrisons, made the strategic necessity for raising armed forces in her own defense as unrealistic as her financial capacity to support them was inadequate. Since that time, it has never been possible for Canada to maintain armed forces in peacetime capable of resisting a sudden attack by a powerful neighbor, and Canadian political society until 1945 survived as a product not of any magical powers of deterrence and diplomacy on her own account but of the acquiescent state of Anglo-American relations. Such armed profession as was implicit, therefore, in the creation of a Ministry of Militia and Defence in 1861 and of the Royal Military College fifteen years later was tempered in its political relations by this ruthless fact: that it was not, and could not be, expected to provide of itself for the defense of Canada.

The roots of this profession lay in the uneasy alliance of two quite separate traditions: that of the Canadian Militia, born during the *Ancien Regime*, to whom the idea of a standing army and all the apparatus of professionalism was not only sinister and repellent, but inappropriate and unacceptable to the economic realities of pioneer society; and that of British military power and doctrine, implanted by Wolfe, in which the expertise and valor of detached regiments seemed the least objectionable form of armed professionalism. If the constitution was framed in such a way as to give the federal government ultimate coercive powers over the provinces, the control of that power, at least until the twentieth century, was never seriously contested or chal-

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lenged; for the question of military power had been subsumed under that of imperial sovereignty and colonial autonomy. The Hutton and Dundonald incidents were struggles not strictly in the relation between military expertise and political authority but in the wider relation of metropolitan power to colonial nationalism, and so long as that relation, however impoverished, existed—in effect, it lasted until 1945—military power as a problem of political control was not likely to arise.

This struggle between the British professional and Canadian constitutional conceptions of the proper relation of armed force to Dominion autonomy was of profound and abiding importance in shaping the curriculum and objectives of the Royal Military College, which, from its establishment in 1876 until the end of the Second World War, remained the nursery of such military education and professionalism in Canada as would add tone and standards to her militia forces. Although R.M.C. was inclined to borrow its essential structural features from West Point rather than Woolwich or Sandhurst, it was nevertheless wholly British in administration and professoriate, was commanded by a British army officer until the 1920's, and subscribed to the teaching of British strategic and tactical doctrine. Infallibly and insensibly, from these and other things there developed a process of conformity to British habits of strategic thought that was further intensified after the Boer War through the medium of the Imperial General Staff, and after the Great War by the practice of seconding Canadian officers to the War Office or sending them to study at the British Staff or Imperial Defence Colleges.[3] Even after fighting its first war under completely autonomous conditions of sovereignty, the Canadian Government, as late as 1947, still felt constrained to invite a British exchange officer, Major-General (later General Sir) J.F.M. Whiteley, to organize the National Defence College upon the Imperial model, and, as first commandant, to nurse it into precarious existence.

The implications for Canadian military autonomy of this reliance upon British strategy, war organization, and professionalism were complex and not at all clear. In the circumstances, it was both inevitable and welcome: inevitable because a Canadian war automatically meant an Imperial war, welcome because it enabled Canada to tap, as in other fields of social and political development such as the universities,

[3] See for instance, M. A. Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians* (Toronto 1962), 98-122; James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada* (Toronto 1966), I; John Swettenham, *MacNaughton* (Toronto 1968), I, 230-35; Adrian Preston, "Canada and the Higher Direction of the Second World War, 1939-1945," *Royal United Service Institute Journal*, CX (February 1965), 28-45.

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rich and ready fields of talent that she could not of her own resources provide. Yet it obscured the need for evolving an independent strategic philosophy or doctrine, for creating native staff and defense colleges as centers of critical thought to counter the influence of the infamous "liaison" letters and the *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, for constructing a local Canadian defense policy separate and distinct from that of Great Britain, and for erecting the machinery and command structure that would be capable of devising an integrated war plan and of efficiently directing its use. Such deficiencies inescapably committed Canada to fight according to a largely predetermined British strategy and plan in both World Wars—an experience that, considering her enhanced constitutional status, her massive economic contributions to the Grand Alliance, and her emboldened autonomy and aspirations in world affairs, she would find intolerable to repeat. Similarly, this undue reliance upon British regimentalism prevented the development of an indigenous code of military behavior and ethics appropriate to the demographic and geo-strategic facts of her existence.

The other distinction inherent in the origins and evolution of R.M.C. was an emphasis upon a type of education that would contribute most usefully and directly to national development as a whole. In the early years of Confederation, the absence of, and lack of necessity for, any permanent armed force to absorb large numbers of officers trained in the conventional professional sense, and the great practical, social, and constitutional problems of nation-building—the need to provide police, administer justice, construct railways—that confronted the new Dominion placed a premium upon a civilian engineering rather than a strictly professional military education. This has meant that Canadian military education has responded to and been more influenced by the demands and criteria of higher education generally than by those of professionalism and defense policy. The formidable nineteenth-century task of organizing the vast wilderness that is now Canada was essentially an engineering project; Canadians, civilian and military alike, consequently emerged possessing the qualities of the engineering mind to a marked degree. In 1876, R.M.C. was opened as an engineering college; and it still largely enjoys that status today. It had been confirmed by the engineering and gunnery operations of the First World War wherein the commander of the Canadian Corps, Sir Arthur Currie, as a technical militia officer, much like Monash of Australia, seemed to epitomize the irregular character of Canadian professionalism and its peculiar fitness for the conditions of total war. It was still further reinforced by Currie's protégé, General A.G.L. McNaugh-

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ton, whose association with the National Research Council was directly transmitted to the postwar administration of R.M.C. This emphasis upon engineering had made Canada mechanically efficient in both peace and war: it was consistent with her policy of making specialized technical contributions to Imperial and Allied—and later United Nations—wars; and it conformed to the requirements of the short-term functionalism that is much of the essence of the profession of arms. But it also in a corresponding degree weakened her social and political perspectives. Thus, combined with the long record of military and political subordination that had been her history, Canada developed as it were a bureaucratic cast of mind, admirably equipped with the gifts of the subordinate, yet wanting in those high qualities of imagination and initiative that intellectual leadership in the theory and practice of war requires.

This technical, as distinct from a philosophical, approach to the study of war discouraged the tendency of the Military College, especially up to the Second World War, to become a great center of strategic thought, research, and scholarship as had Sandhurst under MacDougall and Hamley and West Point in the days of Dennis Mahan and Upton. The exploits of great captains in great wars usually produce great theorists, but Canadian military history has experienced none of these. Admittedly, the bulk of R.M.C. graduates served for some time in the militia; but militia officers have notoriously been disinclined to concern themselves with the subtleties of strategic theory or rigorous analyses of prevailing defense policy. The only military theorist of international reputation that Canada has ever produced—Colonel George T. Denison—was a practicing barrister and was inspired by the American Civil War to write his great treatise on cavalry. It was perhaps too much to expect a handful of people conquering and industrializing an immense wilderness to produce strategic theorists of the order of those of Continental military powers. But the fact remains that after a century of national development, and having reached a stage of political and military maturity at which she needed philosophers more urgently than technicians, Canada possessed no significant tradition of military literature, intellectualism, or scholarship.

This otherwise deplorable situation has, however, not been without its blessings. There has never developed in Canada a nationalistic school of military history that could be accused of being the handmaiden of militarism. We find in Canadian historiography no Clausewitzes or Treitschkes, no Seeleys or Mahans, who have sought to create, propagate, and sustain certain emotions or beliefs concerning national power,

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pride, and loyalty on the one hand and a flawless regimental valor and efficiency on the other. Until very recently, Canadian military history was regarded, as Captain Cyril Falls once described it, as "one of the less attractive types of history, perhaps in a category approaching that of the history of prostitution, to be handed over to a handful of specialists, some of them suspect or even shady."[4] Unlike most military colleges elsewhere, R.M.C. had never been discredited as the hotbed of an uncompromising praetorian professionalism and a doctrinaire approach to tactical and strategic problems. The course of Canadian life had been remarkably undisturbed by civil-military wrangling or conflict. Unlike their British and American counterparts, Canadian generals in the Second World War did not indulge in direct strategic planning with the Prime Minister to the exclusion of the service ministers; and the conscription crises in both World Wars arose not over issues of independent military power but over wider questions of political unity.

1945-1956

The Second World War had an impact upon the structure of Canadian political society not far short of revolution: it transformed a rural wilderness into an urban socialist state, and with the defeats of France, Germany, Italy, and Japan gave Canada an influence in world politics, at least momentarily, quite out of proportion to her intrinsic military power. For the first time in Canadian history, the massive and permanent expansion of her armed forces capable of supporting her new and indispensable responsibilities as so-called interpreter and fixer of the Grand Alliance aroused legitimate fears as to how they could be maintained and controlled—especially if they operated, as they had done in the Second World War, virtually independently as part of a wider coalition of powers—and how they could be absorbed into a community that by tradition and temperament was obdurately antimilitarist. To those in Canada who inaugurated this discussion of civil-military relations, the problem was primarily one of politics: how to control this new-found caste of officers and prevent it from exercising over foreign policy and public opinion, as it had sometimes done in the war, an inordinate military influence; how to ensure that it did not appropriate an unnecessarily large proportion of the national budget; and how *in extremis* or in the long run to restrain it from taking over the state itself. "The two wars together have definitely seen the emergence in

[4] Cyril Falls, *The Place of War in History* (Oxford 1947), 12.

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Canada of a phenomenon which arises in all countries sooner or later," wrote Professor Lower, "that is, a political interest based on the armed services. . . . No country can raise large forces and commission endless numbers of high-ranking officers without bringing into existence formidable vested interests. As long as these confine themselves to the conventional struggle for rank and pay, they are not particularly dangerous, but there were several indications during the closing years of the war of politically minded officers being ready if necessary to oppose the considered decisions of the civil authorities. Canada has had little experience in the problem of the relationship between the military and the civil power. There have been few societies in which sooner or later the professional soldier has not constituted himself a danger to freedom. Canada will be lucky if it escapes the threats to liberty inherent in professional militarism."[5]

In spite of this concern, the control of military power as a political problem, at least until 1950, seems instinctively rather than consciously and dramatically to have guided governmental decisions: decisions that confined the problem to three central areas—the structure of those educational establishments concerned with professionalism, policy, or research; the organization of defense administration; and the formulation of defense policy. The Second World War had emphasized, in a manner quite different from that of the First World War, the advantages of unity of political direction and interservice cooperation, and it was in an effort to preserve and refine these techniques that the three wartime service ministries were abolished and replaced, as after the First World War, by a single Ministry of National Defence, responsible to the Cabinet Defence Committee and the Defence Council as the principal executive strategic policy and planning agency. At the same time, the Royal Military College, the National Defence College, and the Defence Research Board were established as distinctively civilian institutions against the vigorous opposition of the service chiefs, who demanded more specialized forms of technical interservice training and research:[6] R.M.C. as an elitist engineering tri-service military university; D.R.B. as an autonomous civilian-controlled scientific research agency, not dissimilar in function to the RAND Corporation, with equal representation on the Chiefs of Staff Committee; N.D.C. as the first national institution of its kind organized to study Canadian national security in terms of the shifts and trends in civilian industry, finance, and man-

[5] A.R.M. Lower, "Canada, the Second World War and the Future," *International Journal*, 1 (April 1946), 97-111.

[6] See for instance, D. J. Goodspeed, *A History of the Defence Research Board* (Ottawa 1958), 157.

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power, in military technology, and in international politics. All of these institutions, together with the Army and Air Force Staff Colleges, were derived in structure and function from earlier British prototypes, much as were the National Security Council and the National War College developing contemporaneously in the United States; but their creation was more calculatedly a concrete advertisement, meant less for potential enemies than for allies, of Canada's maturity as a "middle" military power and of her comprehensive approach to warfare and international politics in the "new, non-British world."[7] Since 1871 it had been an irrevocable and inescapable condition of Canadian political life that should the United States ever be drawn into the vortex of a major European or Asian war, Canada, for good or ill, would pass into the defense orbit of her traditional enemy: that condition had been successively ratified at the Washington Conference (1922), with the Ogdensburg Agreement and the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (1940), and in the Declaration of Defence Co-operation (1947), which only a solicitude for Imperial sentiment prevented from becoming a formal military alliance. It reached its climax with Canadian participation in NATO, the Korean War, and NORAD—all essentially the products of American defense interests in Europe, Asia, and the Arctic.

The new military tasks entailed in this participation, the appropriate expansion of armed forces, the introduction of the Regular Officer Training Plan and the Collège Militaire Royale to provide sufficient officers to administer and command them, and the appointment of a Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee to coordinate the various European, Asian, and North American contingencies and commitments to fulfill a single defense policy—all gave the armed profession a disproportionate and decisive influence in the shaping of national policy that was not seriously contested until the late fifties and sixties. Much like the wartime British and American Chiefs of Staff Committees, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee now became indispensably and directly responsible to the Minister of National Defence and the Cabinet Defence Committee for the advice and execution of all matters relating to defense policy, strategic appreciations, and military plans. The Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee in particular, as representative of the senior service and chief governmental negotiator for NATO and NORAD, wielded "immense power" and, in the words of General Macklin, "became the real arbiter of the advice on defence

[7] A.R.M. Lower, "Canada in the New, Non-British World," *International Journal*, III (July 1948), 208-221.

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policy tendered to Government."[8] In these circumstances, the powers and functions of the larger Defence Council—again much like those of the Committee of Imperial Defence on which it was modelled—effectively declined except in matters of logistics, management, finance, and manpower. Thus, in a curious reversal of British and American experience between 1945 and 1958, in which military power had been steadily eroded by political authority,[9] the Canadian armed profession during roughly the same period exercised in terms of tasks, expertise, and political influence a virtually unbridled control of foreign and defense policy.

It was a paradox of the new militarism and of the political power it had exorcised that, much like the presence of British troops, commanders, and doctrine in nineteenth-century Canada, it was divisive and obstructive of any legitimate sense of Canadian professional identity that two world wars might have been expected to produce: divisions and conflicts that were all too often reflected in the Chiefs of Staff Committee. With the introduction of ROTP and the adulteration of the elitist ideal and the social homogeneity of the officer corps, R.M.C. moved inevitably toward degree-granting powers within an expanding academic community: powers strongly resisted only by technical military specialists whose heroic MacArthur-like conceptions of professionalism had somehow outlasted the age of Moltke and Schlieffen. The function as a nursery for professionalism and strategic doctrine that R.M.C. had uniquely enjoyed but not very well exploited was now distributed—or at least diluted—among the staff colleges and training schools that were, individually and collectively, overwhelmingly susceptible to the encyclopedic deluge of military philosophy and strategic doctrine that was beginning to pour from the pens of American defense intellectuals and research institutes. Although it is difficult to prove with the evidence available, it seems that the staff colleges came to acquire radically different objectives and doctrinal affinities drawn not from any overall comprehension of an integrated Canadian defense policy but from their own particular, and unconnected, geo-strategic commitments: the army to NATO and European defense; the air force as "a sort of colonial appendage to the United States Strategic

[8] Major General W.H.S. Macklin in evidence before Special Committee on Defence, 1964, *Minutes and Proceedings* (Ottawa 1964), I, 191-92.

[9] Michael Howard, "Civil-Military Relations in Great Britain and the United States, 1945-1958," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXV (March 1960), 35-46; "The Organization for Defence in the United Kingdom and the United States," *Brassey's Annual* (London 1960), 69-77.

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Air Command."[10] In this way, Canadian military professionalism became suffused with the malignancy of "massive retaliation," systems analysis, and management techniques: a malignancy rooted in the theories of nuclear deterrence and escalation advanced by Kahn, Schelling, and Wohlstetter, which identified strategy—as Mahan and Douhet had done—with an inflexible, costly, and insupportable technology. Captive to service loyalties and technological interests, professional military advisers, whether American or Canadian, found it difficult to talk the same language as politicians or to provide them with an objective range of intelligible options. The procedures of democratic politics and international diplomacy often strike the soldier as being ineffectual and repellent; and equating, as he is trained to do, capacity with intentions, he is and was inclined to advise the rapid and irrevocable destruction of any potential aggressor with all the precision of which his weapons disposed.

As the limitations of nuclear power in world politics became recognizable by the mid-fifties, this kind of professional thinking was subjected to increasingly heavy criticism from the universities, from those scientists who had fathered wartime operations research, and from freelance defense specialists and unorthodox soldiers. The classic works of Huntington, Janowitz, and Finer examined the implications of nuclear technology for civil-military relations and professionalism; those of Masland and Radway the implications for professional military education.[11] All refused to be mesmerized by the talisman of technological victory and, as every strategic theorist since Machiavelli has done, urged —not without success—a more humane, liberal, and comprehensive approach to warfare, strategy, and politics. Very little of this debate took place in Canada. Those very institutions that since 1950 under the direction of Colonels Stanley, Stacey, and Sutherland had developed considerable expertise in military history, strategic studies, and operations research—namely R.M.C., D.R.B., and the Historical Section—could not as official bodies freely express criticisms without fear of reprisal. Moreover, their numbers were too small and simply did not have access to the classified materials that made the works of Kahn and Wohlstetter so significant and influential. Some of the best work on modern strategy has been of a consolidative kind, requiring no secret information or axe to grind, adaptable to a fusion of disciplines, and deeply bedded, as in the cases of Brodie and Howard, in a refreshing historical perspec-

[10] Macklin (fn. 8), 192.

[11] J. W. Masland and L. I. Radway, *Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy* (Princeton 1957).

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tive. Yet defense studies in universities in the late fifties were regarded —and largely still are—as the advance guard of a corruptive and repellent militarism.[12] Thus no work was done, or at least published, to expose the spurious and artificial brand of professionalism that an obsession with American, as distinct from Canadian, defense interests, doctrine, and terminology had produced; to explore the dimensions of the dangers placed on political control and operational command when forces of unprecedented size are committed to alliances as kinds of mercenaries in return for increased diplomatic influence abroad; to convince Canadians to measure their place in world affairs less by what they felt they *should* do than by what they knew they *could* do.

1956-1964

The critics of classical warfare—or those elements of it that embraced nuclear strategy—had argued not from the basis of abstract assumptions but in response to a revolution in world order that was unprecedented since the anarchy of Machiavellian Europe. If their writings had little effect upon Canadian defense policy—and that may be a matter of controversy—the conditions certainly did; for it was in attempting to meet the cut and thrust of these conditions that a fresh look at the relation between foreign and defense policies, at the question of political control and unification, and at the state of military education and professionalism was seen to be necessary. The distintegration of the metropolitan authority of the colonial empires has resulted in the proliferation of new Afro-Asian and Middle Eastern States whose economic stability was as precarious as the strategic necessity is imperative for maintaining the armed forces their prestige and domestic order demanded. In the new structure of international politics, there would always be uneasy frontiers; common borders provided sources of interminable dispute, conflict, or alliance; and every change in the number, direction, or length of borders with the emergence or creation of new states—or the expansion of established ones—simply magnified the probability of local conflict, of alliances, and therefore of general war. With military government and coup d'état an inescapable condition of post-colonial politics, indispensable to the stability and welfare of the state, its termination as ruinous as its prolongation was welcome, fresh dimensions were added to the problem of professional conduct and political authority, and irresoluble contradictions provided the need for arms control on the one hand and for technical military assistance on

[12] Adrian Preston, "The Higher Study of Defence in Canada," *Journal of Canadian Studies*, III (August 1968), 17-28.

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the other. Successive uprisings in Russia's East European satellites, rejection of nuclear warfare in favor of subtler means of long-term conflict, and developing differences with China have slowly strangled the myth of monolithic communism that had lain at the basis of American doctrines of containment and deterrence, and have given rise to potent and coherent doctrines of revolutionary warfare that nationalists everywhere did not fail to exploit and in some cases successfully to apply. Warfare has always been in the nature of a dialectic between its classical and irregular forms, and within this dialectic it is impossible to establish degrees or levels of intensity of violence. To the small and middle-sized powers at least, what seemed most appropriate to the new conditions of world politics was not so much a sweeping declaration of *casus belli* and the preparation of methods to meet or contain violence as the intensification of military diplomacy through the symbolic military power and presence of the United Nations to establish a diplomatic ascendency in regions of vital Western interest or to deny that ascendency to a potential adversary.

As it happened, Canadians were seen to possess in a marked degree the qualities and initiatives required to assume this unique and demanding role in world affairs. Their constitutional history was one long advertisement (at times unctuously overdone) of nonviolent anticolonialism, and they harbored no pretensions—even if it were possible—of becoming an atomic or imperial power. Their disputes with the United States over boundary, fisheries, and hydroelectric resources had nourished a realistic appreciation of the politics of power and a sense of prudence and compromise in all negotiation. Canadians as a whole were an uncontroversial, neutralist people—they could hardly afford to be otherwise—admirably equipped with the gifts of the subordinate and the technician, and displaying a faceless kind of collective secretarial or Civil Service approach to problems of military power and international order. They had no significant tradition of or particular predilection for military politics of a dangerous kind, and the new postwar concept of ever-ready forces-in-being, rather than the conventional mobilized militias of the two World Wars, to wage modern conflict obviated the old dangers of disunity over conscription. Indeed, Canadians found to their satisfaction that they could transfer the "legend of the linch-pin," so laboriously contrived by Mackenzie King from partisan motives and quite ill-founded in fact, from the North American to the world stage without incurring unacceptable obligations and risks and without necessitating any substantial increase in military strength.

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The demands of this new role proved more diffuse and exacting than its proponents then dreamt possible. An unimagined and unprecedented range of functions now confronted the armed profession, raising doubts about its legitimacy and integrity—indeed its necessity—as a separate and specialized instrument of politics in a world in which the nature of conflict, as an established and acceptable form of political behavior, had blurred if not dissolved so many of the classical distinctions between soldier and civilian, war and peace, defeat and victory. The techniques and requirements of modern war, revolution, and peace-supervision call for even smaller, more specialized units than those traditionally employed; and the tasks for which they are used, though tactical in method, are often strategic and even political in objective or effect and raise contingent issues as to the number and quality of junior officers, command and control, and subordinate leadership. The scope for military judgment, initiative, and responsibility is as large as are the political consequences of miscalculation. Yet the situations that might arise in which command as traditionally envisaged would seem most necessary are also those in which it is least likely to be exercised. The nature of modern conflict, whether peace-keeping, counterinsurgent, or even nuclear, is such that it must be waged by ever-ready forces-in-being—standing armies, mobile strategic reserves, or armed populations. Conventional mobilized militias, like the massive mercenary *tercios*, are unfitted for the thorny and thankless tasks of observation, inspection, or patrol, without power of reprisal or retaliation. If the modern regiment survives as the basic task-force, it will bear the honors, not of battles fought, but of those averted. Its opportunities for traditional honor and glory will be negligible; its attractions as a career equally so. In a climate of demonstrated public aversion to war, it must continue to perform its missions without fear or favor. In armed forces maintained for this colorless and unheroic role, the nature and function of discipline, morale, and motivation as essential ingredients of command remain complex and open questions.

At the same time, the development of sophisticated and technically demanding weapons systems for the conduct of conventional and possible nuclear war has created a new class of managers, systems analysts, and statisticians who seem to have usurped the technical advisory functions of the military professional and who roam through the war ministries of the world, much like the courtier-intelligencers throughout the Courts of St. James and St. Petersburg two centuries ago, dabbling in defense policy and influencing strategy in a way quite unrelated to professional and humanitarian considerations. In the range, accuracy,

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and destructive power of modern weapons, technology seems to have provided a panacea to the problem of mass training and control in mass warfare; it has reduced the options on human error in command and leadership and has made possible a more scientific and depersonalized form of waging war. That it has obviated mass warfare and the exercise of the traditional military virtues within it may be questioned; but the effect of science, engineering, and industry upon systems of armament, communications, and logistics has been such as to give national defense the unquestionable complexion of a vast and costly sub-industry that needs to be properly managed if it is to function effectively. There has now been interspersed between statesmen and soldiers, commander and commanded, an array of technicians and machinery that needs to be thoroughly mastered before effective command and control are possible. Command is essentially an aspect of war in which cost-accounting is ignored; management is an aspect of peace in which budgetary considerations are paramount. But during periods of protracted crisis or in situations involving limited or anticipated violence, in which political objectives may be covertly pursued under the most rigorous political direction without recourse to a formal and declared state of belligerency, habits of management may well continue to override operational requirements and place upon the exercise of strategic initiative and command inhibitions that can only frustrate the attainment of clearcut and irrevocable decisions.

In these circumstances, the dilemma of professionalism and political control has reached new dimensions. The tactical dispersion that is the essence of irregular warfare and that presumably will be required to avoid or exploit a nuclear strike has aggravated the problems of political command and control and has placed upon the military exceptional demands for discipline and self-sacrifice. The aversion to the use of unrestricted violence as an instrument of policy that has for the most part characterized the conduct of international relations since 1945 and that has perhaps no parallel since the days of Grotius, combined with the frustrations of peace-keeping and the functionalized structure of modern armies, has demanded a fundamental reassessment of the nature and role of morale and motivation that is not solely, as it appeared to Foch and the École de Guerre, within the competence of the military academies to undertake. Military commanders must acquire a high, but not esoteric, degree of technical expertise while avoiding the pitfalls of stereotyping or sub-specialization. They must also acquire extraordinary political wisdom without attempting to reshape the political world to their military image and without becoming unrepre-

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sentative of the military point of view they are paid to provide. It is now necessary to draw, in a way that was not desirable before, a distinction between "training" for short-term technical business and "education" for long-term political judgment. There is indeed a good case for a complete review of the whole Western philosophy of military education and professionalism—to replace outmoded concepts of ceremonial drill, mess etiquette, and route-marching with a new doctrine of motivation and responsibility based on education rather than on training for war; and to redefine the relation between NCOs and subalterns in accordance with it.

Such a review would mean evaluating the importance of operational and management skills in the formulation and execution of defense policy. Management and the command of management techniques must not be allowed to become a separate and intoxicating science nor a special type of professionalism, but must remain an ingredient of command. Although there will be a continuing need for systems analysis and business practices to regulate defense affairs and deploy resources efficiently, the military profession must never become a business, nor be looked upon as one. Political decision must still be the result of dialogue among representatives of foreign, military, and financial policy, and cannot be unduly influenced by administrative convenience. In the waging of conflict and the shaping of strategy, there will need to be a deeper respect for humanitarian interests—which are the essence of command—to counterbalance the increasing impersonality of war made possible by modern weapon systems. There will be a greater requirement for unconventional thought and a more vital role for the qualities of prophecy, imagination, and intuition in order to relax the deadening grip of mass conformity and unanimity in standards and behavior that is a further consequence of the need for mass security. Rising standards of secondary and higher education have now made it possible and even necessary for subalterns to relinquish many of their technical or administrative duties to their NCOs and to reassume their original role as trainers for war in a broader and higher sense. The amount of time they spend on the theoretical study of war and politics, already considerable by nineteenth-century standards, will have to be drastically increased, and means found and machinery created for exploiting this emergent reservoir of trained intellectual potential in the formulation of strategy and defense policy. For these purposes, more and different kinds of military academies, research institutes, and strategic policy centers will have to be created within the services to parallel the enormous growth of civilian centers outside. Perhaps, in-

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deed, in reassessing the role of education and motivation in professionalism it will be necessary to rid ourselves of the generic image of the "all-round" officer whose ability to command will ultimately determine the precise position he attains within a rigidly prescribed pattern of promotion. The idea is still prevalent that only executive officers, whether pilots, soldiers in the fighting arms, or sea-going captains, can efficiently command armed forces from the highest posts. While a great captain of industry may revolutionize the American War Department, we are still far from accepting Liddell Hart's suggestion that the paramountcy of science, technology, and logistics has given the technical or administrative officer an equal claim to the highest commands. With the intellectual demands of technocracy as pressing as the opportunities for traditional command are negligible, modern defense organization and planning requires not a uniform kind of officer but a variety of kinds of special aptitudes, with their own systems of education, rank, and promotion.

The impact of management upon the formulation of strategy and the exercise of command will call for a more rigorous system of political control. If military policy and machinery are not to become the handmaidens of economic theory or mathematical war-gaming, made to move in accordance with certain artificial laws, then politics must penetrate every level of military activity as thoroughly as the nervous system penetrates the tissues of the human body. It might well be advisable to create a substructure of political authority at every significant level of military command, much like the political agents in the nineteenth-century British-Indian armies or the commissars in the modern Russian and Chinese forces. "Only if there is complete mutual understanding and cooperation between civil and military leaders, only if there is effective functioning of the mechanism of command and control, only if there is entire discipline and obedience in every rank of military hierarchy can military power serve as an instrument of international order at all, rather than one of international anarchy and world destruction."[13]

To those who inaugurated the study of professionalism and political control in the late fifties, all this seemed positive and unanswerable. The dissipation of Canadian forces in their separate but collective tasks under international control had resulted, as the Royal Commission on Government Organisation reported in 1963,[14] in confining Canadian

[13] Michael Howard, "Military Power and International Order," *International Affairs*, XL (July 1964), 397-408.

[14] Special Areas of Administration: Department of National Defence, *Report of the Royal Commission on Government Organisation* (Ottawa 1963), IV, 66.

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Forces Headquarters to a logistic support role and in restricting the opportunities of her generals in the independent exercise of high operational command. Moreover, the armed forces suffered from acute doctrinal disparities and from a shortage of critical strategic thinking independent of that obsessed with alliances and the technology that armed them. In these circumstances, Canadian defense policy necessarily presented a fragmentary and diffuse appearance; it made it impossible to formulate any comprehensive and authoritative defense policy in the classical sense, to exercise, or demonstrate a capacity for exercising, that degree of political control over its detached forces that a new, impatient mood of "nationalism" might urgently require, and to develop that domestic rather than international brand of professionalism that has traditionally been the safeguard against Caesarist tendencies or prolonged exposure to military governments. Moreover, it was clear that the decisions of military policy could not sanely be made on the basis of strictly military appreciations of the world situation. Defense specialists can rarely concern themselves with technical matters alone. In their calculations they must account for a wide range of variables—and they may not be conscious of them all—such as local politics, national finance and manpower, strategic possibilities, allied and neutral susceptibilities and intentions. No government can make prudent policy, as Salisbury once cryptically remarked, without first diluting purely military assessments with a strong admixture of diplomatic advice furnished by trained envoys with long and sympathetic experience in the habits of mind and government of the nations to whom they are accredited. As a former mandarin of the foreign service, Pearson's whole careerist concern for international stability and peacekeeping was calculated to strengthen the hand of the Department of External Affairs in the formulation and exercise of defense policy. That department itself had, in response to the proliferation of new states, experienced unprecedented growth, and there had been increasing agitation on the part of retired diplomats for a more rational look at Canadian security policies, based upon the necessity for a more controlled interpenetration of civilian and military advice. It is significant that in the absence of any comparable military center for strategic studies, the Canadian Institute of International Affairs had assumed an active and virtually exclusive ascendency in promoting public discussion of defense issues. If, therefore, the disproportionate influence of the Chiefs of Staff Committee were to be cut down to size and placed in decent relation to the financial, scientific, and diplomatic aspects of policy, it would be necessary to broaden the scope of the Cabinet Defence

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Committee to include external affairs, to institute standing parliamentary inquiries into defense policy, expenditure, and external affairs, to strengthen the powers, functions, and civilian representation of the Defence Council, and to limit the soldiers to a single voice within it. By 1964, therefore, the conviction was abroad that military elements were only one thread in an intricately woven and spreading political tapestry and needed to be treated as such.

1964-1970

The long-term effect of the unification of the armed forces upon the relation of military power to political authority is impossible to foresee. The classical objectives of military reconstruction—fiscal economy, bureaucratic efficiency, and professional war-readiness—have always been a matter of dispute, and the compatability or priority in which they are held tends very much to differ according to the special interests of soldier, official, and politician. Since the Howicke Consolidation Commission of 1833, the increasingly complex and delicate questions of defense policy and international politics have been seen to require a correspondingly simpler and more unitary system of organization than the mechanisms of inter-service coordination, however sincerely embraced, had been able to provide. Although there was apprehension that a single Chief of Defence Staff would wield an influence in defense councils reminiscent of that of the old Commanders in Chief, it was manifest that by reducing the number of professional service advisers who had enjoyed personal access to the Minister and by reviving the proper and summary functions of the Defence Council, political control was made that much more direct and secure. Unification has not been, nor could it have been expected to be, an untroubled process; if the study of past attempts at military reform in Great Britain and the United States tells us anything, it is that the real obstacles—the service traditions, loyalties, and prejudices, the bureaucratic inertia, and the tendencies of revolutions to generate a logic of their own—will only slowly and painfully be overcome. It was in no disparagement that Haldane once said that war ministers have the greatest capacity for imperceptible change; for too impatient a pace, as nineteenth-century military reactionaries quite rightly insisted, was unsettling to discipline, morale, and the structure of military politics, leaving the door dangerously ajar for military firebrands and political adventurers when confidence and stability were most required. In such periods of instability, as in Great Britain with Wolseley or in Germany with Waldersee, professionalism tends to degenerate into indulgent and

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intriguing cliques, suspicious and subversive of the newly consolidated political authority of the state. Yet the state always possesses, as an extreme resort, the coercive power of arbitrary legislation; and it need anticipate no threat to constitutional authority so long as it strives to adjust the structure of military politics to that of political society generally. In the liberal states of eighteenth-century Europe, it was this fundamental process, vigilantly scrutinized, that determined not only the qualifications of officership and the prescriptive right of the officer corps to participate in the brawling politics of the day, but also the disposition of the garrisons and the military policies that guided them.

The connections among political society, defense policy, and professionalism have always been very close, and in the case of Canada, with its small population and pioneer militia traditions, they have been inevitably and especially so. Canada's "defense" policy has never been required primarily for the protection of her sovereignty, and should her alliance commitments dissolve through disuse or *detente* she would still maintain her forces, as she does now, for essentially non-security purposes: to purchase influence and persuade friends. In the foreseeable state of domestic and international politics it is not likely that Canada will become embroiled, either independently or as part of a wider coalition of powers, in a nuclear war. Nor is it conceivable that she will indulge on her own account in the promotion of wars of an insurrectionary kind. Still less is it likely that she will become involved in conventional operations for the protection of her European or Asian interests. The contraction of British defense interests east of Suez and the indisputable economic vitality and military power of a quasi-unified Europe seem to have underlined the logic of Canada's marked sociocultural alienation, political disinvolvement, and strategic disengagement from British military tradition, NATO, and European nuclear warfare. At the same time, the new mood of impatient nationalism that is abroad in the country, and the acute internal challenges to federal authority that have been posed by western regionalism, maritime unionism, and Quebec separatism; the growing disenchantment with the practical results of international aid and peacekeeping; the introspective intellectual aversion to organized and uniformed violence, to foreign military adventurism, and to the shortsighted engineering disciplines that made them possible and immoral; the declining intensification of the Vietnam war—all have tended to confirm the Trudeau administration's overriding concern for continental and constitutional issues. And they have caused him in the name of the Just Society to strike a fresh balance among economic, constitutional, and strategic fac-

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tors, among political, bureaucratic, and professional interests, and among European, United Nations, and North American defense priorities, in the making of national policy. A developing consensus among intellectuals, officials, and politicians has therefore emerged, uncontested by the popular will, which visualizes Canada's performance in world politics less in terms of commitment to formal military alliances than in terms of some kind of *mission civilisatrice militaire* in the third world, of the establishment of a military presence in the Arctic to rationalize and assert her political sovereignty, and of assisting the due processes of national development and unity. If these trends and assumptions are not entirely false, the rationale behind any future Canadian military professionalism would then appear to be one less concerned with operational readiness and efficiency than with military diplomacy abroad and order and prosperity at home.

For the philosophers of professionalism the problems thereby awakened are at once inescapable and insoluble. Technical and managerial functions, whether at home or abroad, tend to adulterate the ethos of command upon which discipline and rank hierarchy have traditionally depended. Fragmentation into detached units may well promote specialized expertise but it tends to be accompanied, as the history of the eighteenth-century British army only too vividly shows, by a diminished sense of community and a marked decline in political influence. In the past such tendencies have been arrested by an implacable and protective bureaucracy, by an obsession for education and theoretical studies, and by the publication of military journalism. The Royal Engineers in the nineteenth century provide us with an unusually appropriate example. Scattered across the globe in the performance of a variety of technical missions and colonial services, they maintained an enviable *esprit de corps* as well as sharing military knowledge through the circulation of their *Professional Papers*. At the same time they came to exercise an influence, quite disproportionate to their numbers, upon the formulation and application of military policy, by dominating the intellectual development of the British army—its intelligence, strategic, and tactical doctrine and professional education—the multiple-committee system in which decisions were ironed out, and the various arbitration and frontier commissions that in the aftermath of most wars or crises attempted to translate official strategic policy into workable ground solutions. Indeed, it would not be too far from the mark to suggest that the Royal Engineers in the nineteenth-century British army provided the core of its professionalism: professionalism that, much as in Prussia between 1806 and 1866, was nourished in the acad-

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emies and staff colleges, in broad theoretical studies, and in an unrestricted intellectual debate, in order to prevent the corps from degenerating into a mere military garage of mechanical services.

There are few states whose security can be entrusted exclusively to its profession of arms, and military education at least in liberal Western communities has been devised so as not to inhibit easy interaction among the academic, scientific, financial, and commercial professions that are otherwise responsible for the order and welfare of the state. It is but a truism—the evidence of Machiavelli, of the reports of the Royal Commissions on Military Education in 1856 and 1870, of the Holloway Plan, and of the structure and objectives of Russian and Chinese military academies should be sufficient—that military education, if it is to serve the needs of the profession and therefore of the state, must be grounded not on any specialized technical foundations but on general interdisciplinary ones. The modern objectives of such a type of education are complicated and difficult to attain. Its graduates must possess the kind of trained expertise, judgment, and control required to operate rationally within an environment of continuous conflict or disorder. As commanders they must understand the powers conferred on them by law, possess the courage to apply them vigorously, yet have the wisdom to know when to refrain from excess or abuse. As diplomatic peace-supervisors, whether at home or abroad, they must be capable of appreciating and resolving the political, emotional, psychological, and cultural factors that make every border incident a microcosm of larger conflict and a potential battleground. As effective advisers on defense policy to Cabinet or parliamentary committees, to disarmament commissions, and to the command structures of allied coalitions, they must possess a thorough understanding of the complexities and irrationalities of decision-making, of the implications of military technology, of the strategic doctrines and principles and the domestic and regional constraints of modern conflict and international politics; and they must be able to interpret them intelligibly to elected laymen or superiors who have not had time to do so. In short, there seems need for a protean approach to "military" education based on the broadest principles and disciplines and designed to enable officers sanely and swiftly to cope with accelerating rates of change in domestic affairs, international relations, and military technology.

Such an approach, it will be noted, does not differ markedly from that pursued by any other form of professional or university education—whether in business, finance, law, or medicine—where the pitfalls or dangers of overspecialization have become all too apparent. If it is to

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flourish, or indeed survive, military education at every stage must correspond to what is going on in our schools and universities: to the changing structure of academic government and to the growth of graduate and interdisciplinary studies. It must strive, as it has traditionally done since the seventeenth century, to contribute to, rather than unbalance, the intellectual homogeneity of the governing elite, which is itself an expression of political society at large. Defense policy has been most apt to go astray when soldiers, whose restrictive technical training has conditioned them to see in every social problem an arbitrary and clearcut military solution, have found it difficult to communicate intelligibly with politicians whose education has been largely grounded in the social sciences or humanities and who can afford to impose no such artificial coherence upon the intentions and actions of their government, much less upon those of a potential adversary's government. If the dialectic between freedom and security is not to break down, the hierarchical structure of the military profession must always correspond to that of political society. So long as this is achieved in a manner that while fully satisfactory to no one is at least tolerable to all, there will be neither anarchy on the one hand nor autocracy on the other.

The study of military sociology and professionalism in Canada has received little attention. Yet it is as central to an understanding of civil-military relations, of the procedures of decision-making, and of the vicissitudes of politics as that of any other form of institutional or social conduct. There is a need, for instance, for studies of the militia as a social and political force such as those pioneered in Britain by Lindsay Boynton and J. R. Western. A sociological study of the structure and management of the Ministry of Militia and Defence, or of Finance, and of its influence upon defense and national policy, would tell us much about Canadian political society. If as a result of social changes we are moving toward a more eclectic definition of military professionalism, recognition and understanding of the nature and limitations of that eclecticism will continue to present, to soldier and civilian alike, an acute intellectual challenge.

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THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL CURRENCIES

By SUSAN STRANGE

AS a direct result of growing economic interdependence and of the accelerating expansion of the international economy and its increasing impact on national economic life, it seems highly probable that diplomacy and international relations among governments will be more and more concerned in the future with financial and monetary matters.

Already in the 1960's these matters had given a new style and content to foreign policy-making and to the conduct of foreign relations. In the United States, the Nixon administration is not the first to find problems of monetary management demanding more time and trouble than it expected. The new British government, too, will soon learn that sterling's troubles are not, after all, quite over and done with. Even countries like Germany and Japan (and in some respects Italy), which congratulate themselves on their economic miracles, do not manage to escape the proliferation of problems of monetary management and the consequent need for an ever more active and resourceful armory of monetary diplomacy. All the rich, developed countries, in short, are finding themselves behaving toward each other more and more often as the defenders and guardians not so much of national territory or of national groups of people as of national currencies and monetary systems.

As Richard Cooper and others have pointed out, there are two broad developments, stemming from economic interdependence, both of which lead in this direction.[1] One is the increasing probability that the monetary management of one national system wittingly or unwittingly causes damage and frustration in the monetary management of another and thus adds to the sources of conflict between states. The other is that the need to take advantage of the benefits of the expanding international economy and of the interdependent system it represents requires of governments that they devise more and more complex and sophisticated monetary and financial arrangements and forms of association among them. The negotiation of these associative arrangements and the resolution of these monetary conflicts are therefore likely to become not a less but a more important part of the stuff of international politics in the 1970's.

[1] Richard N. Cooper, *Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community* (New York 1968), 5-6 and 273-79.

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Yet the political scientists in the field of international relations show themselves singularly ill-equipped as well as disinclined to explain, analyze, or illuminate what are still—despite their economic content—essentially political questions. On the other hand, the economists who are much concerned with the technical aspects of the question, with the analysis of the functioning of monetary and other economic mechanisms, unconsciously tend to ignore or overlook the political elements involved. Between them, there is what I have described elsewhere[2] as a "middle void": a no man's land, an empty quarter unwatered by the academic mainstreams, neglected by most universities, and subject only to sporadic forays by a few financial journalists and to isolated expeditions by a few academic hybrids.

This article is such an expedition. Its purpose is to map out in a rough and tentative way a political theory of international currencies. This theory may, I believe, help a little to explain to non-economists as well as to economists some of the divergent attitudes taken by governments in matters of monetary and indeed of broad economic diplomacy. For there is little doubt that the political element is the missing component in much current discussion of international financial and monetary issues. The debates over Special Drawing Rights two or three years ago and more recently over flexible exchange rates are both good examples. And though the study of international relations has always acknowledged the existence and the power of variant national economic interests, it has done little since the 1930's to develop or elaborate this concept and still less to bring it up to date with the realities of the contemporary international economy.

Honesty compels me to admit that this theory was first evolved in the course of a recent study[3] of the interaction between British policy (including aid, defense, trade, monetary, and broad foreign policies) in the ten years 1958-68 and the position of Britain as the guardian of sterling, a currency used both nationally and internationally. This study revealed first of all that the international use of sterling was of several kinds, distinguishable in political as well as in economic terms, and that because of these multiple roles, the effect of sterling on British policy and on British foreign relations was likely to have been complex rather than simple. The study also revealed the inability of economists, academic and official, to throw much helpful light on the political effects that might be expected to follow from possession of a cur-

[2] Susan Strange, "International Economics and International Relations: A Case of Mutual Neglect," *International Affairs*, XLVI (April 1970).

[3] Susan Strange, *Sterling and British Policy: A Political Study of an International Currency in Decline* (London 1970).

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rency used outside the confines of the nation-state. But, although it was originally suggested by the sterling question, I believe that the theory also has some relevance to the problems of the dollar as an international currency and to the policy options that have faced—and will continue to face—successive governments of the United States.

The theory is concerned with both the causes and the effects of the status of international currency: first, with the political as well as the economic conditions under which national currencies come to be used beyond national frontiers; and second, with the political as well as the economic consequences that follow for the issuing state when this happens. And instead of the mechanistic taxonomy of international economics (which classifies international currencies only by function, for instance, as reserve, as vehicle, or as intervention currencies), I have attempted a taxonomy that is deliberately both political and economic, consciously regarding the two as inextricably intermixed. I have distinguished four types of international currency—Top Currencies, Master Currencies, Passive or Neutral Currencies, and Political or Negotiated Currencies. Each role is distinct but none is exclusive. A single currency can play one of these four roles, or two, or three; or, in the case of the dollar, all four at once. But the political consequences of the different roles will not be the same.

Of the four, the Master Currency is distinguished from the others because the causative factor is primarily political, whereas with the other three types the causative factors are primarily economic. It is the political domination of the state issuing the currency over other areas, which may include, besides direct and acknowledged dependencies, areas that operate as (and for other purposes are treated as) sovereign and independent political units but that either have been or perhaps still are subordinate to it.

As a result primarily of this political domination, either the subordinate state or territory uses the Master Currency or else its own currency becomes a dependent of the Master Currency, so that its monetary policies, including the exchange rate with third currencies (or the volume of trade and capital transactions with third parties), interest rates, and other policies governing the availability of credit are determined by the exigencies affecting the Master Currency.

Obvious examples of Master Currencies are the franc in the franc zone; sterling in the sterling area; and the dollar in the "inner" dollar area of states so closely dependent politically on the United States as effectively to be its protectorates: South Vietnam, South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, and, probably, the Philippine Republic, and most of the

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small states of Central America and the Caribbean—Mexico and Cuba excepted. A minor example is the escudo in Portuguese Africa.

An arguable, borderline example of a Master Currency area is the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe. The Soviet rouble is not, it is true, used for reserve or vehicle purposes in the other countries of the bloc. Each of their currencies keeps its individual identity and does not necessarily maintain a fixed parity with the Master Currency as the Indian rupee used to do to sterling. Yet the political reality is very similar to that of the Indian situation. The currency area is run as a unit, inasmuch as the subordinate states are not free to decide for themselves any matter of monetary or commercial policy considered in Moscow to be vital to the cohesion of the bloc; this applies especially to those questions that might affect political and economic relations with third parties. This limitation the Czechs tragically discovered in 1968. The monetary and commercial reforms contemplated by the Dubcek government proved less acceptable to Moscow than the seemingly more provocative economic nationalism asserted by the Rumanians. More recently, it has been the Hungarians who have been trying cautiously to extend the limits of political dependence in monetary matters,[4] with what success remains to be seen.

In fact, although the Soviet bloc is possibly an extreme variant of the type, there is seldom much uniformity in the methods used by Master Currency states to keep their subordinates under control. France, for instance, managed to control the franc zone after the African states became independent by a combination of dependence on French aid, preferential access to the French market, and a monetary system that, though apparently free inasmuch as it allowed members to acquire unrestricted amounts of French francs, yet gave ultimate monetary control to confederal *instituts d'emission* that remained (in practice) under close French surveillance.

The British system was quite different. In the days of the British Empire the sterling area operated as a single free financial area, throughout which funds could be freely transferred and within which interest rates responded to trends set in London. Control over the subordinates' commercial and financial relations with third parties was indirectly exercised by a rough-and-ready but essentially restrictive check on each territory's money supply. Beginning with the West African Currency Board, set up in response to the recommendations of the Emmott Committee of 1911, each colony was given a colonial Currency

[4] See Andrew Shonfield, "Hungary and Poland: The Politics of Economic Reform" *The World Today*, XXVI (March 1970).

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Board that was statutorily directed to hold sterling balances in London to the value of 110 percent of the colony's fiduciary issue. In return, however, the British government opened the London capital market to the colony's authorities, and did so on preferential terms almost equal to its own. Trustees, for example, who were legally barred from investing funds in risk-bearing equities, were allowed by English law to hold colonial, or later Commonwealth, government stock instead of British government stock, thus assuring these colonial governments privileged access to the London capital market.

Though this system continued to work after the granting of political independence, it was increasingly weakened by it. This weakening was less noticeable in the first postwar decade, after Indian independence, because India and Pakistan had both started with large accumulated credit balances as a result of being military bases in the war, and though they rapidly began to draw these down instead of maintaining the old 110-percent rule, this decrease caused no perceptible strain on Britain because at the same time the rest of the dependent sterling area was busily and conversely increasing its official sterling balance holdings as a direct result of that rule. In the same period, from 1946 to 1958, the other most important preservative of Britain's position in the sterling area and of sterling's position as a viable Master Currency was undoubtedly the strong support, both political and financial, of the United States. Not only was Britain generously provided with American aid and loans, but the United States gave the whole sterling area a special dispensation by allowing its trade policies to discriminate against dollar imports. By this means, the life of the sterling area club was substantially prolonged.

The pinch came after 1958, when a number of new factors all combined to increase the balance-of-payments cost to Britain of trying to maintain sterling as a Master Currency. As independence was given to Malaysia, to Ghana, Nigeria, and then to a series of other African states, the number of sterling area countries who were visibly free of the restrictions of colonial currency boards and the imposed rules of the sterling exchange standard drew the attention of private users of sterling to the notorious "overhang" of official sterling balances over British reserves of gold and foreign exchange. To guard sterling against a resulting loss of confidence in the market, the British monetary authorities had to keep interest rates exceptionally high, and decided to subsidize sterling holders with a cheap insurance against devaluation. This they did, in effect, by supporting the market for forward sterling. As high interest rates and competition from British industry meant that

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little capital was left for sterling area countries from traditional capital market sources, the British government altered its aid policies from 1958 onward to provide the new states with loans whose terms it gradually softened and whose effect was probably to prolong trade and financial ties with Britain.

Political independence in the Master Currency area also changed the financial impact on Britain of her military and naval bases abroad, which could no longer be charged even in part (as the Indian Army always was in the heyday of the Empire) to the local exchequer. They became a burden on the British balance of payments and, from 1958 on, one that was annually more expensive. For at that date, by another unlucky coincidence, Britain dropped its National Service draft law and depended on volunteers who could be induced to sign on for overseas service only if they were better paid and better provided with amenities than those serving at home, and if some at least could take wives and children with them. It was the capital cost of the resulting installations and the consequent elaboration of the military administrative machine that explained why Britain spent £190 million on defense forces overseas in 1957 and £257 million in 1967, when the number of men abroad had actually been cut by 50 percent.

By the end of the post-convertibility decade, the Master Currency had slipped from its earlier status, based largely on British political power in the Empire, to the more expensive status of Political or Negotiated Currency, so that holders had to be bribed with a variety of inducements ranging from the financial ones already mentioned through the promise of military protection and support and finally to the dollar-value guarantee contained in the special agreements concluded first with Hong Kong and then with each member of the sterling area as a concomitant of the Basle Facility Agreement of 1968.

The moral of the tale is simple. The Master Currency depends heavily on the stick. But if the stick is weakened or if the issuing state for any reason becomes too embarrassed to use it, then it must be replaced by carrots. The inducements, *political as well as financial*, that have to be offered, in other words, vary inversely with the exercise of coercive power. Thus, in practice, there is no clear dividing-line between a Master Currency and a Negotiated Currency. The taxonomy is fluid, not rigid. And even the toughest Master Currency state usually finds it necessary to offer a few small carrots. The French, whose power and wealth made the control of the franc zone after the 1959 referendum a very much easier task than Britain's in the sterling area, still found it necessary to offer *surprix* for exports of primary products (at the ex-

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pense of French consumers), to negotiate—through the Yaoundé Conventions—additional aid from her EEC partners, and herself to provide not only economic aid on a lavish scale but also a military guarantee that is normally discreet and largely invisible but—as the Foreign Legion's expeditionary force in Chad last year has shown—is nonetheless effective in case of need. And even the Soviet Union, though still prepared in the last resort to use tanks and military might to keep control over Eastern Europe, has been under increasing pressure to offer more effective credit facilities than Comecon has yet provided. Thus, if necessary, the Master Currency state will find itself subordinating the short-term economic interests of its domestic economy to the welfare and viability of the currency area as a whole. The conflict between the two is less evident when the units in the currency are small and weak, and their demands are modest, or when the Master Currency state itself is large, wealthy, and powerful. This is the case with the dollar in its limited role as a Master Currency. Moreover, the dollar is also what I have called Top Currency. In this role the schizoid character of policymaking processes is of a different kind.

The Top Currency may be defined as the currency of the state that has world economic leadership, the currency of the predominant state in the international economy, what Guido Carli recently described as the world's "super-economy."[5] It is the leading currency—but it may not always or necessarily be the best currency or the safest to keep money in. It may not be the preferred choice of the market when the market has an attack of the jitters. In short, it does not cease to be Top Currency when it leaves something to be desired as a store of value, so long as its predominance as a means of exchange is invulnerable. Charles Kindleberger expressed this well some years ago when he explained the international use of the dollar in terms not of power or prestige so much as of utility. "The power of the dollar and the power of English represent *la force des choses* and not *la force des hommes*, . . ." he said. "It is not nationalism which spread the use of the dollar and the use of English; it is the ordinary search of the world for short cuts in getting things done."[6] The strength of the dollar as a world exchange standard (or vehicle currency) Kindleberger attributed mainly to the international capital market operating in dollars. Although he implied, he did not spell out fully, that it operated in dollars because the world's biggest capital market was in New York, and that

[5] Guido Carli, *Annual Report*, Banca d'Italia (Rome 1970).
[6] Charles Kindleberger, *The Politics of International Money and World Language* (Princeton 1967).

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it was in New York because the United States was the world's leading economy, had not been twice disrupted by world wars, and was therefore much better able than other developed economies to produce the savings to invest abroad as well as at home.

Of course, it is highly probable that any state economically strong enough to possess the international economy's Top Currency will also exert substantial power and influence. The really rich usually do. But there may still be strict limits to the political power conferred by wealth. The political influence of the Top Currency state, therefore, may well be geographically less extensive than the use of the Top Currency. The contrast between unqualified economic preponderance and leadership and strictly limited political influence will be most apparent in the Top Currency state's relations with those states that for one reason or another are less involved in, or by some means are insulated from, the international economy over which the Top Currency presides.

In the heyday of sterling, when it was Top Currency before the First World War, British political influence was very great throughout the Empire and along the sea-routes linking it together. It was most markedly subject to limitation in China, in Latin America (by agreement with the United States), and in backward non-British areas of Asia and Africa. Today, the use and monetary prestige of the dollar is more extensive than the power of the United States Government. China again, the Soviet bloc, and the developing countries least involved in the international economy have each in its way accepted the monetary leadership of the dollar in the international economy while remaining fairly free from the political influence of the United States.

There are, of course, big differences between the dollar and sterling as Top Currency. One is that sterling had the advantage of a much larger role as Master Currency; the empire within which sterling was used as Master Currency was much more extensive than the "inner" dollar area politically dominated by the United States today. The larger role of sterling as Master Currency confined its political effects as the Top Currency mainly to Europe, to that part of the international economy over which the British had very limited political influence. By comparison, the areas where the dollar is acknowledged Top Currency but where the United States has limited political power are much larger.

On the other hand, the domestic economy of the United States is continental and incomparably larger and more self-contained than was that of Britain, and its lead that much greater over all other developed

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national economies, both because of their smaller sizes and because of the setbacks experienced during and after the Second World War. Thus, although the United States is better equipped to manage a Top Currency, its problems are at the same time made greater by the tremendous expansion of the international economy. The collective need for an accepted international monetary medium has increased perhaps a hundredfold in real terms since 1914, as has the size and complexity of the credit structure financing international trade and payments. As a result, any tendency in this international economy to disequilibrium will now surely be greater and less easily overcome or counterbalanced. This growth creates the paradox puzzling to many Americans: that for all their power and wealth they are so constrained by their intractable payments deficit.

And here, in the perceived need to try to overcome it, is another way in which the dollar's situation is more difficult. "Ah, the lucky British," American economists have been heard to sigh, "when sterling was the leading key currency, their statistics were so bad they did not even *know* when they had a balance-of-payments problem." ("And what is more to the point," some will add below their breath, "no one else knew either!") Moreover, the British government in Victorian and Edwardian days acknowledged limited responsibility for the value of the currency and the reputation of British financial institutions and did not accept, as does the United States government today, the additional responsibilities of a modern welfare-conscious administration for the level of domestic employment, and the rate of domestic economic growth. Keeping the balance of payments as well as all these other balls in the air requires a much more highly developed economic dexterity.

Because the Americans are so wealthy, and militarily and technologically so powerful, the perverse and obstinate intractability of the dollar problem has not ceased—or so it seems from across the Atlantic—to trouble and bewilder them. They do not seem to be able to understand why it is that, out of all the numerous dodges and devices they have tried out over the last decade or so, none has worked the trick. Why should it be so difficult? Why is it that success eludes them? They are puzzled by the apparent lack of sympathy, and even indifference, of other countries to their plight, and seem to feel vaguely resentful that others do not step briskly forward to lend a hand in sharing this as well as other burdens. The situation is all the more galling because something like ninety out of every hundred professional economists in the world are American, and the preeminence of American universities

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in the development of economics as an academic discipline is unchallenged and undeniable. If *they* cannot solve the riddle, is it likely that anyone else can?

I would argue—and this is the point of the present article, and indeed of trying consciously to devise a *political* and not just another *economic* theory of international currencies—that others *can* perhaps help. Half the trouble so far may have been precisely because the problem has been left so exclusively to the economists to think about and pontificate on. They do not, mostly—as they are so fond of telling the rest of us—lack intellectual rigor. But they do, too often, lack realism and political common sense. By mechanistic studies they have sought for mechanical panaceas to the problem of the American balance of payments, and have been surprised when each new-found mechanism has broken or proved inadequate. The history of the 1960's has seemed, to the outside observer of this phenomenon, to consist of a series of attempts by the United States to find the perfect economic gimmick.

Now, a basic difference between political scientists and economists is that the study of politics—whether local, national, or international, whether ancient, Renaissance, revolutionary, or contemporary—impresses the student with the unlikeness of the actors involved, with the variety of the generative ideas by which they are influenced, by the quirks and oddities of the systems within which they act. The study of economics impresses the student rather with the likeness to one another of consumers, or of producers, or of markets and mechanisms from Toledo to Timbuctoo. The units along the economic scales are essentially equivalent and undifferentiated.

Small wonder that it is so hard to persuade economists of the simple and commonsensical fact that states operating together in an international economic as well as an international political system think, behave, and react differently, and play essentially different roles. So, of course, do individual human beings in a national economic system. The limitations of the concept of economic man have been widely acknowledged for some time now. Yet the concept nevertheless continues to be used and to influence the thought processes of the economists because, provided the system is large enough, the individual variations quickly become statistically unimportant. As in actuarial calculations, the eccentric accident is lost in the predictable mass. The resulting habits of mind, however, become much more dangerously unrealistic when instead of millions of individual units in an economic system, each taking its idiosyncratic decisions within a statistical scatter, the economist deals with only a handful of individual states. (For though

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the international political system numbers over one hundred and twenty states, the international monetary system numbers few more than the famous Group of Ten.)

All I am saying, to put it briefly and crudely, is that the economists are used to treating equivalent units, that their study exaggerates the interchangeability and underrates the eccentricity of governments when it deals with matters—such as international monetary policy and institutions—in which a few unlike governments, which have unlike preoccupations and divergent interests as well as coincidental preoccupations and interests, are the most important protagonists. If the political scientists (who so far have mostly ignored it) were to give even half the attention and thought the economists have given to this major problem of our international political economy, perhaps the problems of the dollar would not seem quite so bewildering and frustrating.

To be more specific, it seems to me that American economists in their discussions and writings have been assuming all along that because the dollar is the world's leading reserve and vehicle currency, and the world's most widely accepted standard of value, it is therefore like other currencies but more powerful and more privileged. My political theory of international currencies, however, suggests almost the opposite to be true. The dollar, because it is Top Currency, certainly has status. But politically it is subject to peculiar disabilities and constraints that differentiate it sharply from the other leading states in the international monetary system.

Let me suggest briefly three such differentiations, all relevant to the current choice of options before the United States.

The first distinction is that the domestic economy of the Top Currency state is not less but more vulnerable than those of others to the economic stresses and pressures of an accelerating international economy. After 1929, it became widely and firmly believed that if the United States sniffled, the rest of the world sneezed—if it did not actually collapse with pneumonia. So much so, that the idea of the United States being the source of economic trouble and the rest of the world its victim dies very hard, as we have seen only last summer from the reactions of the London, Paris, and Frankfurt stock exchanges to the Wall Street slide. Political scientists should perhaps consider the possibility that the boot is on the other foot; and that, as Top Currency state, it is the United States that is more liable than other national economies to suffer financial scares and crises just because its financial markets are larger and more developed than those of other countries.

This was certainly the British experience in the nineteenth century.

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Judd Polk remarked, in a perceptive study of sterling written some fifteen years ago, on the "economic and financial crises which rocked Britain at roughly ten year intervals throughout the century."[7] Until now, the susceptibility of the United States to such attacks may have been disguised first by the Second World War, then by the Korean War and latterly, to some extent, by the greater vulnerability of sterling—the "front line of the dollar," as it was known before the 1967 devaluation. It may have been mitigated somewhat, too, by the existence of the international capital market in Eurodollars, which is an expatriate market.

In the longer run, however, the United States may well be obliged to look for new safety measures to protect its domestic economic stability from these recurrent shocks. It is striking that both Britain before 1914 and Switzerland in the 1960's developed a habit at times of stress of shedding labor—an important productive resource—from the economy. British waves of emigration, largely to the United States, followed the pattern of economic recession shown by slowdowns in construction investment.[8] And Switzerland, though it is not a Top Currency state, is the possessor of a Passive or Neutral international Currency, which shares with Top Currencies this peculiar susceptibility to financial crises and to cyclical variations in financial activity. In the 1960's it has, however, been able to cope rather successfully with this disability by rapidly shedding resources, by sending home some of the foreign labor that has made up a third of the Swiss labor force; by maintaining a very high ratio of national reserves to liabilities and a national reputation for political stability and economic conservatism; and, lastly, by insulating itself to some extent with measures that make it difficult for foreigners to hold Swiss franc balances yet that allow Swiss banks to act as their intermediaries and agents in accepting and reinvesting foreign funds denominated in other currencies.

By contrast, the United States has left itself little room to use this safety valve. It has become inured to what in most other developed countries is regarded as far too high a level of domestic unemployment; and it has allowed the most vulnerable positions on the margin of the labor force to be occupied almost exclusively by an underprivileged and racially distinct minority but one that—unlike Switzerland's poor Greek and Spanish helots—is politically potent and dangerous. This is the familiar central dilemma of domestic politics. From the

[7] Judd Polk, *Sterling: Its Meaning in World Finance* (New York 1956).

[8] Thomas Brinley, *Migration and Economic Growth: A Study of Great Britain and the Atlantic Economy* (Cambridge 1954); also *The Economics of International Migration* (London 1958).

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outside, it seems as if the United States will not have an effective balance-of-payments policy until it has acquired an effective full-employment policy. But when and if it were to do so, it could conceivably kill two elusive birds with one stone. It could find an economic regulator that would help it to adjust the balance of payments, and it could discover a new way of giving development aid without raising taxes.

The needs of developing countries for skilled and mobile workers, and of the United States for an adjustable economic regulator, could both be met by a new policy that allowed immigrant workers to enter on short-term contract visas. As with the Italians and Portuguese in Switzerland, their visas would not be renewable whenever it became necessary to deflate the economy in order to correct a payments deficit.

The second major effect of Top Currency status on its possessor's political economy is what I would characterize as a hypertrophy of foreign investment. For as well as the advantages of economic leadership, the nationals who are possessors of the Top Currency have an added advantage in that their national currency is so widely accepted by others. It thus becomes particularly easy for them to launch economic enterprises abroad; they are never slow to exploit whatever technological and other advantages they may possess. The investments are distributed haphazardly, at random throughout the international economy, wherever opportunities occur for profit or capital appreciation—even, sometimes, for simple expansion in the size of the individual business enterprise regardless of rational prospects of profit.

Production of United States-owned enterprises overseas is now estimated at some $200 billion annually, over a fifth of the entire GNP of the United States. The book value of their capital assets in 1966 was put at $55 billion, and the investment income of the United States now far outdistances that of all other countries. Significantly, the next highest investment income[9] is Britain's—a legacy of the exaggerated habits of overseas investment developed during British tenure of Top Currency role and of her former Master Currency position in the old sterling area. And though in 1968 private financial flows to developing countries from Germany rose rapidly to nearly $1.1 billion, making her the second largest source of private capital for foreign investment after the United States ($2.2 billion), it is the accumulated stock, the result of past investments, that engenders political concern and is the point here. Investment income is a rough-and-ready indicator of this.[10]

[9] I.e., all earnings from direct overseas investments net of losses, plus interest accruing on government loans and to the portfolio and other investments of individuals. See definition of "item 6" in IMF, *Balance of Payments Manual*, 3rd edition (Washington 1961).

[10] See OECD/DAC *Development Assistance, 1969 Review* (Paris 1970).

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INVESTMENT INCOME CREDITS IN 1966
(*$ million*)

United States	7961
United Kingdom	2632
Netherlands	555
France	462
Canada	454
Germany	389
Belgium-Lux.	304
Italy	275
Japan	243

The British case also indicates how, in this respect, the Top Currency role differs in its effects from a Master Currency role. The latter will also lead to some hypertrophy of overseas investments relative to the norm for developed economies with purely national currencies. But as in the case of the Dutch, or the Belgians, or even the French, the investments will be highly concentrated in the Master Currency area. When sterling was Top Currency, by contrast, British overseas investments in the United States and in Argentina were quite as important as those in its own dependencies of Australia or South Africa. In the British case, the Master Currency role was clearly responsible for a hypertrophy of trade as well as of investment, so that Britain became even more eccentric in her dependence on imported food and raw materials than her geography and economic character alone dictated. A recent comparative study of British agricultural policy concluded that the United Kingdom has had a very high level of food imports, in relation to GNP and per capita production, but that this is the result primarily of an exceptional trading policy rather than of anything inherent in the country's soil or its economic or geographical position. From a policy-making point of view, an eccentrically large involvement in economic enterprise in other countries—some of which are politically associated or dependent and some of which are not—will tend to be reflected in an eccentrically tender concern for the stability, order, and "good government" of areas far from home. Any ideological motivation there may be (e.g., preserving democracy, opposing communism) is reinforced by an economic concern that is not simply mercenary and money-grubbing, but is rather broader and less narrowly self-regarding than Marxist mythology would have us believe.

The point here is really a very simple one. It is that this tender concern felt almost willy-nilly by the United States is not likely to be

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shared, at least to the same degree, by others. It will therefore be futile for the United States to expect the Europeans and the Japanese to feel a concern equal to its own or a matching commitment to maintain political and economic stability in those parts of Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, Australasia, the Middle East, and increasingly even of Africa, with which they have no special strategic or historic links.

It also follows that it would be vain for the United States to pretend that it can choose how much financial assistance (official aid plus private investment) it will provide to the third world. Because of its generous investments, public and private, in the past, it is not more but less free than others to cut off the supply of new capital, without which the developing economy would wither and shrivel up. As a major creditor, its political position toward all the many debtor countries in the world is one of comparative weakness as much as one of comparative strength.[11] The final distinction of Top Currency status is an ambivalence that may be seen as the direct outcome of the dual concern of the Top Currency state's policy-makers with domestic economic welfare and with the welfare and indivisibility of the international economy. In both the British and the American experiences, this (essentially political) ambivalence has been resolved in the same way. Rather than face up to the inherent conflicts apt to arise between these two interests, the Top Currency state seems inclined to develop a strong political/economic ideology that asserts (a) that the domestic and international interests are coincident if not identical, and (b) that a prime aim of the state should be to persuade others that their national economic interests also coincide with the maximum development and extension of the international economy. The Top Currency state characteristically does all it can to propagate this ideology and to use it to enlist the support of others for whatever measures of international cooperation and support it thinks are needed to protect, defend, and stabilize the international economic system. The incidental damage done by financial crises to its own domestic economy are overlooked, and the opinions of foreigners who put national economic interest before the general welfare are regarded as simply unregenerate and perverse. Indeed, a high moral tone quickly creeps in, and what I would describe as the Top Currency syndrome is distinguished by an obstinate, and to others inevitably an objectionable, tendency to self-righteousness.

This is where the inseparability of politics and economics in the

[11] See Susan Strange, "The Meaning of Multilateral Surveillance" in Robert W. Cox, ed., *International Organization: World Politics, Studies in Economic and Social Agencies* (London 1969).

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real world adds to the difficulties of the Top Currency state. Its monetary partners in the international economy are less sensitive than the Top Currency state to any danger that may threaten this international economy, and are therefore less strongly convinced that they should shoulder short-term costs for long-term collective benefits. And what is more, they are also acutely aware of the impossibility of distinguishing between supporting the economic aims of the Top Currency state and supporting, aiding, and abetting whatever more patently political aims it may elect to pursue. With these, as notably with United States methods and objectives in Vietnam as with British methods and objectives in the Boer War some seventy years ago, they may often find themselves out of sympathy. For no monetary system—and this is the point the economists so often forget—is a riderless horse. Any monetary system is at once the servant and the partner of a political system. This is what the late Henry Aubrey, who wrestled so stubbornly and courageously with this problem, was getting at in his *Behind the Veil of International Money*.[12] "The shortcoming of the current balance of payments thinking," he concluded, "is that we seek an economic solution to what is, in large part, a political problem."

I would take the argument a stage further than Aubrey did. Because of the peculiarities of its Top Currency status and the economic role that this implies, the United States must contemplate the possibility that it will have to make political concessions not equal to but greater than those of others if it is to make any significant progress towards international monetary order. The principle of reciprocity and of the equal rights and duties of states, so familiar that it is taken for granted, is no longer enough. The eagle will have to stoop as low as the other birds if it aspires to lead them where it thinks they ought to go.

This political truth lies right in the economists' blind spot. And because, as I have said already, the United States so dominates the study of economics throughout the globe—as, indeed, Britain did from Ricardo to Keynes—there is now no professionally respectable dissent, no significant school of economic thought that is *not* American-influenced. It is therefore particularly hard for economists to be aware of this blind spot. The ideological convictions of the Top Currency state—and American economic ideology often seems a lot more coherent and consistent than American political ideology—are themselves a prime cause of political astigmatism. It is these Top Currency convictions that obscure the political reality and encourage the illusion in America

[12] Princeton Essay in International Finance (Princeton 1969).

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that the monetary goals sought by the United States for the international economy are also sought with equal urgency by all men of good will; that any who do not seek them must be ignorant or misled—or just wilfully subversive. Expound and preach the promised land of orderly international monetary management for long enough, American economists seem to think, and the doubters will be converted. But this is an illusion that could prove dangerous and expensive.

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THREE DIMENSIONS OF ETHNIC POLITICS

By DONALD L. HOROWITZ*

THE growing recognition of the importance of ethnic, racial, and religious groups in the politics of the new states has given rise to an urgent need for theory. Although this need extends to all aspects of group relations, the first priority is for systematic classification to reduce the bewildering array of descent-groups in the developing world to manageable proportions and comparable cases. With a view to facilitating comparative analysis, the aim of this paper is to make a modest beginning in the formulation of meaningful categories.

I. The Structure of Group Differentiation

For political purposes, a basic distinction needs to be drawn between vertical and horizontal ethnic differentiation.[1] In vertical—that is, hierarchical—systems, stratification is synonymous with ethnicity. Political ascendency and social mobility are restricted by ascriptive criteria like color or phenotype. There are superordinate and subordinate ethnic or racial groups. Relations among the groups partake of caste relations and are suffused with deference. The systems of race relations founded on Negro slavery in the Western Hemisphere were archetypical cases of this sort of system.

In horizontal systems, on the other hand, parallel ethnic structures exist, each with its own criteria of stratification. Although the question of group superiority is far from moot, the groups are not, in a general social sense, definitively ranked in relation to each other. Transactions can occur across group lines without necessarily implying anything about ascriptively based hierarchical relations. The Ottoman *millet* was perhaps the paradigm of this kind of parallelism.

Weber has made a similar distinction between a "caste structure" (i.e., a vertical order) and "ethnic coexistence" (i.e., a horizontal or-

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[1] For the sake of terminological clarity, what we shall refer to as vertical groups are divided by what are usually called horizontal cleavages, while horizontal groups are divided by vertical cleavages.

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der), and noted some of the consequences: "The caste structure transforms the horizontal and unconnected coexistences of ethnically segregated groups into a vertical social system of super- and subordination. Correctly formulated: a comprehensive societalization integrates the ethnically divided communities into specific political and communal action. In their consequences they differ precisely in this way: ethnic coexistences condition a mutual repulsion and disdain but allow each ethnic community to consider its own honor as the highest one; the caste structure brings about a social subordination and an acknowledgement of 'more honor' in favor of the privileged caste and status groups."[2]

It is, of course, readily apparent that this distinction between ethnic coexistence and ethnic subordination is often blurred in practice. Regularized interaction among horizonal groups can produce elements of status subordination. A trader from ethnic group A may defer to an aristocrat from ethnic group B, while a servant from group B may be subordinate to the same trader from group A. What is more, ascriptive patterns of recruitment to these roles may develop. Horizontal systems rapidly assume aspects of vertical systems. Conversely, a subordinate ethnic group may, by virtue of education, produce an elite that defies the rules of ascriptive stratification. Neither type of differentiation is pure, and both are usually in a process of change.[3]

Yet a great many systems of race relations can be identified as predominantly hierarchical or parallel, and different characteristics can be attributed to them. Vertical relations frequently have some ritualized mode of expressing the lower status (sometimes "contamination") of the bottom groups: in the United States, various aspects of segregation; in western Uganda, refusal to permit subservient groups to eat inside the house;[4] in India, untouchability. Horizontally ordered groups obviously do not require methods of reinforcing and rationalizing ethnic subordination. Instead, a parallel group in contact and competition with

[2] H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York 1958), 189. For this reference to Weber, I am indebted to the work of René Lemarchand, cited below.

[3] In addition to these variations in kind, there are variations in the degree to which descent is an ordering principle of the society. A system of ethnic stratification, for instance, may be more or less rigid, depending on the extent to which possession of nonascriptive qualifications can compensate for the lack of ascriptive characteristics in facilitating access to status opportunities. Brazil is most often cited as an example of a mixed ascriptive-nonascriptive system (involving color and class), but in greater or lesser measure exceptions to the ascriptive principle are made everywhere. And, of course, there is nothing to prevent horizontal and vertical ethnic differentiation from coexisting within the boundaries of a single state.

[4] Martin R. Doornbos, "Kumanyana and Rwenzururu: Two Responses to Ethnic Inequality," in Robert I. Rotberg and Ali A. Mazrui, eds., *Protest and Power in Black Africa* (New York 1970), 1090.

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others develops elaborate ways of reaffirming the superiority of its own general world-view, even while conceding limited spheres of cultural superiority to other groups.[5]

Despite the rigidity of ethnic stratification, vertical relations usually embody at least some elements of social cohesion and shared expectations, in addition to coercion and conflict. There may be a more or less explicit "premise of inequality." Benefits, such as increased personal security and even limited leeway for maneuver among competing superiors, usually accrue to those of subordinate status who accept the premise most completely.[6] Adaptive behavior by the subordinate group to the requirements of its status is therefore common. The relations between horizontally-ordered groups, however, characteristically lack the authority necessary to establish a high level of reciprocity premised on inequality. They tend to be characterized by much less predictability and much less generalized collaboration than are vertically ordered groups.

Vertical systems thus may possess more social cement than do horizontal at some stages of their evolution.[7] But when the cement cracks, the edifice usually collapses: when vertical systems are undermined, they undergo fundamental transformation. As René Lemarchand has cogently argued, conflict in a vertical ethnic system has a class coloration. When warfare occurs it takes the form of a social revolution.[8] Horizontal systems are also susceptible to periodic violence, but with different goals. The interactions of horizontal groups bear some resemblance to international relations. The "subnational communities," Michael Hudson has observed, "are compelled by the situation to act

[5] Malays, for example, admire the business skill of the Chinese, but often regard Chinese behavior as crude and uncultured. See Peter J. Wilson, *A Malay Village and Malaysia* (New Haven 1967). West Indian Negroes readily grant the greater solidarity, thrift, and shrewdness of East Indians; yet Indians are referred to by the pejorative term "coolie" and are denied possession of cultural traits that would entitle them to prestige according to the norms of Creole society. See Elliott P. Skinner, "Group Dynamics and Social Stratification in British Guiana," *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, LXXXIII (1960), 904-912. Indians, for their part, admire the physical strength of Negroes, but do not acknowledge the moral worth of presumed Negro behavioral patterns in general. See Morton Klass, *East Indians in Trinidad: A Study of Cultural Persistence* (New York 1961), 244.

[6] See René Lemarchand, "Power and Stratification in Rwanda: A Reconsideration," *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines*, VI (1966), 602-605; John Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town* (3d ed., New York 1957), 179, 212, 262, 282; Kenneth M. Stampp, *The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in Ante-Bellum South* (New York 1956), 151. See also Michael Banton, *Race Relations* (New York 1967), 87.

[7] This is especially the case after the firm establishment of authority and before widespread dislocations are produced by the appearance among the subordinate group of a large elite that cannot be accommodated by the ascriptive social structure.

[8] "Power and Stratification," 609-10.

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as if they were states in an international environment."[9] Elite relations partake of diplomacy. "Political relations among these [communal] leaders, which reflect this local autonomy, are analogous to the relations among small states in a multipolar international system. . . . They therefore form alliances that might remind the diplomatic historian of Renaissance Italy, and they deal with one another on the basis of sovereign equality."[10] When ethnic conflict occurs, horizontal groups usually aim, not at social transformation, but at the exclusion of other parallel groups from power and often at reversion to an idealized, ethnically homogeneous *status quo ante*.[11]

In general, vertical systems have been produced by conquest or capture, horizontal systems by invasion resulting in less than conquest or by more or less voluntary migration. The highly stratified ethnic system of central Rwanda was the result of invasion and conquest.[12] American Negro slavery was made possible by the equivalent of conquest—the forced transportation of Africans to the New World. On the other hand, invasion that did not result in total conquest produced parallel groups in Nigeria and Ceylon. Economically induced migration also created horizontal systems in Malaysia, Guyana, and Trinidad.

Hierarchical groups are generally fairly well intermixed geographically. Parallel groups may be either intermixed or regionally discrete. Typically, migration generates more geographic intermixture than does incomplete conquest.

Migration and incomplete conquest also give rise to different kinds of lingering historical grievances. A group whose conquest has been thwarted may nourish unfulfilled territorial ambitions, but a group whose land has been partly conquered may develop a domestic version of *revanche*.[13] An indigenous group that was colonized and forced to

[9] *The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon* (New York 1968), 9.
[10] *Ibid.*, 135.
[11] For concrete illustrations, see Lemarchand, "Power and Stratification"; and Lemarchand, "Revolutionary Phenomena in Stratified Societies: Rwanda and Zanzibar," *Civilisations*, XVIII (1968), 16-49.
[12] Lemarchand, "Power and Stratification."
[13] In Nigeria, the advent of British rule interrupted a Hausa-Fulani invasion southward, and after independence "many Southerners feared that the departure of the British had opened the way for its continuance"—a fear reinforced by occasional Northern utterances. Walter Schwarz, *Nigeria* (New York 1968), 76. In Ceylon, Tamil invasions had resulted in a *de facto* partition of the island long before colonial rule. But the teaching of Sinhalese history had kept the issue dimly alive and given it periodic political significance. In 1957, when the Prime Minister agreed to a decentralization that would have devolved considerable local power on Tamil authorities in the North and East, the opposition toured the country, displaying maps with a black footprint over the areas to be "ceded" to the Tamils. Robert N. Kearney, *Communalism and Language in the Politics of Ceylon* (Durham 1967), 117-18.

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abide the entry of ethnic strangers for colonial economic or administrative purposes may later regard their presence as illegitimate *ab initio*.[14] During colonial rule, however, these feelings tend to be subdued.

Virtually all vertical systems of ethnic relations are in a state either of rapid transition or of increasing coercion designed by the dominant group to avert change. On a global scale, vertical ethnic differentiation seems clearly on the decline, as is attested by the demise of colonial rule and the movements of protest and revolt against various forms of ethnic subordination. Eroded "by the spread of universalistic, egalitarian, achievement-oriented values,"[15] by international contact and communication, by the diffusion of education and other carriers of modern norms, stratification based on race appears to be ideologically obsolete.[16] Among the subordinate groups, economic and educational change have repeatedly given rise to "a new leadership skilled in the ways of the system, and the emergence of intellectuals who debunk the myths of the racial order, who advance new definitions, and who agitate on their behalf."[17] Mechanisms of assimilation, previously utilized to create "exceptions" to the ascriptive principle, are generally unable to adapt fast enough to assimilate the new elites. Consequently, subordinate groups and the frustrated, aspiring elites they produce aim to destroy the ascriptive principle that impedes their mobility and limits their dignity.

Some vertical ethnic systems may be transformed by revolution; some, whose lower strata have produced relatively large elites, may be reordered on horizontal lines; conceivably, some may become largely nonascriptive class systems. But rarely will it be possible, without the application of considerable coercion, to maintain a system of ethnic stratification.

Horizontally ordered ethnic configurations, however, do not suffer from the same ideological disabilities. Parallel groups therefore have much more ability to survive as distinct units. Since there is no ascriptive bar to social mobility, the structure is not tainted with the same obvious illegitimacy that pervades a rigid vertical system, characterized —indeed, defined—by the restriction of status by race. There are wide op-

[14] See, *e.g.*, Elliott P. Skinner, "Strangers in West African Societies," *Africa*, XXXIII (October 1963), 307-20.

[15] Lemarchand, "Power and Stratification," 609.

[16] See the interesting analysis and prognosis of Herbert G. Blumer, "Reflections on Theory of Race Relations," in Andrew W. Lind, ed., *Race Relations in World Perspective* (Honolulu 1955), 13-17.

[17] *Ibid.*, 16. For the role of new elites in transforming some Indian castes from subordinate to parallel groups, see F. G. Bailey, "Closed Social Stratification in India," *Archives of European Sociology*, IV (1963), 122.

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portunities for mobility within the ethnic group; one need not choose between his group membership and personal ambition. This does not mean, of course, that each group has proportionate numbers of its members in all social strata or that mobility opportunities are proportioned to the demand. Discrepancies in these proportions typically constitute an irritant in the relations of parallel groups. Some sectors of economic activity may be all but closed to members of some groups. The point is that each group has its own elite strata—perhaps traditional, perhaps modern, probably both. In the case of Malaysia, for example, there are high-status Malays who are members of the royalty or aristocracy as well as of the modern bureaucracy; there are high-status Chinese among the descendants of the early traders and among the newer industrialists, professionals, and intellectuals. Outside their groups, the elites may meet as social equals. Although in the modern sectors there may be certain common criteria of stratification, the groups do not stand in a generalized hierarchical relation to each other. Each of these subsocieties can and does, as Weber suggested, consider its own "honor" to be the highest.

II. The Locus of Political Interaction

The lines of group differentiation—whether horizontal or vertical—constitute one plane on which racial interaction can be viewed. The locus of that interaction constitutes another. Here the question is whether the primary focal point of political activity among the groups is parochial or national.

Of course, every ethnic group operates at all levels of the political system of which it is a part. A group may simultaneously strive to win local elections, seek a larger share of business licenses from an intermediate governmental body (perhaps at the state level in a federal system), and campaign vigorously for linguistic recognition nationally and for provincial autonomy in its own area. Nevertheless, on the basis of the intensity and extensiveness of activity at various levels, a rough distinction may be drawn between those states with groups whose political activities are mainly local in scope and those with groups whose activities are heavily national. Such a distinction finds support in the general propensity of groups to concentrate their energies on the highest level of activity that seems to promise some success.

Among the states of Africa and Asia are many that possess a large number of dispersed ethnic groups. India is the outstanding example of such a state, but there are many others. In such states, the proliferation of dispersed groups presents formidable difficulties of achieving

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unity and forward motion. Nationalist leaderships find it especially frustrating to confront a society composed of multiple particularisms simultaneously moving in different directions. The insularity of groups renders territorial integration precarious.[18] Separatist movements may weaken central authority and threaten to sever parts of the states.

Despite all of these problems, group identity in such systems is generally so fragmented and loyalties so parochial that national politics does not center on a fixed pattern of ethnic rivalry. Group conflict tends to be localized; it "could put one of a series of watertight compartments out of order, but it could not make the ship sink. . . ."[19] In such situations, the center has some flexibility[20] and can sometimes grant the demands of one group without necessarily injuring the interests of others. Often such demands are made at the expense of the center. Even when they are not, it may be possible to satisfy ethnic aspirations by concessions from the national pool, particularly if these concessions take the form of opportunities for social mobility that are in scarce supply in a given region.[21] The plurality of groups ordinarily enables the center to deal with one conflict at a time, thus providing some assurance that the entire state will not experience destabilizing upheavals simultaneously. Finally, the profusion of dispersed groups usually creates such great heterogeneity at the national level that when the center intervenes it may do so as a neutral arbiter.[22]

A different pattern of demands and tensions prevails in states in which politics is so national in scope and a few groups are so large that their interactions are a constant theme of politics at the center. The demands of one group tend to be made at the expense of another; "mutually exclusive demands characterize political debate."[23] The exigencies of organization pull in opposite directions in the two types of systems. A national leader in India can hardly afford to rely on the support of one or two ethnic groups; a national leader in Guyana, Zambia, or Malaysia can hardly do otherwise. The structure of dispersed

[18] The term "territorial integration" is employed here in the sense that it has been used by Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," *The Annals*, CCCLVIII (March 1965), 57-58.

[19] Doornbos, "Kumanyana and Rwenzururu," 1136.

[20] See, e.g., the suggestions of Myron Weiner, *The Politics of Scarcity: Public Pressure and Political Response in India* (Chicago 1962), chap. 3, which reflect this structural situation.

[21] See Doornbos, "Kumanyana and Rwenzururu."

[22] See *ibid.*; Doornbos, "Protest Movements in Western Uganda: Some Parallels and Contrasts" (mimeo., 1966), 5; Baldev Raj Nayar, *Minority Politics in the Punjab* (Princeton 1966), 283.

[23] W. Howard Wriggins, *Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation* (Princeton 1960), 460. See also K. J. Ratnam, *Communalism and the Political Process in Maylaya* (Kuala Lumpur 1965), 170.

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ethnic systems abets interethnic coalition-building, but the structure of national ethnic systems impedes it.

A centrally focused ethno-political system may possess fewer centrifugal tendencies than a dispersed system, but they are of greater magnitude. The center has much less ability to work on them one at a time or to pacify some groups without antagonizing others. In dispersed systems, the relation between group and group is mediated by the relation between locality and center. In centralized polities, one group confronts another directly. The inescapable presence of ethnic strangers commonly has a profoundly competitive effect. Members of a group measure their social advantages and political power against the attainments and aspirations of a neighboring group. A frenzied contest to catch up or keep ahead may occur on a national scale. If the major malaise of the ethnically dispersed polity is inertia and lack of direction, that of the centralized polity is constant tension and an overheated political system. In general, the room for maneuvering without jeopardizing political stability is seriously limited. The neutrality of the national regime, often an asset in ethnically dispersed systems at times of stress, is constantly under challenge in centralized systems.

Whether ethnic politics is more parochial or more central is mainly a function of group size relative to state size. Group identity is by no means a static phenomenon. Group size in most cases depends on the ability of subgroups to forge a common identity. This, in turn, depends heavily on perceived similarities among the subgroups taken together vis-à-vis the other groups they confront in the society. Although there are, for example, substantial tribal and religious differences among the southern Sudanese, when these groups have interacted with northerners there has been a fairly stable and coherent southern loyalty. Given this dependence of group identity on felt distance from other groups, it is not surprising that states with large groups relative to state size have often experienced intensely hostile relations among the groups. Extensive amalgamation of subgroups is itself often a sign of a great chasm between them and others. To focus on ethnically centralized polities is generally to be concerned with conflict.

To be sure, not all states can be easily classified as either ethnically dispersed or centralized. A number of states are at various points between these extremes. Moreover, most countries with a national ethnic politics also contain within their boundaries smaller groups whose relations with their neighbors are mainly local. Before the Nigerian coups of 1966, each region experienced constant tension between its dominant group and the regional minorities. The Borneo states of Malaysia con-

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tain similar compartmentalized relations, not replicated in peninsular Malaya. The Ceylon Tamils are an important minority in national Ceylonese politics, but in the Eastern Province they are a majority and the Ceylon Moors are an important provincial minority. Nevertheless, in all of these states the major focus of ethnic activity has been the national level of politics.

The extent to which ethno-political interaction is local or national is also related to the degree of governmental penetration of the hinterland and the degree to which the country is united by interregional communications. Modern technology, of course, facilitates a national system of transactions and, as it brings groups into contact, supports the amalgamation of some subgroups into larger units. This is not a unilinear or irreversible process. It certainly does not portend the end of ethnic identifications, because the extent of amalgamation has social as well as technical limits. What it does suggest is that, in some states that until now have been populated by numerous dispersed groups, interaction is likely to occur increasingly among large agglomerations at the national level.

III. The Question of Color

Thus far we have used the terms "race" and "ethnicity" and their derivative forms interchangeably. It is fairly common, however, to draw a clearcut distinction between these two categories, reserving "race" for differences of color.[24] This distinction generally assumes that color differences are capable of arousing uniquely intense emotions and loyalties among the participants, or of serving as unusually reliable signs of identity. The foundations of these assumptions are shaky. Moreover, to make the distinction between color-groups and other descent-groups at the outset is to limit quite significantly the field of comparison and to impose on the analysis unexamined hypotheses about the behavior of different kinds of groups.

The argument that in some way color-group relations necessarily differ in kind from other types of ethnic relations is usually ethnocentric. Notions about the supposedly unique effects of color differences on group antipathy and cohesion are, of course, not confined to North America. Color preferences can be found in many parts of the world.[25]

[24] See, e.g., Harold R. Isaacs, "Color in World Affairs," *Foreign Affairs*, XLVII (January 1969), 235-50; Isaacs, "Group Identity and Political Change: The Role of Color and Physical Characteristics," *Daedalus*, XCVI (Spring 1967), 353-75.

[25] See the contributions to the issue "Color and Race," *Daedalus*, XCVI (Spring 1967). On color images in the Western Hemisphere, see H. Hoetink, *The Two Variants in Caribbean Race Relations* (London 1967).

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Quite often, color is used to explain the special quality or intensity of a given local group conflict. In the United States, however, the presumed uniqueness of color differences is employed in unsystematic attempts to distinguish rigidly hierarchical ethnic systems like slavery and Jim Crow from other forms of ethnic differentiation that seem more flexible because the groups do not have assigned caste or class positions. In other words, the attempt is to explain the special harshness of a ranked system by the presence of somatic differences. Because it occurs in a local context in which color has been closely linked with ethnic stratification, the explanation mistakes the indicator for the substance of the relationship.

Slavery and its successor institutions did come to be identified with color. But color did not initially possess the stigma that it later did. Rather, it was because slavery was so brutal a vertical system that color came to have the intensely pejorative connotations associated with and used to rationalize slave status.

Color facilitated the brutality, not because it originally signified superiority and inferiority, but because it made it more difficult for the slave to escape his singularly disagreeable status. No identity is wholly ascriptive. Marginality and assimilation are familiar phenomena everywhere. Origins can be concealed or "forgotten,"[26] and even color can be changed in the course of generations by intermarriage. But some kinds of assimilation are easier than others to accomplish. Language can be changed, and religious conversion is even less difficult to effect. That is, some forms of identity are more immutable than others and hence

[26] In the vertical system of eastern Rwanda, for example, the Tutsis were the superordinate and the Hutus the subordinate group. "Yet, the evidence shows that in some cases the strength of the local Hutu lineages was such that the Tutsi found it expedient to absorb these meddlesome 'upstarts' into their own caste. In a fascinating discussion of the power struggle which took place in Remera Gravel notes that 'the Hutu lineages which have been *in situ* longest have acquired some sort of priority of rights on the hill. Their members are respected and the heads of the lineages have much influence on their neighbors, and have an important voice in local administration. . . . The powerful lineages keep the power of the [Tutsi] chieftain in check. If, however, they become powerful enough to threaten the chieftainship they are absorbed into the upper caste. Their Hutu origins are "forgotten."'" Lemarchand, "Power and Stratification," 604-05, quoting Pierre Gravel, *The Play for Power: Description of a Community in Eastern Rwanda* (unpubl. Ph.D. diss. 1962), 229.

There is a parallel in the completely different context of Negro slavery in the British West Indies, where children of mulatto parentage, three steps removed from their African ancestry, were by statute considered white. In exceptional cases, usually involving wealthy or well-connected mulattoes, the Jamaican Assembly sometimes passed private bills to confer on individuals without the requisite generational removal all the legal rights of whites. See Bryan Edwards, *The History, Civil and Commercial, of the British Colonies in the West Indies* (4th ed., London 1807), II, 20-23. I have dealt with these and other questions involving the color line in an unpublished paper, "Color Differentiation in the American Systems of Slavery" (mimeo., 1969).

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better suited to the long-term maintenance of large-scale vertical ethnic systems. This point was apparently grasped by whites in North America in the seventeenth century, and was reflected in shifting terminology. Early in the century, the English were usually called "Christians"; after about 1680, the term "white" appeared. The initial differentiation between groups relied heavily on religion.[27] But in time some Negroes had become Christians. If reliance had continued to be placed mainly on religion, baptism could be employed to escape from bondage.[28] Color, however, provided "a barrier" both "visible and permanent,"[29] and therefore apt for maintaining a degrading and hereditary system of forced labor. The special place of color in American race relations seems to have originated in the special desire of the slaveholders for a permanently servile group.[30] In a system of vertical ethnic stratification, that purpose could readily be implemented for the dominant group by redefining the indicia of ethnicity.

The distinction between color and other forms of ethnic identification thus derives largely from the failure to distinguish between horizontal and vertical systems of ethnicity. The most significant way in which color differs from other varieties of ethnicity is its relative immutability. But this characteristic is far more important in systems of ethnic stratification, where there is likely to be some attempt by members of the subordinate group to escape their identity, than it is in parallel systems.[31] Where similar conditions of ethnic hierarchy do not exist, it is hazardous to generalize about the role of color from the American experience.

The peculiar passions supposedly aroused by color differences can be generated on an ascriptive basis without them. The Chinese penchant

[27] See Winthrop D. Jordan, *White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812* (Chapel Hill 1968), 91-98.

[28] For evidence that this possibility genuinely disturbed the slaveholders, see Jeffrey R. Brackett, *The Negro in Maryland* (Baltimore 1889), 32, 38.

[29] Jordan, 96.

[30] Cf. Dollard, 61, for the apocryphal story of a Negro riding in a railroad car reserved for whites on a Southern train. Asked to move to the Jim Crow car, he announced he had "resigned" from the "colored race." Obviously, the reply sounds absurd in the Southern context only because color was an immutable indicator of subordinate identity. There is a double impossibility, physical and social: (1) Color-group membership is fixed. (2) Even if it were not, movement from one group to the other cannot be at the choice of a member of the subordinate group in a system of ethnic stratification. It would be less impossible on the first count to decide to "resign" from a linguistic, ethnic, or religious group; and on the second count if the group did not occupy an ascriptively subordinate position.

[31] The distinction made by Laponce between "minorities by force" and "minorities by will" is suggestive in this connection. J. A. Laponce, *The Protection of Minorities* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1960). By the former, Laponce seems to refer mainly to subordinate groups in hierarchical systems; by the latter, to parallel groups excluded from political power.

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for the consumption of pork can be seized upon by the abstemious Malays as a sign of the uncleanliness and crudeness associated with the Chinese[32] in somewhat the same way as blackness became a symbol of pejorative traits associated with Negroes. Color may conjure up a series of disdainful stereotypes. Because it is easy to graft such group preconceptions onto culturally defined concepts of beauty, color and physiognomy are a convenient shorthand for more extensive stereotyping. But it may be equally easy to associate stereotypes with other cultural qualities or practices, such as eating habits, speech, or dress.[33]

Even where the aesthetic concept is similar, color may not connote undesirable traits. The mix of physical and cultural attributes is not necessarily the same. Some Sinhalese, for instance, view Ceylon Tamils as dark and unattractive, but the prevailing association is not black, ugly, indolent, and ignorant, but rather black, ugly, diligent, and shrewd.[34] In a society where color is related to identification but has not been the criterion for automatic assignment to inferior status, it need not be associated with only negative cultural traits. This complex connection of esteemed and deprecated characteristics tends to go unnoticed in discussions of "color prejudice" rooted in the American racial experience. It underlines the importance of making the basic distinction between vertical and horizontal ethnic systems. Only in the former is such a balance of attributes precluded by the social structure.

Depending on the social and historical context, color may be a more extensive differentiator of identity—in the sense of being a more accurate predictor of affiliation for more individuals—than other indicators. But color and appearance can also be inaccurate and misleading indicators. In many societies other indicators, like language, can rival it for extensiveness and salience.

Where there are ambiguities of group membership, ways are found of making accurate identifications as fast as necessary. Color and phenotype are not the only visible clues, and in any case reliance need rarely be placed on visible clues alone.[35] In a North Indian village area, for example, shopkeepers, using posture, bearing, gesticulation, clothing,

[32] Wilson, 25.

[33] For a similar view of race or ethnicity as stemming from presumed hereditary differences, and pigmentation as only one of many potential differentiators, see Tamotsu Shibutani and Kian M. Kwan, *Ethnic Stratification: A Comparative Approach* (New York 1965), 44-45, 218-19.

[34] Cf. Wriggins, 232.

[35] Even the North American system of slavery, which placed a premium on the visibility and permanence of the identifying criteria, was obliged to resort to evidence of ancestry in the case of mulattoes who claimed to be descended of a free mother. Stampp, 195-96.

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and grammatical usage in addition to physical features, were rapidly and reliably able to single out low-caste strangers for discriminatory service.[36] In the Nigerian massacres of September and October of 1966, Northern mobs in search of Ibos sorted out Yorubas by their dress.[37] In the heat of the Ceylon riots of 1958, Sinhalese mobs were even more methodical. They employed a variety of indicators of Tamil identity: they systematically made preliminary investigations in the search for men "who wore their shirts over their *vertis*, Tamil fashion," who possessed earring holes in their ears (a Tamil sign of "early parental affection"), or who could not on the spot "read and explain a piece from a Sinhalese newspaper."[38] Calling into operation as they did the wrath of the mob, these alternative tests of identity constitute a grim caution against acceptance of the figment of the pigment.

To summarize: the rationalizing and symbolizing functions of color in a vertical ethnic system are not necessarily replicated in a horizontal system, even though color may play a part in identifying the groups. Where color is a less salient differentiator, other indicators may serve as alternative cluster-points for group preconceptions, and may furnish more accurate clues to identity. The significance of the visibility and permanence of color differences has been overemphasized for societies in which the desire to escape identification is not a pervasive feature of ethnicity.

[36] James M. Sebring, "Caste Indicators and Caste Identification of Strangers," *Human Organization*, XXCIII (Fall 1969), 199-207.

[37] This method enabled a few fortunate or foresighted Ibos to escape death by taking refuge with sympathetic Yoruba neighbors who provided them with Yoruba clothing. This account is drawn from the official Eastern version of the riots, *Nigerian Pogrom: The Organized Massacre of Eastern Nigerians* (Enugu 1966), 15, 19.

[38] Tarzie Vittachi, *Emergency '58: The Story of the Ceylon Race Riots* (London 1958), 54.

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THE POLITICAL ECONOMICS OF POPULATION GROWTH

The Case of China

By PI-CHAO CHEN*

I

SOME economists argue that high population density and rapid population growth are not in themselves impediments to economic development. On the basis of a quantitative analysis of historical data, Simon Kuznets, for instance, concludes that, historically, rates of economic development have not significantly correlated, either positively or negatively, with rates of population growth.[1] Similarly, E. E. Hagen observes that "nowhere in the world has population growth induced by rising income been sufficient to halt the rise in income. . . . The historical record indicates that rise in income in these societies has failed to occur not because something thwarted it, but because no force has been present to cause income to rise."[2] Still, there are other economists who argue that population growth is capable of stimulating economic growth. Foremost among them are those in the Keynesian tradition. According to them, one of the causes of economic stagnation is a diminishing rate of population growth; population growth can stimulate the demand for capital and services, which in turn reduces unemployment and results in a rise in income.[3] However, one does not have to be a Keynesian to believe in the positive effects of population growth. Colin Clark, for instance, argues that a substantial

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[1] Simon Kuznets, "Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, v (October 1956), 1-94.

[2] Everett E. Hagen, *On the Theory of Social Change* (Homewood 1962), 48.

[3] John Maynard Keynes, "Some Economic Consequences of a Declining Population," *Eugenics Review*, xxix (April 1937), 13-17; Alvin H. Hansen, "Economic Progress and Declining Population Growth," *American Economic Review*, xxix (March 1939), 1-15, reprinted in Joseph J. Spengler & Otis D. Duncan, *Population Theory and Policy* (Glencoe 1956), 256-69. For recent elaboration of the consequences of demographic change on aggregate demand and hence growth in advanced economies see National Bureau of Economic Research, *Demographic and Economic Change in Developed Countries* (Princeton 1960), 324-40 and 352-71.

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population growth can have beneficial economic and cultural effects, as is evidenced by the experiences of ancient Greece about the sixth century B.C., Holland in the sixteenth century, Britain in the second half of the eighteenth century, and Japan in the modern era.[4] Hagen also emphasizes a beneficial effect of population growth—i.e., the economics of scale: densely populated countries require considerably less capital overhead and other capital "indivisibilities" per unit of product. Furthermore, rapid population growth "absolves" a country from the consequences of erroneous investment decisions. An erroneous investment in a rapidly growing economy stands a good chance of being put to some alternative use.[5] A. O. Hirschman, likewise, has hazarded an interesting thesis about the positive effects of population growth. He argues that, to the extent that it "presents the developmental forces within a society with an opportunity to assert themselves" and supplies "the motive and the cue for passion for development," population growth could be an "inducement mechanism." "Population pressure on living standards will lead to counter-pressures, i.e., to activities designed to maintain or restore the traditional standard of living of the community." Activities thus undertaken by the community could result in "an increase in ability to control its environment and to organize itself for development." Hirschman, however, concedes that of all the "inducement mechanisms," population growth is the most "clumsy and cruel stimulant" and "the least effective" of all.[6]

One of the purposes of this paper is to show that, though the theses summarized above may be valid in other contexts, they are largely inapplicable to contemporary China. The Keynesian model is irrelevant because the crucial problem confronting China is not one of an ineffective demand for capital but one of capital inelasticity; the Chinese economy is not an advanced economy where capital supply is abundant and where the important problem is how to assure the full employment of resources available.[7] Hagen's thesis (the economics of scale) is valid elsewhere but irrelevant to China because China is beset not by insufficient population, but by a capital shortage. Nor does his thesis that rapid population growth "absolves" a country from the consequences of erroneous investment decisions hold for China; it took China

[4] Colin Clark, *Population Growth and Land Use* (New York 1967), 237.
[5] As summarized in Clark, 256-57.
[6] Albert O. Hirschman, *The Strategy of Economic Development* (New Haven 1958), 176-82.
[7] Cf. Benjamin Higgins, "An Economist's View," in *Social Aspects of Economic Development in Latin America* (Paris 1963), II, 226; A. L. Levine, "Economic Science and Population Theory," *Population Studies*, XIX (November 1964), 139-54.

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quite a few years to recover from the losses wrought by the Great Leap, notwithstanding the size and growth rate of her population. As for Hirschman's thesis, it may be valid in a context where non-development is due to a lack of motive and passion for development, but it certainly does not apply to contemporary China. The Chinese leaders have been committed to rapid transformation of the economy and society whether population pressure exists or not. If anything, too much passion and impatience may be a curse rather than a blessing, as the Great Leap episode seems to suggest.

The central proposition of this essay is that rapid population growth hampers China's attempt to modernize her economy and realize full employment, and threatens her political stability.

THE 1953 CENSUS

In the modern period, few demographic questions could be of greater interest than the size and vital rates of the population of China. But China is probably the greatest demographic enigma of our time. She has had a long tradition of enumerating and registering her population for purposes of political control, tax collection, and conscription. In the twentieth century there have been three attempts at a more modern enumeration; the imperial Ch'ing Dynasty count in 1907, the Republican government survey in 1912, and the Nationalist government registration in 1928. Since these all fell in a period of political disunity, and since none of the governments had an administrative apparatus adequate to conducting a nationwide census, the results were defective and unreliable. In the absence of reliable data, numerous estimates have been attempted but their results tend to be conflicting and uncertain, and attempts at estimating the vital rates by means of small-scale sample surveys have also yielded conflicting results.[8] Estimates of total population range from a high of 600 million to a low of 350 million.[9]

Thus, when Peking announced in April, 1953, that a nationwide census in connection with the registration for elections to the National People's Congress was to be undertaken in June,[10] students interested in the population of China had good reason to celebrate. Since the Com-

[8] For tables listing such estimates, see John L. Buck, *Land Utilization in China* (Chicago 1937), 363; Karl J. Pelzer, *Population and Land Utilization* (New York 1941), 33.

[9] Ta Chen, *Population in Modern China* (Chicago 1946), 28-30; Irene Taeuber and Karl E. Taeuber, "The Fertility of the Chinese in Northeast China," *Proceedings of the International Population Conference* (Vienna 1959), 348-54; W. Thompson and C. M. Chiao, *An Experiment in the Registration of Vital Statistics* (Oxford 1938), 70.

[10] "Directive on National Census and Registration," *Jen-min Jih-pao* (April 3, 1953).

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munist regime was the first in modern times to have succeeded in establishing a unified administrative apparatus throughout the entire country and to have displayed unusual organizational skill, it was hoped that this enumeration would solve the longstanding demographic enigma once and for all.

After months of preparation and field work, the census was concluded in April, 1954,[11] and its results were officially released on November 1, 1954. According to the official communique issued by the State Statistical Bureau, mainland China had a total population of 582.3 million as of June 30, 1953.[12] On the same day Peking also disclosed the vital rates: a sample survey covering 30.18 million persons showed a birth rate of 37 per thousand, a death rate of 17 per thousand, and hence a natural growth rate of 20 per thousand.[13] If the State Statistical Bureau's figures are valid, China's population was growing by more than 12 million per year, a figure greater than that of the total population of many nations.

TABLE I.

POPULATION OF MAINLAND CHINA, 1949-1956
(in millions)

Year	*Year-End Figures*	*Percent Growth Over Previous Year*
1949	541.67	
1950	551.96	1.90
1951	563.00	2.00
1952	574.82	2.10
1953	587.92	2.29
1954	601.72	2.34
1955	614.65	2.14
1956	627.80	2.14

Source: State Statistical Bureau, "The Statistical Data on Our Country's Population, 1949-56" *T'ung-chi Kung-tso*, No. 11 (June 14, 1957), 24-25.

Instead of solving the demographic puzzle, the release of the 1953 census set another round of debate in motion.[14] This renewal of the

[11] For a detailed description of the progress of the census-taking, see *China News Analysis*, Hong Kong, No. 61.

[12] "Communique on the Results of the National Population Enumeration and Registration," *Jen-min Jih-pao* (November 1, 1954).

[13] Pai Chien-Hua, "600 Million—A Great Strength for Our Country's Socialist Construction," *Jen-min Jih-pao* (November 1, 1954).

[14] John S. Aird argues that the 1953 census represented a genuine effort on the part of the Communist regime to count the population of China and that the census results probably understate the true population size by 5 to 15 percent. See Aird, "Present

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debate arose not so much because the total population figure was incredibly high or the vital rates unusually low, but because Peking had withheld the release of further census data, except for a few aggregate figures such as age structure, sex structure, composition of nationalities, provincial population figures, and the vital rates. Some of the information given was either improbable or inconsistent with established demographic knowledge.[15] Demographic analysis becomes extremely difficult where detailed statistical data are not available, and this is the case for demographic analysis of the population of China. However, the existing

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and Prospective Population of Mainland China," in *Population Trends in Eastern Europe, the U. S. S. R. and Mainland China* (New York 1960), 94-116; Aird, "Population Growth," in Alexander Eckstein and others, eds., *Economic Trends in Communist China* (Chicago 1968), 183-328. Dwight H. Perkins, though agreeing with Aird on the nature of the 1953 census-taking, doubts that the margin of error could be as high as 15 percent. "Such an error would imply that the census takers missed two persons in every three families investigated, or perhaps failed to register as many as 1 in 7 families. . . . It is difficult to see how such an enormous number of mistakes could be made." See Perkins, *Agricultural Development in China, 1368-1968* (Chicago 1969), 201. John Durand, though willing to accept the official figure, questions the Communist claim of the accuracy of the enumeration by pointing out the methodological and operational deficiencies. See Durand, "The Population Statistics of China. A.D. 2-1953," *Population Studies*, XIII (March 1960), 246. Ping-ti Ho, also pointing out the procedural defects of the census, accepts its results as being "closer to the truth than any previous population figures" without hazarding a guess at the margin of error. See Ping-ti Ho, *Studies on the Population of China, 1368-1953* (Cambridge, Mass. 1959), 93-94. John L. Buck believes that "the Communist 1953 census figure . . . is undoubtedly more nearly correct than that of any previous census, and there is no reason to suspect the 1953 Communist census figure as being too high." Buck and others, *Food and Agriculture in Communist China* (New York 1966), 40. Of all the demographers who have studied the 1953 census returns, Irene Taeuber and Nai-chi Wang are most critical of all. They point out the "strikingly consistent patterns of similarities and differences" between the 1953 provincial registration figures and those of the 1850's and the 1928's, which were "defective and unreliable," and suggest that there had probably never been "either field enumeration or a controlled registration of the population of all China." See Taeuber and Wang, "Questions on Population Growth in China," in *Population Trends in Eastern Europe, the U. S. S. R. and Mainland China* (New York 1960), 263-302. Some Western-trained Chinese social scientists have also politely questioned the "scientific" quality of the 1953 census. At a symposium sponsored by the State Statistical Bureau on May 27, 1957, in connection with the Hundred Flowers campaign, Chen Ta criticized the processing of data by tallies at successive levels and recommended that a second census be taken in 1960 and that a pilot project be first set up at a *hsien* with a population of less than 300,000 that was not too far away from Peking in order to field-train cadres of the State Statistical Bureau. See "Chen Ta's remarks, *T'ung-chi Kung-tso*, No. 12 (1957), 1-2. Ma Yin-ch'u also suggested that the actual vital rates were probably higher than those reported by the State Statistical Bureau and recommended that a second nationwide census be taken in the near future. See Ma Yin-ch'u, "A New Theory of Population," *Jen-min Jih-pao* (July 5, 1957).

[15] Aird, for instance, points out the deficiency of persons aged 5 to 14 and the high sex ratio in this age-group and suggests that there was probably an undercount arising from biases in reporting age and selective omissions by age and sex. See John S. Aird, "Present and Prospective Population of Mainland China," in *Population Trends in Eastern Europe, the U. S. S. R. and Mainland China* (New York 1960), 109-115.

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evidence tends to suggest that the planners in Peking have generally used the same data in their own discussions and formulations of plans.[16] There has been no evidence suggesting a "nationwide network of deception," with the government in Peking giving one set of demographic data to the planners for internal use and another set for external consumption and propaganda purposes.

II. Population Growth and Economic Development

If the official figures for the vital rates are valid, then as early as 1953 China had already experienced a significant drop in the mortality rate while her fertility rate remained more or less stable at a fairly high level. The consequence of this decline in mortality and high, stable fertility rate was, of course, a rapid population growth. Since at this point a significant rise in real income had not occurred, the falling mortality rate cannot be accounted for by the Malthusian model. The decline, if true, must be a result of the cessation of internal wars, the effectiveness of public health measures, and an improved system of food distribution effected by the Communist regime.

The classical attempt at postulating a circular causation between demographic dynamics and economic development is, of course, the Malthusian theory of population, which postulates an essentially homostatic model: a rise in income per capita tends to lead to population growth through the mechanism of a decline in the mortality rate, which, in turn, tends to depress per capita income because of the diminishing returns to labor. In other words, the theory assumes a self-correcting mechanism in which the opposing forces, mortality and income (or, rather, means of subsistence), tend toward equilibrium within certain ranges.[17] However, the Malthusian theory has been proven wrong, largely because of its underestimation of the rapid rise in agricultural and industrial productivity resulting mainly from technological and organizational innovations.

Recent attempts at reformulating the same circular causation examine the economic effects of falling fertility, instead of considering the effects

[16] The articles published in *Chi-hua Ching-chi* [Planned Economy] in the 1950's all seem to suggest that the authors (i.e., the planners) had used the same set of data.

[17] A recent attempt at reformulating the Malthusian model in a more rigorous way was made by Leibenstein. See Harvey Leibenstein, *Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth* (New York 1957), 20 and 56; Richard R. Nelson, "A Theory of the Low-Level Equilibrium Trap in Underdeveloped Economies," *American Economic Review*, XLVI (December 1956), 894-908. For a more recent attempt at reversing the causal direction of the Malthusian model as an explanation of historical population, see Ester Boserup, *The Conditions of Agricultural Growth: The Economics of Agrarian Change Under Population Pressure* (Chicago 1965).

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of declining mortality on the economy and vice versa. This approach focuses on the economic effects of changes in age composition of the labor force, and consequent changes in its size, implied by declining fertility. By clarifying the effects of falling fertility on age composition, on the size of the labor force, and hence on the dependency burden, consumption, savings, investment, and the pattern of resource allocation, this approach shows that reduced fertility accelerates the rise in total income, and even more the rise in per capita income. This acceleration occurs because falling fertility brings about an age-composition that immediately increases the savings potential and makes it easier to realize a pattern of investment that increases capital equipment per worker and hence total output.[18] Our discussion of the economic consequences of rapid population growth in China will draw heavily upon the insights of this approach.

As Coale and others have demonstrated, the crucial determinant of the age-composition of a closed population is fertility rather than mortality.[19] Persistently high fertility tends to give rise to a broad-based, sharply tapering age-structure with a large proportion of the population under the age of fifteen, that is, under productive age. This kind of age-structure implies a high dependency burden—i.e., a high ratio of dependent persons (consumers) to persons at productive age (producers). As Table II shows, in 1953 a large fraction (36 to 40 percent) of China's population was under fifteen. When the per capita income is low, a high dependency burden forces the government to allocate a relatively large proportion of the national income to current consumption. In 1952-1957, the Chinese government was able to retain an annual average of 24 percent of national products for in-

[18] Ansley J. Coale & Edgar M. Hoover, *Population Growth and Economic Development in Low-income Countries* (Princeton 1958); "Growth Models for Illustrating the Effects of Alternative Employment and Investment Policies," United Nations, ECAFE, *Economic Bulletin for Asia and Far East*, IX (New York 1958); Stephen Enke, "The Economic Aspects of Slowing Population Growth," *Economic Journal*, XXVI (March 1966), 44-69. For a critique of this approach, especially the Coale-Hoover model, see Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama*, III (New York 1968), 2068-2075. Myrdal's criticisms are directed at (1) certain omissions (i.e., leaving out consideration of a number of important variables because they pose difficult problems of measurement), (2) certain arbitrary assumptions, and (3) the accuracy of the model, especially the narrow ranges of its results. These criticisms, however, supplement rather than invalidate the essential soundness of the Coale-Hoover model. Myrdal himself also concurs with Coale and Hoover regarding the "substantial" and "cumulative" economic benefits of fertility reductions. Myrdal, II, 1467.

[19] Coale, "The Effects of Changes in Mortality and Fertility on Age Composition," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, I (January 1956), 79-114; G. J. Stolinitz, "Mortality Declines and Age Distributions," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, I (January 1956), 178-215; N. Keyfitz, "Changing Vital Rates and Age Distribution," *Population Studies*, XXXII (July 1968), 235-52.

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vestment. Compared with that of other developing countries, this rate of capital formation is very high, the only comparable experience being that of the Soviet Union shortly before 1928.[20] Only totalitarian regimes are capable of realizing such a high rate of savings where per capita income is low. Needless to say, this high rate of savings entailed great sacrifice for the people of China. A lower dependency burden certainly would make it far easier for the Chinese government to realize the same rate of savings without entailing so great a sacrifice.

A large proportion of people under fifteen also means that a large proportion of savings has to be spent on education, housing, and other social-overhead costs. This diversion of savings to low-yielding and late-yielding social-overhead expenditure, although necessary for raising the productivity of the future labor force, means that a smaller proportion of savings is available to raise the total immediate output.

Assuming a certain capital/output ratio (or a certain incremental capital/output ratio), an increase in the labor force resulting from population growth means that a given amount of capital investment is needed merely to prevent per capita output from falling,[21] although faster population growth does not necessarily generate a larger supply of investable capital. In other words, in a low-income economy, an increase in the labor force means that less capital is available for each worker and thus hinders a rise in labor productivity. Yet a steady rise in labor productivity is an important index of sustained economic development and is necessary to a rise in income per capita.

A greater number of consumers, implied by a higher rate of population growth, means lower consumption per head and is likely to lower the morale and productivity of labor, partly as a result of lower levels of nutrition and partly because of lack of incentive.

III. Population Growth, Land Resources, and Agricultural Development

Where agriculture's share in the domestic product is significant and where the overwhelming majority of the labor force is employed in the agricultural sector, the rate at which agriculture grows to a great extent determines the overall economic growth. In spite of China's back-breaking efforts at rapid industrialization, agriculture still occupies a

[20] K. C. Yeh, "Capital Formation," in Eckstein and others (fn. 14), 509-548. See also T. C. Liu and K. C. Yeh, *The Economy of Chinese Mainland* (Princeton 1965), Table 13, 74.

[21] This and the diversion of savings to "social-overhead" expenditure are what Sauvy calls "demographic investment." See Alfred Sauvy, *Fertility and Survival* (New York) 110-123. See also Jan Tinbergen, *The Design of Development* (Baltimore 1958), 13-14.

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predominant position in the national economy and will continue to set the pace for overall economic development for some time to come. One of the major elements in agricultural production is land resources. Any judgment regarding the effect of the man/land ratio on agricultural development can be only provisional because the point of diminishing returns to labor, with a fixed supply of land, varies in proportion to the levels of farming techniques and capital investment.[22] Nevertheless, we may still argue that, when per capita income is low and the man/land ratio is extremely high (as is the case of China), rapid population growth tends to retard agricultural development if the cultivated areas cannot increase at a pace commensurate with the population growth.

One way of measuring the man/land ratio is by determining the number of persons per square mile regardless of the proportion of the population employed in agriculture or the proportion of land under cultivation.

TABLE II.

AGE STRUCTURE OF THE POPULATION OF MAINLAND CHINA, 1953

Age	*Modified Level 20 stationary population* (2)	*Population with constant fertility and falling mortality* (3)
All ages	100.0	100.0
0 to 4 years	15.6	16.7
5 to 14 years	20.3	23.1
15 to 24 years	17.0	18.5
25 to 34 years	14.8	14.5
35 to 44 years	12.2	11.0
45 years and over	20.1	16.2
45 to 54 years	9.4	8.0
55 to 64 years	6.4	5.0
65 to 74 years	3.3	2.5
75 years and over	1.0	0.7

Source: John Aird, *The Size, Composition, and Growth of the Population of Mainland China* (Washington 1961), 72.

Figured in this way, the population density of the People's Republic of China in the 1950's was about 170 persons per square mile.[23] However, treating the man/land ratio in this manner could be misleading. The mountainous character of most of China and its various climatic condi-

[22] Theodore W. Schultz, *Economic Growth and Agriculture* (New York 1968), 46-54.
[23] Li Fu-ch'un, "Report At the Sixth National Conference on Statistical Work," *T-ung-chi Kung-tso*, XXII (November 29, 1957), 6.

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tions greatly limit crop-growing areas; about nine-tenths of China is uncultivated. Only about 10 percent of the country grows crops of any kind, 20 percent has poor pastures, and another 10 percent is covered by forests. Most of the remainder is desert, mountains, or eroded land.[24] Therefore, the amount of arable land per capita is a much more meaningful measure.

TABLE III.

SIZE OF CULTIVATED LAND AREA, MAINLAND CHINA, 1949-1958

Year	*Hectares of Cultivated Land (in millions)*
1949	97.9
1950	100.4
1951	103.7
1952	107.9
1953	108.5
1954	109.4
1955	110.2
1956	112.0
1957	111.8
1958	107.8

Source: State Statistical Bureau, *The Great Ten Years* (Peking 1962), 113.

As Table III shows, the total average of cultivated land in the 1950's was around 107 million hectares. Per capita cultivated land was very low. As Table IV indicates, cultivated land per capita during 1952-1957 was slightly below 0.46 acres. Moreover, the first Five-Year Plan period witnessed a steady shrinkage of cultivated land per capita: from about 0.46 acres in 1952 to about 0.43 acres in 1957 (China's average figure for the 1950's, approximately 0.45 acres, may be compared with Japan's 0.3 acres, the Indian subcontinent's 0.7 acres, the Soviet Union's 1.8 acres, and 2.5 acres for the United States). In view of her steady population growth and lack of substantial expansion of cultivated areas, China's cultivated land per head must be steadily diminishing. In relation to her population size, her land resources are severely limited. Other things being equal, this fact alone would place China at a severe economic disadvantage.

What about the possibility of reclaiming wasteland as a means of increasing per capita cultivated land? Unfortunately, China is old, and most of the readily available cropping possibilities have been explored. Even the most optimistic pre-war estimates did not indicate that, in

[24] George B. Cressey, *Land of the 500 Million* (New York 1955), 103-104.

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TABLE IV.
CULTIVATED LAND PER CAPITA IN MAINLAND CHINA, 1952-1957

Source	*Year*	*Land per Head (acres)*
Li Fu-ch'un[A]	1952	.47
	1957	.43
Tan Cheng-lin[B]	1952	.46
	1955	.45
Wang Kuang-wei[C]	1952	.46
	1957	.44
Chi Chung-wei[D]	1952	.47
	1957	.44
Chao Hsueh[E]	1952	.47
	1956	.41

Sources: [A] Li Fu-ch'un, "Report at the Sixth National Conference on Statistical Work," *T'ung-chi Kung-tso*, No. 22 (November 29, 1957), 5.
[B] Tan Cheng-lin, "A Preliminary Study of the Income and Living Standard of the Peasants of Our Country," *Jen-min Jih-pao*, May 5, 1955.
[C] Wang Kuang-wei, "Several Questions Concerning the Development of Agriculture," *Hsueh Hsi*, No. 17 (September, 1957), 27.
[D] Chi Chung-wei, "Our Country's Industry Actively Supports Agricultural Development," *Ching-chi Yen-chiu*, No. 2 (February 17, 1958).
[E] Chao Hsueh, "On the Problem of Population Transfers and Land Reclamation," *Kuang-ming Jih-pao* (January 15, 1958).

China proper, total cultivated land could be expanded by more than 10 percent.[25]

According to the official estimate, China possesses about 100 million hectares of potentially reclaimable wasteland, approximately the amount of land presently under cultivation. Of these potentially reclaimable areas, 5.3 million hectares had been surveyed by 1957, about 3 million of which were found suitable for cultivation.[26] Even if China does possess such a vast amount of potentially reclaimable wasteland (which is quite possible despite contradicting previous estimates), reclamation still does not provide a satisfactory solution to the high man/land ratio. Assuming that each settler were allotted 2 hectares (4.94 acres) of wasteland, the total of 3 million hectares (7.4 million acres) could absorb only about 1.4 million potential settlers. If the allotment were reduced to 0.494 acres, which is only slightly larger than the average 0.44 acres of the 1950's, it would be theoretically possible to settle only

[25] Buck (fn. 8), 6.
[26] Li Fu-ch'un (fn. 23), 6; see also Ou Yu, "On the Problem of Population Resettlement and Land Reclamation," *Kuang-ming Jih-pao* (January 15, 1957).

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about 15 million people. This figure is equivalent to the population increase in a single year, assuming that China has a population of 600 million and that her natural growth rate is 2.5 percent a year. Aside from the problems of dislocation, the cost of reclamation and resettlement would be formidable and beyond her current financial capability.[27] Even if funds were available, the extremely high cost of reclaiming wasteland as compared to the cost of improving existing cultivated land would make reclamation a poor investment.

Because of this calculation, Chinese planners quite early ruled out, as uneconomical, raising agricultural output by reclamation of wasteland. Except for the opening up of state farms in Northern Manchuria and Sinkiang, the Communist approach to agricultural development has, from the very beginning, concentrated on raising the per-unit yield rather than on increasing the acreage through reclamation.[28] The measures introduced include enlarging sown areas by double-cropping (especially in South China and the Yangtze Valley, where rice cultivation predominates), expanding irrigated areas, controlling and draining flooded and water-logged areas, increasing the application of fertilizer, improving pest control, promoting improved strains and seeds, and so forth.[29] In the 1950's the Communist regime attempted to implement this approach by taking up the existing slack in the use of current resources; it increased the intensity and duration of labor utilization, without making substantial investments in modern capital inputs. This approach, in effect, attempts to develop agriculture by further exploiting the growth potential of traditional farming. However, though low in opportunity-cost, it is incapable of producing substantial agricultural growth, as poor agricultural performance in the 1950's bears eloquent witness. To modernize agriculture it is necessary to channel the scarce industrial resources into that sector,[30] but because of their scale of preference, the Communist decision-makers resisted the policy implications of this reality until the Great Leap fiasco forced them to face them.

[27] H. Yuan Tien, "The Demographic Significance of Organized Population Transfer in Communist China," *Demography*, I (November 1964), 220-226.

[28] See, for instance, "Draft Outline of the Plan for the Development of Agriculture," *Hsin-hua Pan-yeh Kan*, LXXXVIII (1956), 2-5; Liu Shao-chi, "Political Report to the Eighth Party Congress," *Jen-min Jih-pao* (September 17, 1956); Wang Kuang-wei, "Certain Problems Concerning the Development of Agriculture," *Hsueh Hsi*, No. 17 (September 3, 1957), 25-28.

[29] Kenneth Walker, "Organization for Agricultural Production," in Eckstein and others (fn. 14), 397-458; C. M. Hou, "Sources of Agricultural Growth in Communist China," *Journal of Asian Studies*, XXVII (August 1968), 721-37.

[30] Anthony M. Tang, "Policy and Performance in Agriculture," in Eckstein and others (fn. 14), 1968, 504.

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In his monumental study of China's agricultural development from 1368 to 1968, Perkins argues that over the centuries China has experienced something like a doubling of average unit-yields of grain, as a result mainly of expansion of the cultivated areas, somewhat less of changing cropping patterns and rising "traditional" capital input per unit of land, and even less of the introduction of new crop strains such as corn and potatoes. However, since most of these changes were closely related to increases in the labor force due to population growth, a corresponding rise in per capita grain output did not occur; per capita output fluctuated within narrow limits. Nevertheless, although China's traditional methods of grain production failed to raise per capita grain output, they did prove capable of preventing a decline in food intake as long as there were new lands to open up.[31] But by the middle of the twentieth century there was little virgin land left and even Manchuria, at the beginning of the century the only region with a significant amount of reclaimable wasteland,[32] had been settled by the 1950's. At the time when China was about to exhaust her arable land resources, her population growth began to accelerate, and demand for marketable grain rose considerably as a result of the rapid growth of the urban-industrial sector. Once there was no more new land to be economically brought under cultivation, China's traditional agriculture could not respond adequately to such a challenge.[33] In the decade following the Communist rise to power, grain output grew as fast as did the population, or somewhat faster. Since the per capita availability of grain was extremely low compared with that of the Soviet Union at the comparable stage of economic development (220 and 256 kilograms in 1952 and 1957 respectively as opposed to 415 kilograms in 1932),[34] this modest rate of agricultural growth effectively restrained the pace of China's drive toward industrialization. The period of the first Five-Year Plan (1953-1957) witnessed a cyclical pattern of growth in which the rate

[31] Dwight H. Perkins, *Agricultural Development in China 1368-1968* (Chicago 1969).

[32] In 1941 the Japanese estimated that about 28.7 million hectares of additional land in Manchuria could be brought under cultivation. See *Japan-Manchoukuo Yearbook* (Tokyo 1940), 710.

[33] Perkins (fn. 31), 189-91.

[34] In 1957 China's per capita grain availability was 256 kilograms. In contrast, in 1928, the Soviet Union's per capita grain availability was 480 kilograms. Thus, during comparable stages of their respective drives toward industrialization, China's per capita grain availability was less than half that of the Soviet Union. This difference accounts for the fact that whereas, in the Soviet Union agriculture permitted industrialization to proceed at a maximum level set by factors endogenous to industry and trade, in China the agricultural bottleneck has set the pace of her industrialization. See A. M. Tang, "Agriculture in the Industrialization of Communist China and the Soviet Union," *Journal of Farm Economics*, LIX (December 1967), 1118-34; Nicholas Spulber, "Chinese and Soviet Development Strategies," *Soviet Studies*, XV (July 1963), 1-16.

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of capital formation followed the harvest fluctuation by a one-year lag, because the volume of savings was largely determined by the harvest of the preceding year, and the state derived the bulk of its revenue (and hence investment funds) from the agricultural sector.[35]

By 1957 the traditional sources of agricultural growth began to dry up. As one economist puts it, attempts at raising farm productivity by placing primary reliance upon the exploitation of traditional sources of growth in the late 50's could extend the useful life of traditional farming by only a few years. To raise farm output significantly requires that substantial investment of modern capital be diverted into the farming sector.[36] The Great Leap campaign (1958-1959) was essentially such an attempt, and with its failure the Communist decision-makers realized the need to restructure their previous resource-allocation pattern. Since the early 1960's, the regime has channelled an increasing amount of modern capital into the farming sector—e.g., expanding rural electrification, increasing the production and distribution of modern farm implements, motors, electrical and diesel pumps, and greatly increasing the production and importation of chemical fertilizer.

This policy of increasing the investment of modern capital, together with the massive extension of modern farming methods and improved seeds, will undoubtedly raise the agricultural output considerably. However, in the face of continuing rapid population growth (2 to 2.5 percent a year in the 1950's), the expected increase in agricultural output will hardly meet the growing urban-industrial sector's demand for grain and light industry's demand for raw material. Furthermore, a rise in agricultural growth can, at best, provide a respite allowing China's program of industrialization to proceed for a short time unhindered by the bottleneck created by agricultural stagnation. If her population continues to grow at the current rate, or even at a lower rate, it will not be long before her agriculture is simply unable to absorb any additional labor or will absorb it at a very low level of marginal productivity. If by this time the process of industrialization has not reached a level where it can absorb a significant proportion of the increase in the labor force, the situation will be one of great misery for the masses of China's farming population and will also spell retardation or even stagnation of China's economic development.

[35] A. Eckstein, "Economic Fluctuations in Communist China's Domestic Development," in Tang Tsou and Ping-ti Ho, eds., *China in Crisis* (Chicago 1968), Book 2, 691, 729.

[36] A. M. Tang (fn. 30), 1968, 504-505. Two more students of China's economy, Perkins and Ishikawa, express essentially the same view. See Perkins (fn. 31), 189-91; Shigeru Ishikawa, "Factors Affecting China's Agriculture in the Coming Decades" (unpubl. manuscript), 1967; Shigeru Ishikawa, "Resource Flow Between Agriculture and Industry," *Developing Economics*, IV (December 1966), 3-49.

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IV. Industrialization and the Utilization of Labor

In China, where the man/land ratio is high, the proportion of the labor force employed in the farming sector is large and the prevailing productivity (except in the state farms) is low, industrialization probably offers the only promise of a substantial increase in income and living standards or mere prevention of their deterioration. Theoretically, industrialization can accomplish this by effecting transfers of labor from the agricultural to the nonagricultural sector, especially to the modern industrial sector, where productivity is usually higher than it is in the primary sector—particularly now, because of the rapid and accelerating increase in the labor force implied by a large natural increase of population. In this section we shall argue that, though industrialization may provide the only answer in the long run to China's problems of acute under-utilization of labor, low labor productivity, and low living standards, in the short run modern industry simply cannot absorb more than an insignificant fraction of the natural increment in the labor force for decades ahead.

Since the early 1950's, China has undergone rapid industrialization; for instance, the rate of domestic capital formation averaged 24 percent a year for the period of 1952-1957. This rise resulted in a drastic increase of the modern nonagricultural sector's share of the net domestic product (from 28.8 percent in 1952 to 41.2 percent in 1957).[37] In spite of this rapid industrial development, the proportion of the nonagricultural labor force remained almost constant, comprising only about 14 percent of the total civilian labor force in the 1950's.[38] And this condition may have persisted throughout the 1960's.

Table V presents two estimates of the growth of nonagricultural employment in the 1950's. As the two estimates show, nonagricultural employment grew rapidly during the early years of the Communist rule, 1949-1952; from 26.3-34.6 million in 1949 to 36.8-44.9 million in 1952, with an average annual growth rate of 9.1-11.9 percent. Since 1953, however, the growth rate of nonagricultural employment began to stabilize at a fairly low level. During the first Five-Year Plan, nonagricultural employment increased from 36.8-44.9 million in 1952 to 39.7-47.7 million in 1957. Of the total increase of 2.9-2.8 million, about 80-89 percent, or 2.3-2.5 million, was recruited in 1953. The balance of less than a half million was recruited during the subsequent four years, 1954-1957, averaging an annual growth rate of only 0.4 percent.

[37] Ta-chung Liu and Kung-chia Yeh, *The Economy of the Chinese Mainland* (Princeton 1965), 98.

[38] C. M. Hou, "Manpower, Employment, and Unemployment," in Eckstein and others (fn. 14), 376.

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TABLE V.

GROWTH OF NONAGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT IN MAINLAND CHINA, 1949-1958

Year	*Total (in millions)*		*Percent of Growth over Previous Year*	
	Emerson	Hou	Emerson	Hou
1949	26.3	34.6		
1950	30.3	38.6	15.4	11.6
1951	34.7	42.9	14.5	11.1
1952	36.8	44.9	5.8	4.7
1953	39.1	47.4	6.4	5.6
1954	39.8	46.8	1.6	—1.3
1955	38.9	45.4	—2.2	—3.0
1956	39.4	47.6	1.3	4.8
1957	39.7	47.7	0.8	0.2
1958	56.9	63.6	43.0	33.3

Source: John Philip Emerson, *Non-agricultural Employment in Mainland China: 1949-1958* (Washington 1965), 128.
C. M. Hou, "Manpower, Employment and Unemployment," in Eckstein and others, *Trends in Communist China* (Chicago 1968), 362.

Although the impressive growth rate of nonagricultural employment in the early years can be accounted for largely by the rapid economic rehabilitation following the cessation of the civil war in 1949, the modest growth rate in the subsequent years cannot be explained entirely by the techniques and scale chosen by the Communist regime. It cannot, for instance, be accounted for by the fact that during the first Five-Year Plan period the government channelled most of its investment into erecting 156 large-scale, capital-intensive projects.[39] The explanation is that industrialization, when proceeding from a low base, can have at most a marginal effect on labor-participation ratios during a very considerable early period. China's industrialization was, in the 1950's and 60's, and still is in the early phase of development. During this phase the employment-creating potential of an infant modern industry is very small. The effect of industrialization on the direct demand for labor is a function, not only of the pace of industrialization, but also of the position already achieved by modern industry in a national economy.[40] Thus, even if the Chinese government had opted for a much more labor-intensive approach to industrialization (by, say, doubling the labor per unit of investment), its effect upon

[39] Hou, *ibid.*, 377; K. C. Yeh, *Soviet and Communist Chinese Industrialization Strategies* (Santa Monica, May 1965).
[40] Myrdal (fn. 18), II, 1173-74.

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manufacturing would probably have increased employment in these industries by no more than 10 to 15 percent. As Myrdal observed about India, "Labor-intensive methods within the limits of feasibility set by presently available technologies for the production of modern lines of industrial output cannot aspire to raise enough demand for industrial labor to absorb more than a minor fraction of the natural increment in the population of working age."[41] A few figures should suffice to illustrate this point.

According to Sung Ping (a member of the State Planning Commission in the mid-1950's), the first Five-Year period saw an expansion of the "chi-king" (employees and workers employed in the modernized industrial sector and government) by about 1.3 million a year on the average. During the same period, the average annual increase in population was about 13 million and that of the labor force was about 4 million.[42] This meant that the modern nonagricultural sector was able to absorb about one-third of the new entrants to the labor force each year and the remaining two-thirds of the new entrants had to seek employment in the already overcrowded agricultural sector.

TABLE VI.

SIZE AND GROWTH RATE OF THE POPULATION OF CHINA BY URBAN AND RURAL RESIDENCE, 1949-1956

(Absolute figures refer to the year-end and are in thousands)

	Total		*Urban*		*Rural*	
Year	*Number*	*Percent Increase during 1 year*	*Number*	*Percent Increase during 1 year*	*Number*	*Percent Increase during 1 year*
1949	541,670		57,650		484,020	
1950	551,960	1.90	61,690	7.00	490,270	1.29
1951	563,000	2.00	66,320	7.50	496,680	1.31
1952	574,820	2.10	71,630	8.00	503,190	1.31
1953	587,960	2.29	77,670	8.43	510,290	1.41
1954	601,720	2.34	81,550	4.99	520,170	1.94
1955	614,650	2.14	82,850	1.59	531,800	2.24
1956	627,800	2.14	89,150	7.60	538,650	1.29

Source: "The Statistical Data of Our Country's Population, 1949-56," *T'ung-chi Kung-tso*, No. 11, June 14, 1957, 24-25.

[41] Myrdal, *ibid.*, 1199-1200.

[42] Sung Ping, "On the Question of Labor Employment," *Hsueh Hsi*, No. 12 (June 18, 1957), 25.

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Worse still, the same author contends that as of 1957 the urban areas alone would increase the labor force by about 1 million people annually. Given the high rate of urban growth, this number would certainly increase with time.

The creation of 6 to 7 million modern nonagricultural jobs was called for in the proposal for the second Five-Year Plan (1958-62). Since industrialization could create fewer than 1.5 million jobs a year, the labor supply from the urban areas alone would be adequate to staff them. This meant that the industrial sector would not be able to absorb any of the increment in rural labor force, the implication of which was that, other things being equal, there would be a decreasing utilization of rural labor.

What has been the condition of manpower-utilization in the countryside? According to one planner, there were approximately 260 million labor force units (*lao-tung-li*, "a standard unit representing the labor power of an individual person") in 1957.[43] He projected that during the second Five-Year Plan period labor-force units would increase annually by more than 4 million and that by 1962 there would be approximately 280 million labor-force units in China. Thus, additions to the labor force from the urban sector alone would more than suffice to fill all the modern nonagricultural jobs created. Assuming that the cultivable land could not be expanded substantially, the increase in the agricultural labor force would inevitably mean further shrinkage of cultivated land per capita and deterioration of labor-utilization in the rural areas.

Aside from the chronic under-utilization of labor, seasonal fluctuation has also been a serious problem. Although there is often a shortage of labor during the agricultural peak season, there are almost no employment opportunities during the winter months.[44] The 1957-1958 winter mobilization campaign represented, in a sense, the first nationwide experiment to overcome this seasonal fluctuation. The Great Leap, launched in late 1958, was an even more ambitious attempt to cope with this problem and to raise industrial and agricultural output by

[43] Wang Kuang-wei, "Some Opinion on the Arrangement of Agricultural Labor Force," *Chi-hua Ching-chi* (August 9, 1957), 6-9.

[44] For a discussion of seasonal fluctuation in labor utilization in the 1930's, see John L. Buck, *Land Utilization in China* (Chicago 1937), 295-96. Available surveys of the same phenomenon in the Communist period are summarized in Hou (fn. 38), 378-79. See also John P. Emerson, "Manpower Absorption in the Non-Agricultural Branches of the Economy of Communist China," *China Quarterly* (July-September 1961); Lee Orleans, "Problems of Manpower Absorption in Rural China," *China Quarterly* (July-September 1961).

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labor-intensive methods.[45] During 1958-1959, labor was moved out of agriculture and employed in industrial production and agricultural capital construction projects on a large and damaging scale. This huge transfer of the labor force not only failed to achieve sustained economic growth, but plunged China into an economic recession. In the aftermath, the urban population (which probably grew from 92 million in 1957 to about 130 million in 1960) was forcibly reduced to 110 million and urban employment was cut to roughly one-half that of the Great Leap period.

The experiences of economic development elsewhere suggest that an attempt to increase the nonagricultural labor force by more than 5 percent a year is likely to result in a lower or negative rate of growth in industrial productivity.[46] Since both the economic development of Meiji Japan and that of contemporary China may be regarded as instances of development "with unlimited supply of labor,"[47] the growth pattern of the nonagricultural labor force in Meiji Japan might provide some valuable clues to the future growth pattern of China. In the decade following the Meiji restoration, 1871-1881, the Japanese nonagricultural labor force grew on the average of 4.67 percent a year. In the subsequent decade, the growth rate decreased to 4.15 percent and further declined to 3.10 percent during the period 1891-1901. Subsequent decades witnessed a secular decline in the growth rate of nonagricultural employment.[48] Throughout this period, the growth rate of industrial productivity was lower than that of nonagricultural employment. However, in contemporary China the maximization of the growth rate of nonagricultural employment has not been an important consideration in economic planning. The rate at which labor can move from the agricultural to the nonagricultural sector is a function of the rate of growth of nonagricultural employment and the number of entrants into the labor force each year. There are essentially two ways whereby China

[45] Hou (fn. 38), 379-82; A. Eckstein, "The Strategy of Economic Development in Communist China," *American Economic Review*, LI (May 1961), 508-17; Shigeru Ishikawa, "Choice of Techniques in Mainland China," *Developing Economics*, II (September-December 1962), 39-49.

[46] There are two historical cases illustrating this: the Soviet Union in the period 1928-1937 when Stalin was implementing his forced rapid industrialization scheme and Canada in the decade 1900-1910 when there was a record rate of migration. See Clark (fn. 4), 259.

[47] W. Arthur Lewis, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor," *Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies*, XXII (May 1954), 139-91; reprinted in A. N. Agarwala and S. P. Singh, eds., *The Economics of Underdevelopment* (London 1960), 400-49.

[48] Mataji Umemura, "Agriculture and Labor Supply in Japan in the Meiji Era," *Developing Economics*, III (September 1965), 269-85.

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can hope to effect a steady inter-sectoral transfer of labor: (1) to achieve a faster rate of industrial growth, and (2) to reduce the number of future entrants into the labor force by inducing a decline in fertility. Needless to say, the two approaches are complementary rather than incompatible. Attempts at raising the rate of industrial growth have hitherto been handicapped by the agricultural bottleneck, and, in view of China's demographic dynamics, an increasing number of people are expected to enter the labor force each year. The combined effect of the two trends would result in a further deterioration of the unemployment situation and continuing under-utilization of the labor force. In China, as elsewhere, large-scale unemployment means a tragic waste of human resources as well as misery for the individuals affected. It also threatens the hard-won political order that successive governments of modern China have striven to bring about but that only the Communist Party has succeeded in accomplishing, after a century of chaos and disintegration.

V. Unemployment of the Educated and the Unrest of Youth

As we have noted, massive unemployment is one of the problems posed to China by a growing population. Unemployment and the underutilization of labor are phenomena well known in many contemporary developing countries; less well known, but increasingly attracting the attention of students of development, is the phenomenon of unemployment of the educated. Many developing nations are currently confronted with a situation in which the number of high-school and university graduates seeking employment far exceeds the economy's ability to provide them with jobs. This situation is due mainly to a slowly growing economy and a sudden increase of enrollment in the post-independence era, and its result is massive unemployment of educated youth,[49] frustration of whose legitimate aspirations for a gainful job tends to breed an alienated state of mind. According to one analyst, this alienation might explain why educated youth has played a leading role in the sporadic outbursts and riots of the Far East and Asia.[50]

[49] For discussion of the phenomenon of unemployment of the educated in South Asia, see Myrdal (fn. 18), II, 1124-31; Warren F. Ilchman, "People in Plenty: Educated Unemployment In India," *Asian Survey*, IX (October 1969), 781-95. See also A. C. Callaway, "Unemployment Among African School Leavers," *Journal of Modern African Study* (September 1963), 531-71, International Labor Office, "Unemployed Youth: An African Symposium," *International Labor Review*, LXXXVII (March 1963), 183-205.

[50] Ulla Olin, "Population Growth and Problems of Equipment in Asia and the Far East," in United Nations, *Proceedings of the World Population Conference, 1965*, IV (New York 1966), 314-17; S. Tangri, "Urbanization, Political Stability and Economic Growth," in Jason L. Finkle and R. W. Gable, eds., *Political Development and Social*

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As we have indicated, the magnitude of the under-utilization of labor in China has been such that there is no satisfactory solution in the foreseeable future. We might say that the Great Leap and the People's Commune movement represented a serious attempt to cope with massive under-utilization of labor and the Malthusian specter. After the failure of the campaign, the government retreated from its earlier radical measures and adopted a number of remedial measures in order to stave off an economic crisis and severe shortage of essential consumer goods in the urban areas.[51] One of the measures adopted was forced de-urbanization. Intent on stabilizing the urban population at around 110 million, the government reportedly forced 20 million recent migrants to return to the countryside. At the same time, the educational system began to release large numbers of high-school and university graduates. For some reason, it had retained most of its students in the first decade and released graduates only after 1960. "While the education system released to society only 3.3 million secondary and higher education graduates in the ten years of 1960, in the following six years it released about 23 million."[52] Many of these graduates were originally prepared to join an urban-industrial labor force twice as large as that of the post-Leap period, and the drastic shrinkage of the urban-industrial labor force, together with the release of large numbers of graduates, gave rise to a serious problem of educated unemployment.

In an attempt to solve the problem, the government further accentuated its policy of forced de-urbanization. Following the Tenth Plenum (October, 1962), Peking launched a "go-to-the-countryside campaign" (*Shan-san Hsia-hsiang Yun-tung*).[53] Although as early as 1956 Mao Tse-tung had called upon educated youth to go and resettle in the "vast rural areas" where "there is plenty of room for them to develop their talents to the full," as of 1962 the forced resettlement of

Change (New York 1966), 305-20; Myron Weiner, *Politics of Scarcity* (Chicago 1962), 184.

[51] For a discussion of the retrenchment policy adopted in the aftermath of the Great Leap, see Chao Kang, "Economic Aftermath of the Great Leap in Communist China," *Asian Survey*, IV (May 1964); P. P. Jones and Thomas T. Poleman, "Communes and the Agricultural Crises in Communist China," *Food Research Institute Studies*, III (February 1962), 3-22; P. C. Chen, "Individual Farming After the Great Leap," *Asian Survey*, VIII (September 1968), 774-91.

[52] Edwin F. Jones, "The Emerging Pattern of China's Economic Revolution," *An Economic Profile of Mainland China*, I (Washington 1967), 91.

[53] The campaign discussed here should be distinguished from the "hsia-fang" [downward transfer] campaign, although the two have much in common. For studies of the latter, see Rensselaer W. Lee, III, "The Hsia Fang System: Marxism and Modernization," *China Quarterly* (October-December 1966), 40-62; Hermia Chen, "The Ziafang [hsia fang] of Cadres: A Means of Mass Communication," *China Mainland Review*, II (March 1967), 257-61.

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educated youth had not assumed large proportions. Between the spring of 1962 and early 1964, some 292,000 junior and senior middle-school graduates were reportedly dispatched to the rural areas and frontiers,[54] and in 1964 alone, over 400,000 youths with primary- or middle-school education were reportedly transferred.[55] Between January and August of 1965, another 250,000 urban-educated youths were dispatched to the countryside,[56] the majority in rural people's communes and the rest joined on state farms, state forestry stations, and fisheries.[57]

They were assigned to the rural areas semi-permanently by means of official removal of each person's household registration from his original place of residence. Thus, he had no way of obtaining ration coupons if he ran away from the assigned place and returned to his home town, and if he did run away he was considered a "social youth" unfit for any position of responsibility. Since a runaway could not get ration coupons without a household registration certificate, he had to be supported by his family or, if he could afford them, he would purchase ration coupons on the black market. In spite of these measures, many refused their assignments and consequently had to be supported by their parents and odd-job earnings.[58]

From the government's point of view, the policy of forced resettlement was fully justified. The campaign helped to close the gap between manual and mental labor and to obliterate rural-urban differences. The educated youths could be of greatest service to the socialist motherland by resettling in the countryside where they could help diffuse modern farming techniques, operate modern farming implements and machinery, help administer agricultural production units at various levels, teach in primary and secondary schools, run adult literacy schools, and sponsor all sorts of useful cultural activities.[59]

Many youths who had invested time and effort in education with the expectation of filling challenging positions of responsibility in the new society thus found themselves forced to leave the city indefinitely. Their feelings of betrayal and disappointment must have made fertile soil for any cry of injustice, real or imagined. The "revolution of rising

[54] *Kung-jen Jih-pao* (March 22, 1964).
[55] *Jen-min Jih-pao* (February 19, 1965).
[56] *Jen-min Jih-pao* (September 25, 1965).
[57] Chin Yun, "Millions of Educated Youth Go to the Countryside," *Peking Review* (July 16, 1965), 10.
[58] For an eyewitness account describing the tension related to job assignment upon graduation, see Chi-ping Tung and Humphrey Evans, *The Thought Revolution* (New York 1966), 182-85.
[59] It goes without saying that a strong case can indeed be made for the desirability of adopting such a policy. The Peace Corps and Vista are essentially American counterparts of the Chinese campaign, except that they are run on a voluntary basis.

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expectations," fostered by the Party and reinforced by the solid accomplishment of the 1950's, thus gave way to a "revolution of rising frustrations."[60]

Under such circumstances, the need for an outlet for pent-up frustration outweighs any appeal for a rational and realistic appraisal of the situation, and it is not difficult to understand why Mao was able to harness the frustration of the young people (i.e., the Red Guards) and turn their hostility on the teachers, principals, rank and file of the Party, and other "capitalist roaders" who occupied positions of leadership denied to recent graduates. Nor is it difficult to understand why the Red Guards' assaults should have centered on the Party cadres and government functionaries who, in young eyes, wrongfully held their positions by virtue of seniority rather than of professional competence. Ever since their early school days these young men had been taught that the new society belonged to them. Accordingly, they had worked hard to prepare themselves for the expectation of making their place in it. However, upon graduation they found that opportunities for upward mobility were largely frozen and instead of getting rewarding posts, they faced the prospect of being sent to the countryside where, they were told, the socialist motherland needed them most. Their ensuing disappointment and feeling of betrayal was not likely to be soothed by the Party's ideological rationalizations and apologies. Though they played no part in initiating the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, once it was initiated they immediately seized the outlet for their pent-up frustration and launched extremely violent attacks on the established authority. In a very real sense, the recent dramatic outbursts of violence and hostility by the Red Guards against established authority had their roots in the social tension arising from the massive unemployment of the newly educated generation, sponsorship and encouragement from Mao notwithstanding.[61]

[60] Daniel Lerner, "Toward A Communication Theory of Modernization," in L. W. Pye, ed., *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton 1963), 330.

[61] Commenting on the Stalinist purges of the 1930's Zbigniew K. Brzezinski observed that the purges served two useful functions for the dictator. First, they provided an escape valve for popular discontent by allowing the tormented population the pleasure of seeing some of its tormentors get their come-uppance. Second, by removing senior Party cadres and functionaries, they provided openings for upward mobility within the Party and thus gave increased opportunity to lowly but ambitious party cadres. See Brzezinski, *The Permanent Purge* (Cambridge 1956), 33-36. In turning the furious youths against the rank and file of the Party, Mao might originally have entertained the hope of re-instilling revolutionary zeal in the young generation and thereby setting the country again on the path of "uninterrupted revolution," and of eventually replacing the purged Party "Capitalist roaders" with Red Guards who had tempered and proved themselves in the violent struggle in positions of responsibility. This expectation, however, was to prove to be unrealistic and was largely unfulfilled,

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During the Revolution of the Red Guards, all the college and middle-school students stayed out of school in order to "make revolution" full-time. After the armed intervention of the Peoples Liberation Army put an abrupt end to the Cultural Revolution, the Red Guards were ordered to return to school to "make revolution" there, and then to resettle in rural villages to be re-educated by peasants and to "make revolution" there. In December of 1968, Mao issued a directive: "It is very necessary for educated young people to go to the countryside to be re-educated by the poor and low-middle peasants. Cadres and other people in the cities should be persuaded to send their sons and daughters who have finished junior or senior middle-school, college, or university to the countryside. Let us mobilize. Comrades throughout the countryside should welcome them."[62]

After two years of suspension due to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the campaign of "going-to-the-countryside" was reinstituted.[63] Since late 1968 the mainland Chinese press has with increasing

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since in the course of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution the Red Guard units engaged in endless bloody factional struggles among themselves.

[62] "Chairman Mao Tse-tung's Latest Directive," *Peking Review*, No. 52 (December 27, 1968), 2.

[63] Connected with the revival of the resettlement policy has been educational reform, which Peking introduced in mid-1968. Because of the paucity of information on this new development, it would be unwise to make a definite statement about the shape this reform will take. However, on the basis of scattered information available and at the risk of simplification, we may suggest that the new curriculum decreases the proportion of purely academic subjects, increases that of "thought reform," and emphasizes transmission of practical, applied technical knowledge. Apart from Mao's apparently genuine conviction of the desirability of such a change, the reform may also be regarded partly as a response to the economic-demographic situation in which China finds herself at the present stage of development. When the urban industrial sector is growing too slowly to absorb many highly trained industrial technocrats, it does not seem very sensible to turn out a large number of engineering graduates. A much more sensible approach to development would be to restructure the educational policy in favor of training a large number of low-level agricultural technocrats in order to raise agricultural production in as short a time as possible. This may partly explain post-1968 emphasis on establishing a new type of agricultural middle school, at the grass-roots level, to be financed by communes or production brigades, and to recruit students from among the children of peasants. The curriculum of this type of agricultural middle school emphasizes indoctrination (i.e., studying the Thought of Mao Tse-tung) and transmission of simple arithmetical and literary skills (i.e., ability to read and do simple calculations and bookkeeping), as well as applied agricultural science (knowledge of how to apply fertilizer, man and service electrical pumps, plant new strains, control weeds and pests, and so forth). This type of school has three advantages. First, since it is financed locally, it not only costs the state nothing but also enables the state to channel its precious revenue previously allocated for the maintenance of "regular" middle schools to other investment purposes. Second, since the students are locally recruited, while in school they can help on the farm during the agricultural peak season, and upon their graduation the state will not face the problem of resettlement, which is both painful and costly. Third, this type of school will enable the state to train a large number of grass-roots agricultural technocrats who are in-

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frequency carried reports of resettlement in rural villages by primary- and secondary-school graduates, and other, scattered evidence tends to suggest that the policy of forcible resettlement of educated youth has been pursued more vigorously since its revival than it had been previously. In a sense this policy may be viewed as a device of the Maoists to remove many Red Guards from urban centers, thereby getting rid of one of the major forces obstructing the re-imposition of social order in China. But it is more than a mere device of convenience, for the policy does have its intrinsic merits.

Even though the recent violent uprising of the Red Guards in China, unlike many youth protest movements and riots in some South and Southeast Asian countries, did not occur spontaneously, the ease with which the Maoists were able to instigate it underscores the fact that China is not invulnerable to youthful protest and riots. This potentially poses a major threat to the political stability of China.

VI. Conclusion

Organski and Organski have argued that no nation can attain the status of a first-class power without a large population, and that population size plays an important part in determining future shifts in power, "usurping to a large extent the crucial role now played by the level of economic advance." In their view, China's population of 700 million bestows the "power potential" that may one day enable her to join the exclusive club of major powers. As they put it, "no war need win first place for China, and no war will stop her."[64] We have no quarrel with the Organskis' contention that a large population accrues "power potential" to a nation, but it is important to emphasize the subjunctive nature of their arguments. They do not argue that China, by virtue of her population, is a major power. All they argue is that, given the size of her population, if and when China does attain a relatively high level of economic advancement, she will command the status of a major power. For the time being, however, a more realistic and more important question is, given the natural increase rate of her population, if and when China will ever attain the level of economic productivity of the currently advanced countries. Even if the 1953 census results exaggerated her population by 50 to 100 million, she

dispensable to nationwide extension of modern farming methods. In short, post-1968 educational reform may be viewed as a step in the right direction in view of China's demographic-economic realities.

[64] Katherine & A.F.K. Organski, *Population and World Power* (New York 1961), 18-35. Also see Raymond Aron, *Peace and War* (New York 1966).

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would still have had a population problem of formidable proportions. The exact size of the population is immaterial. The combination of rapid population growth, high population density, and low per capita income pose problems with great social, economic, and political consequences.

In contemporary China, with agriculture occupying a predominant position in the national economy, agricultural development must keep pace with, if not outrun, sustained industrialization.[65] As her recent experience has amply illustrated, unless agriculture grows faster than it has, it will not be able to (1) produce increasing quantities of grain needed for the growing urban-industrial sector, (2) provide raw material to expand light industry, and (3) provide surplus for exports in exchange for capital goods. Otherwise growth of the industrial sector will be retarded. Even access to an unlimited quantity of foreign grain, which may be unpredictable and subject to political interference, would not eliminate the problem posed by slow agricultural development. Imports of large quantities of grain would cut into the hard-earned foreign exchange badly needed for importing essential capital goods, and a reduction in imports could in turn slow down industrial growth (as has probably taken place in recent years). Further, with the agricultural sector unable to supply sufficient raw material for light industry, China can scarcely hope to expand her light industry to the extent that she can export manufactured consumer goods in large enough quantities to pay for imports of grain and capital goods.

Given her low acreage per capita and her limited reclaimable wasteland, China's hope of raising agricultural products rests largely on increasing per-unit yields, an increase that requires raising the level of farming techniques and the investment of a vast amount of modern capital inputs. Yet the realities of low per capita income and rapid population growth converge to impede the achievement of higher rates of capital formation and the diversion of sufficient amounts of capital into agriculture. It would be difficult even if the pattern of allocation of resources were so revised as to favor the agricultural sector more than it has hitherto done.

In view of the Japanese and Taiwanese experience, we cannot seriously doubt that China can and will increase—even double—her per-unit yields in the decades ahead, provided that adequate investment is

[65] For discussion of the role of agriculture in economic development, see Bruce F. Johnston, and John W. Mellor, "The Nature of Agriculture's Contribution to Economic Development," *Food Research Institute Studies*, 1 (November 1960), 335-56; Johnston and Mellor, "The Role of Agriculture in Economic Development," *American Economic Review*, 11 (September 1961), 556-893.

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channelled into agriculture, tested farming technology is extended, and an appropriate form of organization for agricultural production is found and adopted. But even if China can eventually raise per-unit yields substantially, she can ill afford to let her population grow at the current rate. Unless the population growth can be slowed down, her hard-won increase in agricultural productivity will soon be offset, or more than offset, by the additional mouths that have to be fed.[66] With her population growing at the current rate, China will have to run very fast in order simply to stay where she is with respect to per capita availability of food and clothing, let alone health, education, housing, and other welfare provisions.

The steady transfers of labor from the agricultural to the nonagricultural sector is tantamount to increasing labor productivity and raising real income. Industrialization has thus far proved inadequate to effect drastic changes in the occupational structure of the labor force, and after almost two decades of an intensive drive toward industrialization, the occupational structure remains virtually unchanged. The reason for this stasis is largely that industrial development, when starting from a low base, cannot have more than a marginal uplifting effect on labor participation ratios during a very considerable early period. Continuation of the current rate of population growth leads to the inescapable predicament that, for a considerable time to come, China will be plagued by acute under-utilization of her massive labor force and low productivity in the agricultural sector unless ways and means of counteracting the present trend can be found.

Japan's history since 1868 has been one of spectacular success in modernization. There are a number of reasons for this success, one of which is unquestionably the favorable demographic dynamics prevailing at the crucial "take-off" stage. In the wake of the Meiji restoration, as the Japanese economy was experiencing rapid and secular growth, the population grew at the modest rate of about 0.5 percent a year. Thereafter, in the mid-1880's, the rate of natural increase began to rise steadily. After it had reached 1 percent a year in the 1900's, the trend of higher rate continued until the end of the Meiji era, never reaching 1.5 percent a year.[67] This low rate of natural increase at the crucial stage conse-

[66] Even the "Green Revolution," which holds the promise of doubling grain output in a few years, will only postpone the time of reckoning. Besides, the hybrid seeds that have been developed are intended for use in tropical and semitropical areas, which means they can be used only in regions south of the Yangtze river. For a documentation of the "Green Revolution," see Lester R. Brown, *Seeds of Change* (New York 1970).

[67] Minoru Tachi, "Population Trends and Economic Growth in Japan," in Kenneth Berrill, ed., *Economic Development with Special Reference to East Asia* (London 1964),

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quently produced age-structures and dependency-burden ratios conducive to rapid capital formation and sustained economic development. Needless to say, successful modernization is more than a function of favorable demographic dynamics at the crucial period, but to say this is not to deny that favorable demographic conditions at the initial stage tend to facilitate sustained economic development. The modest rate of population growth during the Meiji era, together with other favorable social, political, and psychological factors,[68] certainly helped Japan to overcome the difficulties posed by her unfavorable endowment and to effect a fundamental transformation of her economy and society in the course of one hundred years.

At a time when China is experiencing rapid industrialization, she is also encountering a population explosion, with her population growing at a rate of 2 to 2.5 percent a year. This is in sharp contrast to the annual rates of 1 to 1.5 percent that characterized the earlier population explosion in Japan and the presently developed countries of Western Europe and North America at comparable stages of development. A natural annual rate of 2 (or 2.5) percent means that her population will approximately double every 36 (or 27) years. Accordingly, it remains to be seen whether the Communist regime can, for all its determination, bring about a fundamental transformation of the Chinese economy and society.

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54. See also Minoru Tachi and Okazaki Yoichi, "Economic Development and Population Growth," *Developing Economics*, III (December 1965), 498-500.

[68] The last two decades have seen the emergence of a growing literature in English that attempts to account for the success of Japanese modernization from the point of view of various social science disciplines. See for example, William Lockwood, *The Economic Development of Japan* (Princeton 1954); Lockwood, "Japan's Response to the West: The Contrast With China," *World Politics*, IX (October 1956); Marion J. Levy, Jr., "The Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan," in Simon Kuznets and others, eds., *Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan* (Durham 1955), 496-536. Robert Bellah, *The Tokugawa Religion* (Glencoe 1959); Robert E. Ward, "Political Modernization and Political Culture in Japan," *World Politics*, XV (July 1963), 569-96; Norman Jacobs, *Origins of Modern Capitalism and East Asia* (Hong Kong 1968).

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Review Articles

SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND PUBLIC POLICY

Some Thematic Concerns

By RICHARD A. RETTIG

Joseph Haberer, *Politics and the Community of Science*, New York, Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1969, vi, 337 pp. $5.50

Edward Shils, ed., *Criteria for Scientific Development: Public Policy and National Goals*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, M.I.T. Press, 1968, xvi, 207 pp. $2.95

Kalman H. Silvert, ed., *The Social Reality of Scientific Myth: Science and Social Change*, New York, American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1969, 239 pp. $7.50

Paul J. Piccard, ed., *Science and Policy Issues: Lectures in Government and Science*, Itasca, Illinois, F. E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1969, ix, 156 pp.

Lars Dencik, ed., *Scientific Research and Politics*, Lund, Sweden, Studentlitteratur, 1969, 203 pp.

I

IT is now twenty-five years after World War II, the event that permanently established the large-scale, symbiotic relation between the scientific and technological communities and the political-governmental system. It is now fifteen years since Don Price opened the world of "science and public policy" to his colleagues in government and the university.[1] The analysis and commentary that followed Price's book has been as diffuse as the subject has been complex,[2] and of uneven quality. It was described several years ago as a "literature in search of a field."[3]

Increasingly, however, respectable analytical work is emerging that suggests certain thematic concerns capable of giving shape and direction to the study of "science, technology, and public policy." The importance of agreement on major themes cannot be overemphasized,

[1] Don K. Price, *Government and Science* (New York 1954).

[2] See Lynton K. Caldwell, ed., *Science, Technology, and Public Policy: A Selected and Annotated Bibliography*, Vols. I and II (Bloomington 1969), for the most extensive and thorough bibliographic source through 1967.

[3] Brewster C. Denny, "Science and Public Policy: A Literature in Search of a Field," *Public Administration Review*, XXV (September 1965), 239-48.

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since such agreement is essential to the cumulative development of data and theory in this area of inquiry. An effective "invisible college"[4] is one having some measure of consensus regarding its research agenda. It is the purpose of this review, then, to highlight three themes that emerge from the above books, and to suggest how they might be extended through further research.

II

Joseph Haberer has written the most important book about the relations between the scientific community and the political realm since the appearance in 1965 of *The Scientific Estate*.[5] In *Politics and the Community of Science*, he has "deliberately emphasized the link between the politics of science and the social responsibility of scientists" (p. iii). He has thus been sensitive to Sayre's admonition that "particularly for political scientists interested in the supposed new confrontation of government and science, it would seem that their professional curiosities most effectively begin, though they need not end, with the varied roles of scientists in the political system . . . rather than with an elusive abstraction labeled science."[6] Haberer's analysis is at once imaginative, complicated, and provocative in both its empirical findings and its normative implications.

The argument can perhaps be grasped most readily if represented schematically.

This representation is an effort to highlight both the explicit and implicit arguments of the book. Explicitly, the political attitudes and behavior of the acknowledged leaders of the scientific community receive attention through three case studies that examine their response to crises in which the "fundamental values, key institutions, and leaders" (p. 9) of science are under attack. The first study is of the respective roles of Bacon and Descartes in founding the institutions of modern science, and in establishing the legacy of "prudential acquiescence" as the dominant pattern of political behavior.

The roots of prudential acquiescence are found in Bacon's utilitarian view of science and in his view that science should be an ally of the state. In the long run, he saw as one effect of science the preemption of politics through administration, a viewpoint very much alive today. But when confronted with an attack on his own political position, viz., in 1621 when he fell from his position as Lord Chancellor, he acquiesced

[4] Derek J. de Solla Price, *Little Science, Big Science* (New York 1963), 83-86.
[5] Don K. Price, *The Scientific Estate* (Cambridge, Mass. 1965).
[6] Wallace S. Sayre, "Scientists in Politics," *Science*, CL (29 October 1965), 595-96.

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LINKAGE BETWEEN THE POLITICS OF SCIENCE AND THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF SCIENTISTS

Historic Period	*Internal Development of Science*	*Interaction of Scientific and Political Realms*	*Political Attitudes and Behavior of Scientists*
early 17th c.	Founding of modern science; Cartesian in organization.	Very limited; one of essential autonomy of science; goodwill of state minimal requisite.	Cartesian view—disengagement; Baconian view—science as ally of state; prudential acquiescence to state when conflict arises.
middle 19th c.	Professionalization occurs; Baconian model is increasingly important in organization.		
middle 20th c.	Highly organized; development affected by state support.	Permanent interdependence; W. W. II is watershed; power of scientific community is greatly enhanced.	Prudential acquiescence manifest; coming to terms with political reality occurs.
Future		Science becomes a (the) "leading institution" of society.	Social responsibility must be developed commensurate with enhanced power.

to his political enemies with hardly a murmur: for whatever reasons, "Bacon clearly preferred Survival over Pride and Honor" (p. 85). And survival may be the most important value for men and institutions growing in power but still vulnerable.

Descartes, in contrast to Bacon's utilitarianism, saw science as an endeavor of genius dedicated to the comprehension of the entire natural universe. Disengagement from the state was the indicated posture if one were to master this objective. Mastery, or domination, indeed, was the desire that united the objective of science with the Cartesian scientist's ego. The desire for domination, coupled with disengagement from the political realm, led to prudential acquiescence in response to political attack: if one could not dominate the political realm, as one could not,

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then capitulation was the only alternative. Thus, the founders of modern science bequeathed to it the legacy of the politics of prudential acquiescence.

The second case study examines the response by German scientists to the purge from their ranks of Jewish scientists in 1933-34, set against the years from 1919 through 1945. There can be no doubt that prudential acquiescence characterized the behavior of the leaders of German scientists during these years. Nowhere does the empirical evidence fit so closely to the hypothesis as it does here.

The third case is the response of American scientists to the 1954 hearing (or trial) of J. Robert Oppenheimer. Oppenheimer was the model Cartesian scientist—Berkeley in the thirties, Los Alamos in World War II, the Institute for Advanced Studies from 1947 until his death in 1967. He was strangely disengaged from politics—completely detached before 1936, acutely conscious of the power of The Bomb yet not opposed to its use against Japan, supportive of the Baruch plan although aware of the implausibility of its adoption, opposed to construction of the hydrogen bomb yet unwilling to resign the chairmanship of the General Advisory Committee. In 1954, he was passive and personally disengaged from the issue of the hearing, ineffective in personal defense, weak in public statements; and he failed to exhaust all possible remedies. Similarly, the scientific community was initially divided on the charges against J.R.O., and later on the A.E.C. decision. Interpretation of the case was left to nonscientists, with the exception of the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*. Oppenheimer and the American scientific community, Haberer concludes, manifested prudential acquiescence to the United States government in this critical situation.

How adequate, we must ask, is the term prudential acquiescence for empirically describing the political behavior of the scientific community? It is not clear. The three cases constitute a rather selective sample: for instance, Haberer attaches some importance to the professionalization of science in the mid-nineteenth century, yet selects no illustrative case from this period. Crises, moreover, may be of heuristic value for analysis, but their value for descriptive and prescriptive theory depends upon their frequency. The German case is persuasive. But how important were Bacon and Descartes for the institutional founding of modern science?[7] And if Oppenheimer suffered less disavowal than

[7] Joseph Ben-David, "Scientific Growth: A Sociological View," *Minerva*, II (Summer 1964), 455-76; see also C.H.G. Oldham, "Science and Social Change: Politics and the Organization of Science," in Kalman H. Silvert, ed., *The Social Reality of Scientific Myth* (New York 1969), 203-211.

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Bush and Conant by the scientific community, to what extent did he retain a role of leadership within the scientific community? Or, can the failure of the scientific community to come to the defense of a former leader under oblique attack for his political views and their pertinence to his complicated role as policy adviser be rightly considered a case of prudential acquiescence in an attack upon science? Perhaps, but it is not entirely clear.

The notion of prudential acquiescence does suggest, however, a spectrum along which it is possible to evaluate the political behavior of the scientific community. That spectrum ranges from partisan support for the government through prudential acquiescence and prudential opposition to "partisan opposition." It can be represented in the following manner:

POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY*

Political Issue	*Partisan Support*	*Prudential Acquiescence*	*Prudential Opposition*	*Partisan Opposition*
N.B.S. Director[8] (1953)			Scientific community	
N.S.F. Director[9] (1969)		S.A.P.	N.A.S.	A.I.B.S.
A.B.M. Debate[10] (1969)	O.D.D.R.E.	O.S.T.	Former insiders	Ralph Lapp
Mansfield[11] amendment (1969-70)		Scientific community	O.D.D.R.E./ Sec. Def.	
H.E.W. Blacklist[12] (1969)		N.I.H. Establishment	American Orthopsychiatric Association	
N.S.F. Budget[13]		N.S.F. N.S.B. Former insiders		

* Abbreviations: N.B.S. = National Bureau of Standards; N.S.F. = National Science Foundation; S.A.P. = Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology; N.A.S = National Academy of Sciences; A.I.B.S. = American Institute of Biological Sciences; O.D.D.R.E. = Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering; O.S.T = Office of Science and Technology; Sec. Def. = Secretary of Defense; A.B.M. = anti-ballistic missile; H.E.W. = Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; N.I.H. = National Institute of Health; N.S.B. = National Science Board.

[8] Samuel A. Lawrence, "The Battery Additive Controversy," in Edwin A. Bock and Alan K. Campbell, eds., *Case Studies in American Government* (Englewood Cliffs 1962), 325-68.

[9] Philip M. Boffey, "Nixon and NSF: Politics Block Appointment of Long as Di-

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The above suggests a range of political activity far broader than prudential acquiescence that, nevertheless, builds upon that pregnant term. The A.B.M. debate is the only issue not directly pertinent to science itself, and constitutes another instance in which divisions among the scientists and technologists approximate those within the larger political arena.[14] The other issues are all directly pertinent to science: the two cases of the N.B.S. Director and the N.S.F. Director suggest great concern within the scientific community for defending positions of leadership; the cases affecting resource allocation, the Mansfield amendment, and the N.S.F. Budget suggest more passivity than we might expect on the issue presumably most salient to the scientific community; the H.E.W. blacklist remains a puzzle because of its prolonged existence

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rector," *Science*, CLXIV (18 April 1969), 283-84; Philip M. Boffey and Bryce Nelson, "NSF Directorship: Why Did Nixon Veto Franklin A. Long?" *Science*, CLXIV (25 April 1969), 406-411; Philip M. Boffey and Bryce Nelson, "NSF Director: Nixon Admits He Was Wrong," *Science*, CLXVI (2 May 1969), 532-34.

[10] Richard L. Garwin and Hans A. Bethe, "Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems," *Scientific American*, CCXXII (March 1968), 21-31; Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, *Anti-Ballistic Missile: Yes or No?* (New York 1968); Abram Chayes and Jerome B. Wiesner, eds., *ABM: An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Anti-Ballistic Missile System* (New York 1969); Johan J. Holst and William Schneider, Jr., eds., *Why ABM? Policy Issues in the Missile Defense Controversy* (New York 1969); William R. Kintner, ed., *Why the ABM Makes Sense* (New York 1969); John Walsh, "ABM: Scientists' Loyal Opposition Finds a Forum," *Science*, CLXIII (21 March 1969), 1309; John Walsh, "ABM and the Scientists: A Long Dialogue Continues," *Science*, CLXIII (28 March 1969), 1436-38; Bryce Nelson, "ABM: Scientists are Important in Building Senate Opposition," *Science*, CLXIV (9 May 1969); 654-56; Philip M. Boffey, "ABM: Critical Report by Scientists Brings Sharp Pentagon Rebuttal," *Science*, CLXIV (16 May 1969), 807-810.

[11] Andrew Hamilton, "Basic Research: Congress on Prowl," *Science*, CLXVI (14 November 1969), 849; John Walsh, "Pentagon Promises to Observe Congressional Curbs on Research," *Science*, CLXVI (12 December 1969), 1386-88; Philip M. Boffey, "Mansfield Amendment Curb on Basic Research May Spread," *Science*, CLXVII (13 March 1970), 1473; Andrew Hamilton, "Laird Seeks Industry Aid to Defeat Mansfield Amendment," *Science*, CLXVII (20 March 1970), 1599; U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Astronautics, *Mission Agency Support of Scientific Research*, Report, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., 1970.

[12] Bryce Nelson, "Scientists Increasingly Protest HEW Investigation of Advisors," *Science*, CLXIV (27 June 1969), 1499-1504; Bryce Nelson, "HEW Security Checks Said to Bar Qualified Applicants to PHS," *Science*, CLXV (18 July 1969), 269-71; Richard D. Lyons, *New York Times*, October 9, 10, 11, and 12, 1969; Bryce Nelson, "HEW Blacklisting Issue Ignites Again," *Science*, CLXVI (17 October 1969), 357; Nancy Gruchow, "Blacklists: HEW Revisions Due," *Science*, CLXVI (26 December 1969), 1607; Bryce Nelson, "HEW: Blacklists Scrapped in New Security Procedures," *Science*, CLXVII (9 January 1970), 154-56.

[13] Philip M. Boffey, "NSF Budget: House Group Reacts to Data on Plight of Science," *Science*, CLXVIII (3 April 1970), 95-97; John Walsh, "Kennedy Asks More for NSF," *Science*, CLXVIII (17 April 1970), 347; Philip M. Boffey, "Recession in Science: Ex-Advisors Warn of Long-Term Effects," *Science*, CLXVIII (1 May 1970), 555-57; U.S. National Science Board, *The Physical Sciences* (Washington 1970).

[14] See, for example, Robert Gilpin, *American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy* (Princeton 1962), esp. 262-342.

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prior to the controversy. In any event, there are a wide variety of political styles adopted by the scientific community on political issues affecting them that need further elaboration,[15] of which prudential acquiescence is only one. The examination of political issues and political styles should be coupled with careful attention to the potential efficacy of scientists, a matter we are unable to address here.

Haberer's less explicit but no less important argument is that the professionalization of science that began in the mid-nineteenth century has now converged with the permanent interdependence of science and the contemporary state to enhance appreciably the political power of the scientific community. The scientific community is ill-equipped to deal with this enhanced power, however, because of both the tradition of prudential acquiescence and the absence of a strong institutional ethic governing relations between science and its external environment. It is obligated, therefore, to develop an ethic commensurate with its new political power and, by doing so, to fulfill the social responsibility of science. The need for such an ethic is made especially critical by the anticipation that science is on the threshold of becoming a (the) "leading institution" of society.

Let us examine the leading-institution argument. A leading institution of society may be the religious, military, economic, or other vocational community whose "values and patterns of conduct are preeminent" (p. 3) at a given time, and that is capable of exerting political and social control through representatives who have reached "the seats of power and [have] cast the imprint of their institutions upon a social order" (p. 4). Though the leaders of the scientific community "have not attained the influence and power which would make them, in effect, spokesmen for a pervasive leading institution" (p. 4), they may be on the threshhold of such power. Why, we ask? Because science has already "radically altered man's image of himself and of his place in the cosmos" (p. 4); it has established for society the objective of power over nature; it has impressive problem-solving accomplishments to its credit; consequently, some now "argue persuasively that science may solve man's political and social problems with equal success" (p. 5). Moreover, the rate of growth and the magnitude of the scientific enterprise indicate "a potential for power and influence that has not been fully utilized" (p. 6), since the large-scale investments in research and

[15] David Nichols has elaborated several of these political styles in "Scientists and Politics," paper presented at Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (New York, September 1969); and in "The Political Attitudes of Elite Scientists," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (Boston, December 1969).

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development that characterize modern industrial society will "require a significant measure of planning, hierarchical leadership and bureaucracy" (p. 302). Thus, the perceived instrumental value of science and the associated managerial responsibilities of large-scale science are major reasons that suggest why science, in Haberer's view, is likely to become a (the) leading institution of society.

It is not apparent, however, that there exists a value-consensus in American society, at any rate, that would support such a role for science. Many of the values of science are consonant with the values of a democratic society,[16] but there is a sufficiently deep and powerful reaction against science and technology among university students today to draw our attention to the mismatch between the perceived values of science and those of a democratic society.[17] The Faustian image of science, embodied most vividly in The Bomb, almost guarantees a residual set of hostile and antagonistic attitudes.[18]

It is clear that the late 1950's and early 1960's did witness the movement of natural scientists into positions of national power and influence. But how much power and how enduring the influence? Greenberg has argued that the power of the scientific elite has rather severe limits.[19] Price, who argued in the mid-1960's that science had become an "establishment" taken on faith by the polity,[20] has more recently sought to defend science from attacks from both left and right.[21] Many observers who initially confused the presence of scientists in high places with the possession of political power, have concluded that the scientific community has declined in its political power. The short run, then, does not suggest that science is about to become a (the) leading institution of society. The long run is an open question.

[16] Robert K. Merton, "Science and the Democratic Social Order," in *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe 1957), 550-61; Bernard Barber, *Science and the Social Order* (New York 1962), 93-121.

[17] Robert S. Morison, "Science and Social Attitudes," *Science*, CLXV (11 July 1969), 150-156.

[18] See, for example, the case of James Shapiro, who withdrew from research in genetics at the age of 26 after having participated in a team that had achieved a brilliant scientific success by isolating a pure gene from a bacterial virus for the first time in history, in James L. Glassman, "Harvard Genetics Researcher Quits Science for Politics," *Science*, CLXVII (13 February 1970), 963-64; and letters in *Science*, CLXVII (27 March 1970), 1668-69, and *Science*, CLXVIII (12 June 1970), 1285.

[19] Daniel S. Greenberg, "The Myth of the Scientific Elite," *The Public Interest*, 1 (Fall 1965), 51-62.

[20] Don K. Price (fn. 5); and Don K. Price, "The Scientific Establishment," in Robert Gilpin and Christopher Wright, eds., *Scientists and National Policy Making* (New York 1964), 19-40.

[21] Don K. Price, "Purists and Politicians," *Science*, CLXIII (3 January 1969), 25-31.

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The social responsibility of science is a major concern of Haberer's, and especially as it is exercised by the collective behavior of the scientific community. He says, "A strong *methodological ethic* and a weak *institutional ethic* have infused the scientific enterprise" (p. 321). The methodological ethic governs science internally, maintains its integrity, reinforces its norms and values, and provides sanctions against falsification, plagiarism, and other kinds of scientific fraud. This ethic, it is worth noting, is operationally necessary for science; further, it is not embodied in any formal statement of ethics but is part of the oral tradition of science. It is the weak institutional ethic, however, that troubles Haberer. This ethic governs relations between science and its external environment: it provides little check on prudential acquiescence, is inadequate in providing for the defense of science, and clearly is inappropriate to a potential leading institution.

Two questions are pertinent. First, can we suggest the empirical roots of the weak institutional ethic? And second, what is the appropriate formulation of the problem of the social responsibility of science? The answer to the first question is found in part in an understanding of the nature of the scientific community. A rich body of literature in the sociology of science deals with the historical development of science,[22] the social system of science,[23] and the communication system of science.[24] Several novels and certain biographical materials amplify this literature.[25] The picture of science that emerges from this literature is that of a closed community linking individual scientists together in competitive/cooperative relations, variously described as disciplines, fields, "invisible colleges," "peer groups," or "neighborhoods of science";

[22] Ben-David (fn. 7); Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago 1962); Robert K. Merton, "Puritanism, Pietism, and Science," and "Science and Economy of 17th Century England," (fn. 16), 574-606 and 607-627.

[23] Barber (fn. 16); Warren O. Hagstrom, *The Scientific Community* (New York 1965); Robert K. Merton, "Priorities in Scientific Discovery: A Chapter in the Sociology of Science," *American Sociological Review*, XXII (December 1957), 635-59; Norman W. Storer, *The Social System of Science* (New York 1966).

[24] Derek J. de Solla Price: (fn. 4); also "Networks of Scientific Papers," *Science*, CXLIX (30 July 1965), 510-15; and with Donald deB. Beaver, "Collaboration in an Invisible College," *American Psychologist*, XXI (November 1966), 1011-18; Herbert Menzel, "Scientific Communication: Five Themes from Social Science Research," *American Psychologist*, XXI (November 1966), 999-1004; American Psychological Association, *Reports of the American Psychological Association's Project on Scientific Information Exchange in Psychology*: I, II, III (Washington, December 1963, December 1965, January 1969).

[25] Sinclair Lewis, *Arrowsmith* (New York 1925); C. P. Snow, *The Search* (New York 1960); Jeremy Bernstein, "A Question of Parity: T. D. Lee and C. N. Yang," in *A Comprehensible World: On Modern Science and Its Origins* (New York 1967); James D. Watson, *The Double Helix* (New York 1968).

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the individual scientist is rewarded by the professional recognition granted by his scientific peers on the basis of his published scientific research.

What does it mean, in the light of the above, to speak of the profession of science? The professionalization of science that occurred in the mid-nineteenth century saw the decline of the amateur scientist, the rise of organized training for new scientists, and the creation of new forms of educational certification. To be a professional scientist means to be full-time at it. In another sense, though, science is not a profession like law, medicine, engineering, and architecture. Men in these professions have clients, are client-oriented, receive material reward for their services from their clients, and normally have formal statements of ethics governing relations between themselves and their clients, peers, employers, and the public. Scientists, by contrast, have no clients, are peer-oriented, receive the reward of professional recognition—the coin of the realm—from their peers, and do not have formal statements of ethics governing their relations outside the scientific community. In short, without excusing the absence of a strong "institutional ethic" among scientists, we can in large measure explain that absence by the fact that scientists are oriented primarily to other scientists and to the internal business of the scientific community, not to the external world beyond science. A strong institutional ethic for science will emerge more slowly than it has for other professions because the demand for it does not flow directly from the workaday world of the scientist.

A good deal has been written about the social responsibility of science, much of it addressed to the moral responsibility of the individual scientist for the use of his work. Some scientists have denied responsibility for the use of their research, arguing that that responsibility is borne by others and their responsibility begins and ends with doing good science. Other scientists have refused to do research they thought might in its use be detrimental to humanity.[26] Haberer is rightly concerned about the collective responsibility of the scientific community, especially in relation to the well-being of science. His concern leads us to ask what the appropriate formulation of the question of social responsibility is.

The problem of the social responsibility of science consists of two questions: Whose responsibility? For what? Responsibility resides with the individual scientist, the scientific community, and the polity; it is

[26] Haberer points to Bridgman as an example of the first type and to Wiener as illustrative of the second, 313-18; see also the discussion of Shapiro regarding the second type (fn. 18).

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exercised with respect to the health of science and the use of science. Restated, the problem is the social responsibility of/for science. This can be represented in the following manner:

THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF/FOR SCIENCE
LOCUS OF RESPONSIBILITY

Nature of the responsibility	*Individual scientist*	*Scientific community*	*The polity or society*
Health of science		X	Shared
Use of science		Shared	X

Let us consider the use of science first. The above representation suggests that responsibility is shared between the scientific community and the polity, leaving aside the behavior of the individual scientist, but that the primary responsibility resides with the polity. The basis for this statement is that science is utilized mainly through technology for which scientists are only partly responsible, that scientists are frequently divided among themselves on issues of use along lines that parallel divisions in the polity,[27] and that the only legitimate authority capable of assuming such responsibility resides with the polity. If this prescriptive view is valid, then the main problem is to build the institutions, processes, and instruments of control by which the use of science and technology is subjected to societal purpose.

Concern for the health of science is also a responsibility shared by the scientific community and the polity, though primary responsibility here resides with the scientists. Haberer is concerned that a vocational community like science has the responsibility "first of all to acquire a considerable degree of internal autonomy" in order to "be able to protect the essential values embodied in their practice, the institutions on which it depends, and the members which make up its community from attacks which would weaken or destroy them" (p. 319). Historically, the scientific community has had a great deal of autonomy from the state, but that has been reduced by the current dependence of science upon large-scale public support. One consequence of this reduced autonomy is that the protection of the values and institutions

[27] Gilpin (fn. 14); see the editorial by Philip H. Abelson, "Social Responsibilities of Scientists," *Science*, CLXVII (16 January 1970), 241, for an interesting point of view on this matter.

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of science has become the common responsibility of the scientific community and the polity. And much time and attention has been devoted by the scientific community and the United States government, for example, to working out the appropriate balance between scientific autonomy and public accountability.[28]

III

Beyond the matter of autonomy, however, the health of science is dependent upon the provision to science, by the public, of adequate financial resources. This leads us naturally to a consideration of national science policy. Edward Shils, in *Criteria for Scientific Development: Public Policy and National Goals*, has conveniently brought together the major articles on national science policy that appeared in *Minerva* from its inception in 1962 through its first five years. The making available of these articles to a wider audience is a welcome event.

Shils gives the objective of science policy as "the deliberate effort to influence the direction and rate of development of scientific knowledge through the application of financial resources, administrative devices, and education and training insofar as these are affected by political authority" (p. ix). Discussion of this subject is given urgency, according to Shils, by the scarcity of resources, the need for priority in their allocation, the propensity toward marginal economic analysis of contemporary budget-makers, the need for future planning, and the need for and fact of centralized decision-making regarding science.

The case for public support of scientific research is fairly straightforward and is based upon the failure of the private sector to invest in such research at a socially optimal level. Failure of the private sector is due to the public-goods quality of the research output. Inasmuch as the results of research are published in the open scientific literature, it is prohibitively costly to preclude those who do not support research from appropriating these results. Even if research results are useful to certain parties, there are no incentives for them to reveal their preferences since they benefit from research, once performed, whether they pay or not. A further disincentive to private investment in research arises from the uncertainty of benefit associated with its results and the tendency of the private sector to underinvest in risky ventures. Thus, the market fails to provide signals for the optimal amounts of

[28] *Report to the President on Government Contracting for Research and Development* (Washington, 30 April 1962); National Academy of Sciences, *Federal Support of Basic Research in Institutions of Higher Learning* (Washington 1964).

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such outputs, and private firms cannot be relied upon to produce research at a socially optimal level.[29]

The conceptual difficulty arises in determining what is the socially optimal level of investment in scientific research. Part of the difficulty stems from the fact that research that can be viewed in terms of investment, i.e., the science that contributes to the development of technology, seldom has a simple and direct utilitarian outcome. Indeed, it has been argued that the interactions between science and technology are weak rather than strong interactions.[30] And part of the difficulty stems from the fact that not all science can be viewed in terms of investment, i.e., some science is admittedly rather remote from utilitarian application. The essays in the Shils volume represent an initial effort to develop criteria pertinent to these aspects of the problem of allocation of resources for the support of scientific research, and they are helpful in this regard. Nevertheless, they indicate that although a good case can be made for public support, it cannot be made with any great precision.

Concern for national science policy has taken on a new urgency.[31] The fat years of support for science have been followed more recently by lean years. Let us examine first the problem of policy and then the political problem posed by this development. The policy problem is that exponential growth for the support of science has passed and science must now adapt itself to living in equilibrium with a slower rate of growth. Derek Price anticipated this in 1962. He foresaw "the possibility that the exponential law of growth may be beginning to break down."[32] The shape of the curve could be expected to be logistic rather than exponential, and after the point of inflection had been passed we might expect "the cybernetic phenomenon of hunting" to set in and the curve to "oscillate wildly."[33] Martino has recently suggested the effect an equilibrium rate of growth might have on science, if constrained by either

[29] Kenneth J. Arrow, "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," in National Bureau of Economic Research, *The Rate and Director of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors* (Princeton 1962), 609-25.

[30] Derek J. de Solla Price, "Is Technology Historically Independent of Science?" *Technology and Culture*, VI (Fall 1965), 553-68; Donald Q. Marquis and Thomas J. Allen, "Communication Patterns in Applied Technology," *American Psychologist*, XXI (November 1966), 1052-60; Thomas J. Allen, "The Differential Performance of Information Channels in the Transfer of Technology," in William H. Gruber and Donald Q. Marquis, eds., *Factors in the Transfer of Technology* (Cambridge, Mass. 1969), 137-54.

[31] John Walsh, "Science Policy: Budget Cuts Prompt Closer Look at the System," *Science*, CLXVIII (15 May 1970), 802-805.

[32] D. J. de S. Price (fn. 4), 19.

[33] D. J. de S. Price (fn. 4), 24.

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G.N.P. or population.[34] The policy problem, then, is the accommodation of the growth of science to some equilibrium with the growth of society.

The political problem is rather interesting. In the mid-1960's, at the end of a period of very rapid growth for science, and concurrent with the onset of the slowing rate of growth, the scientific community elaborated a presumed need for a 15 percent annual increase in support for science.[35] This presumed need went unrecognized by the government and even far more modest growth rates were not realized.[36] Very recently, however, a Presidential task force issued a report that sought to peg the National Science Foundation budget to 0.1 percent of the Gross National Product.[37] Whether this is accepted or not—it would represent a doubling of the N.S.F. budget—something of this nature seems a more sensible basis on which to make a political deal than the rate of 15 percent of a few years ago.

A second aspect of the political problem is that the old coalition of forces that supported science has simply broken down. The bloom is clearly off the Defense Department rose for many reasons. And the National Institutes of Health no longer have a John Fogarty, a Lister Hill, or a James Shannon. There is some indication, however, that renewed attention is being given to strengthening the political role of the National Science Foundation in the support of science.[38]

Still, there are some deeply ingrained views within the scientific community that lead us to question whether it perceives the political problem clearly or not. The proposal by Representative Emilio Q. Daddario to create the National Institutes for Research and Applied Science (N.I.R.A.S.) is apparently developing increasing support among scientists.[39] The crucial question, however, is whether the scientific community is seeking an administrative solution to a political problem, a

[34] Joseph P. Martino, "Science and Society in Equilibrium," *Science*, CLXV (22 August 1969), 769-72.

[35] See Harvey Brooks, "Future Needs for the Support of Basic Research," in National Academy of Sciences, *Basic Research and National Goals* (Washington 1965), 77-110; also National Academy of Sciences, *Ground-Based Astronomy: A Ten-Year Program* (Washington 1964); National Academy of Sciences, *Chemistry: Opportunities and Needs* (Washington 1965); National Academy of Sciences, *Physics: Survey and Outlook* (Washington 1966).

[36] *Special Analyses, Budget of the United States, Fiscal Year 1971* (Washington 1970), 255.

[37] U.S. President's Task Force on Science Policy, *Science and Technology: Tools for Progress* (Washington 1970).

[38] Walsh (fn. 31); U.S. President's Task Force (fn. 37).

[39] Walsh (fn. 31); U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Astronautics: *Centralization of Federal Science Activities*, Report, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969; *Centralization of Federal Science Activities*, Hearings, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969; *The National Institutes of Research and Advanced Studies*, Report, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., 1970.

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Baconian tendency noted by Haberer, or whether it recognizes the necessity of building a strong political base, a necessity indicated by Sayre some time ago.[40] It is also the case that many scientists continue to respond to the present situation merely by reiterating the overriding importance of basic research to the society.[41] The question here is whether the scientific community will persist in this litany or whether it will begin to develop the sophisticated policy analysis that takes fewer assumptions for granted, is less preaching to the converted and more appealing to the reason of concerned nonscientists. In short, can the scientific community develop the political resources and the analytical case required if the polity is to understand the meaning of the "health of science" and answer its needs in a responsible manner? The authors of the articles in the Shils volume have begun the analytic task, and that task should be pursued. The degree of success in fulfilling the political task will be decisive.[42]

IV

The primary concern of the volume edited by Silvert, *The Social Reality of Scientific Myth: Science and Social Change*, is the relation of science and technology to the development of the new nations. There are useful case studies of policy on nuclear energy in Brazil (James W. Rowe), of scientific education in Africa (Nicholas DeWitt), of scientific and technological development in Iran (E. A. Bayne), of the development of science in Japan (F. Roy Lockheimer), of continuity and change in Russian and Soviet science (DeWitt), and a comparative look at the politics and organization of science in the United Kingdom and China (C.H.G. Oldham). Gallagher's contribution on the capability of several major non-Western languages—Turkish, Arabic, Israeli Hebrew, Persian, Bahasa Indonesian, and Japanese—to adapt to the needs of modern science is also quite helpful. Those interested in science, technology, and development will find this a useful book.

The book has a utility of another kind as well. In the first place, the point is made that science and technology are separable activities and in some measure independent of each other. Silvert puts it succinctly: "We have been given evidence that technology can exist without science, although science cannot be imagined in the absence of technology; and

[40] Wallace S. Sayre, "Scientists and American Science Policy," in Gilpin and Wright (fn. 20), 97-112.

[41] Victor F. Weisskopf, "The Need for Basic Research," *Science*, CLXVII (13 February 1970), 935.

[42] F. A. Long, "Support of Scientific Research and Education in Our Universities," *Science*, CLXIII (7 March 1969), esp. 1040.

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that science seems to demand particular environments if it is to flourish but that technology is a human universal to be found under any social conditions" (p. 228). On this point of the separability and partial independence of science and technology from each other there occurs a convergence with a literature that is increasingly exploring the interactions between the two activities.

Derek Price has pointed out that the cumulative nature of science is recorded in the scientific literature, but that the cumulative character of technology is embodied in artifacts and recorded, not in the technical literature, but in engineers' handbooks, users' manuals, catalogues, and the like.[43] Allen has underlined this separability by demonstrating the very limited reliance engineers place upon scientific literature in development work.[44]

We have noted earlier that the interactions between science and technology have been characterized as weak rather than strong interactions. The history of technology indicates that science-based technology is a recent development.[45] Industrial research and development in the United States, moreover, is concentrated in a few industries, a few firms, and a few product lines,[46] and, with the exception of the chemical industry, this concentration bears a close relation to the federal government's investment in defense and space R and D. The point is that the area of strong interdependence between science and technology can be delineated with some accuracy within limited boundaries, and that science and technology are in no small measure independent activities.

Gruber and Marquis have suggested, moreover, that science, technology, and utilization can be viewed as three streams of activity, each largely independent of the other, each having its own internal dynamic, each interacting with the other streams in a highly complex manner. This interaction, in effect, constitutes a challenge to a more popular view frequently found among members of the scientific community that suggests that science leads to technology, which leads to utilization.[47] In summary, the major points that are important for both analytic and policy purposes are these: science and technology are separable activities; they are independent of each other in large measure, and the

[43] D. J. de S. Price (fn. 30).

[44] Marquis and Allen (fn. 30); Allen (fn. 30).

[45] See A.R.J.P. Ubbelohde, "The Beginning of the Change from Craft Mystery to Science as a Basis for Technology," in Charles Singer and others, eds., *A History of Technology:* IV: *The Industrial Revolution* (London 1958), 663-81; see also the Preface to V: *The Late Nineteenth Century.*

[46] Richard R. Nelson, Merton J. Peck, and Edward D. Kalachek, *Technology, Economic Growth, and Public Policy* (Washington 1967), 66-88.

[47] Gruber and Marquis (fn. 30), 3-8.

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area of interdependence can be described with reasonable accuracy; and the complexity of the interactions among science, technology, and utilization should be recognized and fully explored.

The second general point raised by the Silvert volume is that if science and technology are to be utilized for constructive social purposes—development or whatever—careful attention must be given to the envelope of values, institutions, and processes within which the activities of science, technology, and utilization are linked together. Morton notes, for example, that though the effect of science on warfare is self-evident, "the art of war in any age depends as much on organization, tactics, and generalship as on weapons and supplies" (pp. 24-25). Morison has amplified this point with his fascinating study of the introduction of continuous-aim firing to the United States Navy in the early twentieth century.[48] In general terms, though, the interaction of science and technology, the progression of technology from technical feasibility to economic feasibility, the innovation and diffusion of new technology, must all be considered if science and technology are to be effectively utilized.

This envelope may require for developing countries a transformation of their world view comparable to that of the seventeenth-century scientific revolution in Europe.[49] It surely requires a modern university system.[50] Or, as Silvert puts it, "the values of science, to become effective, must be supported by more general societal values, as well as the public power, institutional structures, and class systems appropriate for the purpose" (p. 231), and must include mechanisms for insuring the effective "mobilization and institutional integration of individuals" (p. 232) in this context.

Consideration of the envelope of values, institutions, processes, and people is also required in a number of other specific contexts: the development of civilian technology in industries that have traditionally made a limited investment in research and development; the use of science and technology to improve urban mass transit systems or to increase the efficiency of the housing industry; or the use of science and technology by state and local governments. The linkages among science, technology, and utilization must be better understood if society is to employ its knowledge-generating and tool-creating capabilities to best advantage.[51]

[48] Elting E. Morison, *Men, Machines, and Modern Times* (Cambridge, Mass. 1966), 17-44.

[49] Basil Willey, *The Seventeenth Century Background* (London 1934).

[50] Ben-David (fn. 7).

[51] See, for example, the following: National Academy of Sciences, *A Strategic Approach to Urban Research and Development: Social and Behavioral Science Considera-*

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Interest Groups in Soviet Politics

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V

The volume edited by Piccard consists of a series of lectures given in 1964 and 1965 at Florida State University by some observers of and some participants in the science-policy debates of the mid-1960's. The contributions by Mendelsohn and Lakoff are useful, but the book as a whole has a rather dated quality. The book edited by Dencik, *Scientific Research and Politics*, consists of papers and discussion at a student symposium in June, 1968, at the University of Lund in Sweden. The discussions were marked, as the editor suggests, "by the coming together of three different and influential lines of thought on scientific research, politics, and the relations between the two:—Anglo-Saxon Neopositivism, German Humanism, and French Marxism." The result may be of interest to those interested in an ideological discussion of these matters; it will be of much less interest to those concerned with analysis.

VI

This review has discussed three thematic concerns that deserve systematic development by those in the field of science, technology, and public policy. The first is that of the political interactions among the scientific and technological communities and the political-governmental system, and especially, as we have discussed above, the political behavior of the scientific community. The second concern, a more normative one, is that of national science policy. If science, like war, is too important to be left to the scientists, then the health of science ought to concern a number of science-watchers, and the greatest good they can do is to drive the analytic work forward. The third thematic concern, here discussed with reference to development, is the use of science and technology for constructive social purpose. This is perhaps the least developed and most important of the three. We should also note in passing that concern for the secondary and tertiary effects of science and technology is likely to become a theme of major importance in the immediate future.[52]

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tions (Washington 1969); National Academy of Sciences, *Waste Management and Control* (Washington 1966); Wallace S. Sayre and Bruce L. R. Smith, "Government, Technology, and Social Problems," An occasional paper of the Institute for the Study of Sciences in Human Affairs, Columbia University (New York 1969); U. S. National Science Foundation, *Weather and Climate Modification* (Washington 1965).

[52] Raymond A. Bauer, *Second-Order Consequences: A Methodological Essay on the Impact of Technology* (Cambridge, Mass. 1969); National Academy of Sciences, *Technology: Processes of Assessment and Choice* (Washington 1969); National Academy of Engineering, *A Study of Technology Assessment* (Washington 1969); U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Astronautics: *Technology Assessment,*

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Conscious attention to these several themes suggests a manner by which science, technology, and public policy can fruitfully develop in the near future with less of the diffuseness that has characterized it in the past. Beyond the substantive importance of the issues in the field, the economic organization of the intellectual energies of those in the field is a most pressing task.

Statement of Emilio Q. Daddario, Chairman, Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967; *Technology Assessment Seminar*, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967; *Technical Information for Congress*, Report, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969; *Technology Assessment*, Hearings, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969.

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CHINESE STUDIES IN CRISIS

By RICHARD W. WILSON

Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., *China in Crisis: China's Heritage and the Communist Political System*, I, Book 1, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1968, 447 pp., $10.00.

Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., *China in Crisis: China's Heritage and the Communist Political System*, I, Book 2, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1968, pp. 449-803, $10.00.

Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., *China in Crisis: China's Policies in Asia and America's Alternatives*, II, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970, 484 pp., $10.00.

WHETHER as junior partners in the tea trade, as the fount of much Christian proselytizing effort, as puppet-sized imperialists in the Philippines, or as unhappy (but not necessarily unwilling) participants in three major mid-twentieth-century wars, Americans have become increasingly involved in East Asian affairs. We might hope that so crucial an involvement would be the subject of intensely developing academic scrutiny. Alas, while we can boast a great increase in the quantity of analyses concerning Asia, we cannot boast a *comparable* increase in the quality of these inquiries. At worst, on the popular level, there is a raw continuation of stereotypes familiar a hundred years ago. But even more sophisticated work too often leaves us victims of pedantries that promise much but say little. Moreover, Chinese society often receives no better treatment from those who profess to address themselves to general problems of social analysis. The experiences of more than one-quarter of mankind are too frequently ignored or casually matched with those of smaller new nations. How can it be, the Sinologist asks, that Chinese studies are so ignored or equated? Surely this ancient and glorious East Asian civilization has a claim on the interests and needs of our troubled world and *must* occupy one of the most prominent and unchallenged positions in the general study of mankind. Perhaps—but the importance of Asia in general scholarship is no more marked now than it was a decade ago. Indeed, largely intermediate-range problems such as man's experience in his cities, his interaction with his environment, and his dilemmas as a multi-colored species seem currently most critical.

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trained, and how much has been published. No doubt these data will occasion quiet self-congratulation in some quarters, but they cannot hope to reveal adequately the qualitative isolation and intellectual barrenness of much of the work in Chinese studies. Fortunately—or unfortunately—the two volumes of *China in Crisis*, a collection of twenty-eight essays accompanied by critical comments, written by many of the foremost social scientists and historians interested in China, serves this purpose admirably. Within its covers the pace and direction of a whole field can be seen, and I will therefore use *China in Crisis* as a starting point for a critical evaluation of Chinese studies in general. Let me first, however, make some general comments concerning the volumes themselves.

China in Crisis

The published papers from any conference are never of uniformly high quality, and that is certainly the case here. However, most of the articles, taken separately, are informative and original and are the basis for the generally favorable reviews *China in Crisis* has received in academic journals. Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, the editors, clearly organized an elite task force for the large and complicated problem of analyzing modern China. Considering the talent that was available, however, it is surprising how little inner cohesiveness informs these two volumes. Overall there is almost no connection whatever between volume I and volume II, the first being devoted to China's internal affairs and the second to her external relations. Although we might have expected the editors to provide us with some explicit rationale for the conjoining of these two main topics, the failure to cohere is even more glaring in terms of the articles within each volume. In so large a collection of articles covering many disparate fields we can perhaps excuse the extraordinary differences in methodology and accessibility of data. Those asking questions concerning modern foreign policy, those enquiring about economic growth where reliable statistics are nonexistent, those asking historical questions concerning problems where abundant and relatively reliable "official" data exist (although, perhaps, in a form difficult to transpose for the purposes of modern Western historiography)—will each use different methods, and these methods will not only influence the questions that are asked but also the way in which data are organized, and even the conclusions that are drawn. It is incumbent upon editors of works such as *China in Crisis* to inform readers both of the various complexities involved in handling Chinese data, and also why certain problem areas (foreign policy, for one)

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have been singled out for special attention and other areas (the arts and humanities are a prominent example) have been virtually ignored. The failure to give that information in these two volumes is not a trivial one.

In terms of internal consistency the major shortcoming is the failure to provide any focus more powerful than the over-arching topic of "crisis" (which, after all, is about the least surprising thing one can say about modern China). More specifically, there is a self-evident failure to unify the articles—either *in toto* or in groupings—by any device more powerful than a chronological ordering in volume I coupled with a weak disciplinary co-orientation, and by the internal/external nexus that distinguishes volume I from volume II. Volume II, which is by far the weaker of the two, is so lacking in internal cohesiveness that several articles (notably those by Hilsman, Bobrow, and McVey) say virtually nothing significant about China itself.

Despite these caveats, the reader progresses only a short distance into volume I before stumbling over ideas that, with varying degrees of explicitness, thread their way through the entire work. One of these is the question of the military basis of the Chinese state, a question that appears at the beginning of volume I and continues through to volume II, where the nuclear power of the modern Chinese nation is discussed by Morton H. Halperin. Though not, perhaps, setting forth the problem as precisely as we might wish, Ping-ti Ho in the opening essay states that "the persistent historical fact is that the Chinese state has always derived its ultimate power from the army, and this has largely predetermined its authoritarian character" (Ho, I, I, p. 16). This hypothesis, which undercuts many of the ideal notions of modern Chinese concerning the bases of their traditional society, deserves fuller and more systematic explication. Unfortunately, none is forthcoming, either from Ho or from other contributors who touch on this problem. In his analysis of nineteenth-century China, K. C. Liu suggests that although the Manchus with their supporting Chinese troops had declined in military effectiveness, local Chinese *yung* (brave) forces had taken over the task of guarding internal peace and security (Liu, I, I, p. 112). Many commanders of these forces, through their ability to organize defense against foreigners, became high-level provincial leaders, and it was the quality of these men combined with the effectiveness of their troops that underwrote stability in Chinese society at that time (Liu, I, I, p. 119). Moreover, as Philip Kuhn suggests in his comments on Liu's article, "The campaigns of the new provincial armies were complemented by the local-control and fund-raising activi-

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

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ties of gentry militia organizers. . . . That the mid-century rebellions left the rural elite solidly entrenched is further suggested by the tendency of the *pao-chia* system [local collective security] to come under its control . . . that *pao-chia* were being turned over to those members of the local elite who were already the de facto power in their communities: those in command of local militia associations" (Kuhn, 1, 1, p. 196). These tempting leads take on greater significance for twentieth-century Chinese politics in C. Martin Wilbur's article, "Military Separatism and the Process of Reunification under the Nationalist Regime, 1922-1937." Wilbur traces the expansion of Chinese military forces, from 500,000 in 1913 to more than 2.2 million in July of 1928, of which approximately 1.6 million were Kuomintang troops (Wilbur, 1, 1, p. 214). In the 1920's, such large forces existed at a time when the size of the American military, in comparison, was insignificant; moreover, these forces did not decrease as the civil war continued and as war with Japan threatened and then developed. Those who are concerned about the potential impact of the current American military organization upon American society will not be surprised at Wilbur's assertion that militarism was one of the major problems facing the Chinese in the first half of this century and that "a militarist system that lasted for any period in a particular base was intimately related to the local society" (Wilbur, 1, 1, p. 208).[1]

These ideas concerning militarism, its relation to social organization, and its effect upon the process of social transformation are not presented in any self-conscious, reinforcing way. They merely suggest what might have been a very powerful organizing framework for a number of the papers. The fact is, however, that other powerful—if not unrelated—problems also appear in the volumes yet are similarly ignored as potential low- or middle-range foci. To a great extent the article by K. C. Liu deals with the problem in traditional Chinese society of political integration between a formal bureaucratic center and diffuse local political power. This question of integration—with a different focus—becomes central in the fourth and excellent essay by Tang Tsou (in which the reader abruptly vaults into the Cultural Revolution). Integration, Tsou says, is composed of three elements—integration among elites, integration between the elite and the mass, and integration of the political community—that are empirically linked together but in which "a study of the process of integration must start with the

[1] Wilbur defines militarism as "a system of organizing political power in which force is the normal arbiter in the distribution of power and in the establishment of policy" (Wilbur, 1, 1, p. 203).

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elite" (Tsou, 1, 1, p. 279). In examining recent Chinese political history in the light of this formulation, Tsou concludes that ideology plays a crucial role, for it not only sets a framework for integration but also prescribes the rules of the game, defines common purposes, enlists commitments, motivates action, legitimizes the political system, and transforms power into authority (Tsou, 1, 1, p. 281). Understanding ideology and those individuals who form and wield it is therefore assumed to be a central component of analyses of political integration, and in Tsou's hands becomes a key to the mystery of the causes of the Cultural Revolution. Prior to this Revolution, he says, Chinese politics was "an organic unity of the charismatic leader, the ideology, and the organization" (Tsou, 1, 1, p. 320), and the recent crisis reflected a division that developed between the charismatic leader, his allied ideological lieutenants, and the organizational structure that had rapidly become a routinized bureaucracy.[2] In this sense, as Oksenberg points out, Mao may be addressing one of the central problems of our age by coming to grips with organizations that are ostensibly designed to serve society but that seemingly have a built-in bias toward self-aggrandizement. Goal-conflicts among elites, then, which a uniformly shared ideology should avert, become one of the major stumbling blocks to integration.

C. K. Yang picks up this theme in his article, "Cultural Revolution and Revisionism." Since goal-conflicts seem to be recurrent in the history of the Chinese Communist movement, Yang suggests (but does not rigorously test) the hypothesis that "goal instability is an inherent characteristic of major revolutionary movements" (Yang, 1, 2, p. 502). Yet Yang, no less than Tsou, feels that goal alterations in modern China are due not to policy conflicts alone but as much to the personality symbol of Mao himself (Yang, 1, 2, p. 510). For, beyond controversy over policy, there is often a sense of inevitability concerning ultimate conflict between Mao and the party organization leading the movement. As Franz Schurmann has noted, "anyone who has interviewed Chinese from the mainland cannot help noting how they speak of the 'party' in the sense of a reified source of authority" (Schurmann, 1, 2, p. 548). In this sense goal conflict is an aspect of a broader problem of integration involving a power struggle between Mao and the party he ostensibly heads. Mao's use of ideology, his Thought, is an essential component of his integrative strategy.

[2] John W. Lewis presents some interesting data on Liu Shao-ch'i that point out that Communist practice and notions of organization contradict these assumptions. Liu, he says, "perceived the importance of the integrative effects of a continuing process of struggle on the group" in which Liu noted that "inner-Party struggle is fundamentally a form of struggle and controversy over ideology and principles" (Lewis, 1, 2, p. 454).

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Although the theme of integration is obviously an important one to the several authors involved, it is never consciously shared among them as a unifying problem area, and they seem virtually oblivious of the writings of their fellow contributors. Moreover, their expository styles differ markedly. Tang Tsou, for instance, writes largely in a documentary manner with no very apparent systematic effort to explore the theoretical leads he himself raises. As he is one of the editors of *China in Crisis*, his style may explain the same apparent bias in the overall organization of the other contributions.

Chinese Studies in Crisis

The manifest failure of *China in Crisis* to provide any adequate middle-range foci for analysis of Chinese society is not a new phenomenon. Indeed, the question of whether Chinese studies should be large-scale or small-scale, "problem"-centered or "data"-centered, has been raised before, although without resolution. A decade ago John K. Fairbank, in his preface to *Ch'ing Administration*, asked, "Are we not trying in this field [the China field] to go too directly into the big problems raised by contemporary social science—questions of social mobility, of entrepreneurship, of class and power structure and ideology, for example—without having first performed the factual, detailed foundation work which in other, more mature fields, has facilitated the eventual asking of such big questions?"[3]

Mary C. Wright, reviewing *Ch'ing Administration*, disagreed and stated that more, not less, attention should be given to the social sciences since historians and social scientists learn from each other even though their aims are different. It may be, she said, that the methods of social scientists are not capable of coping with as yet unprocessed Chinese (or other non-Western) data, but there can be no doubt that we need work on patterns as well as on facts at all times.[4]

This general controversy over a problem-centered versus a topic-centered approach raises several interesting questions concerning Chinese studies and the role of the social scientist within this field. Generally speaking, the core of Chinese studies, whatever the disciplinary orientation of the particular individual, is a language program wherein a student is not only trained to communicate but is also introduced to selected writings or other materials concerning China. The individual's

[3] John K. Fairbank and Tseng Ssu-yu, *Ch'ing Administration* (Cambridge, Mass. 1960), *v*, *vi*.

[4] Mary C. Wright, "The Social Sciences and the Chinese Historical Record," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, xx (February 1961).

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process of acquiring the language depends on several variables (ability, area of study, level, etc.) but in any case is a long and arduous one. With language as a common denominator and unifying thread, fields such as Sung art, T'ang poetry, Yuan drama, Ch'ing history, and political studies of the Thought of Mao Tse-tung are linked together as Chinese studies despite the fact that each has unique and idiosyncratic problems of collection, verification, and analysis of data.

Data collection and verification are crucial factors with different implications for different categories of scholars within Chinese studies. To simplify somewhat, for the historian of traditional China, whose basic reference group is other historians of China, knowledge of the Chinese historical record and competence in language are the *central* and unchallenged credentials of his intellectual life. The same, to a great extent, can be said of most others in Chinese humanistic studies. For such scholars no deep-seated opposition should (or perhaps can) exist to viewing data humanistically, as does an artist who interprets reality intuitively through reliance on essentially implicit theories.

Although this characterization of the historian contains obvious elements of stereotyping, it serves to establish a reference point for comparison with an alternate category of scholar, one for whom the cardinal rule of scholarship is to view data as a body of empirical knowledge that can be subjected to explicit ordering and to which general theories can be applied. The primary reference group for such scholars is not basically those with area competence but rather other members of a discipline who demand self-awareness and competence concerning such general theories. Social scientists form the largest component within this category. Yet despite the very different type of demands placed on them by their particular academic reference group, a not infrequently heard complaint is that Asian social science specialists live behind a "Great Wall," cut off from "normal" and "relevant" discourse with their colleagues. A more serious criticism involves the quality of their work. Joseph D. Olander, for instance, has noted the following:

> For decades, political science scholarship on China has been based upon a serious absence of explicit rules of evidence and of correspondence which permit the making of inferences about Chinese political behavior. Hence, disputes about such behavior have been resolved most often by recourse to competing claims of "expertise." Such claims are normally structured on the basis of a period of residency on the Mainland, a "familiarity" with either the history or the language of the country, etc. Much of what has been passed

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off as an analysis of Chinese politics came as a result of the research strategy of the "inside dopester." Too often this strategy has led to a great deal of intelligence-collection and not to analytical scholarship.[5]

Unfortunately for many social scientists specializing on China, pressures for discipline-oriented scholarship are matched by competing demands from within the field of Chinese studies itself. The major "pressure group" involved is the "mandinarate" of non-social science Asian specialists who claim the right to verify the intellectual validity of works in the China field and who do so by criteria that are essentially ancillary to the social sciences, i.e., language competence and historical expertise.[6] The "legitimacy" of this self-selected coterie is established during the training period for Chinese specialists, when a knowledge of basic cultural data and the acquisition of language competence are considered essential. The tendency to stress language competence is particularly noteworthy. It is a peculiarity of Chinese language training that its complex and intimate relation to Chinese culture (plus the difficulty of mastering Chinese) results in the fact that for many Chinese specialists knowledge of the language *per se* becomes a major criterion for judging the competence of scholarly works. This criterion is asserted despite the fact that the sterility of most Chinese language-teaching methods and the irrelevancy of the training materials used would seem, on the face of it, to belie such an assertion. It is granted that a given (although variable) level of language and historical competence should be acquired, yet, like statistics for some social scientists, the Chinese language becomes for its proponents not a tool but a yardstick and sometimes even an end. Need we, we can reasonably ask, go as far as P. T. Ho who, apologizing for the lack of a language section in the *China in Crisis* Conference, mentions that a distinguished participant had noted privately that "this Conference has not afforded any opportunity for a

[5] From a review by Joseph D. Olander of Doak A. Barnett, ed., *Chinese Communist Politics in Action* (Seattle and London 1969) in *The Journal of Asian Studies*, XXIX (February 1970), 436. Olander feels that the Barnett volume does not follow the pattern as given in the quotation. It is, perhaps, worth pointing out that Olander's "inside dopester" has not been "inside" now for many years. Instead there is a breed of refugee scholar—both Chinese and Westerner—who is cut off from his emotional roots and, partly as a result, stresses those facets of learning that rely heavily on the types of expertise that were acquired before the Chinese unceremoniously closed their gates.

[6] The major exception to this condition appears to be the economists. Nearly 150 pages in book 2 of volume 1 of *China in Crisis* are devoted to exposition and discussion of economic conditions in Communist China. With few data but with much explicit emphasis on techniques of analysis the economists engage in a most vigorous and stimulating debate.

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systematic assessment of what may indeed have been China's most important heritage, namely, the Chinese language. I can hardly agree more . . . that it is the Chinese language that has, among other things, shaped Chinese thoughts and philosophy, determined the nature and styles of Chinese literature and arts, accounted at least in part for the failure of traditional China to develop science, and contributed to the molding of a civilization that is uniquely Chinese" (Ho, 1, 1, p. 81).

Implicit biases that appear so strongly with regard to language training are no less in evidence with regard to the mastery of historical minutiae, and further stress the uniqueness and self-contained quality of Chinese studies. In one sense, like an echo from the Manchu dynasty, antiquity itself is admired for the lessons it provides. Wang Gungwu, discussing the paper by C. Martin Wilbur and commenting on twentieth-century "military separatism," writes of nine historical periods of loss of central political control. He begins with the Spring and Autumn and Warring State periods of antiquity, progresses to the Ch'in and Han dynasties of two millennia ago, and then boldly moves into more "modern" times (Wang, 1, 1, pp. 266-67). More precisely, P. T. Ho says, "For the study of traditional Chinese state and government, no period is more important than the Western Han (B.C. 206—8 A.D.). Even bearing later modifications in mind, it is small exaggeration to say that the fundamental character of the traditional Chinese state was determined in Western Han times . . ." (Ho, 1, 1, p. 10). Here is an argument that, though doubtless true in essence, seems perilously close to the justifications for classical studies that until the late nineteenth century graced our own academic tradition.

It is not simply the unique worth of antiquarian data that is stressed, however, but the positive value of the past for present knowledge. K. C. Liu opens his essay on nineteenth-century China with the comment, "Few will deny that without knowledge of Imperial China one cannot hope to understand China today. . . . Despite the many-sided revolution that has occurred, certain basic patterns of power and policy, of ideology, and even of the economy, are as evident today as in the dynasties of the past. One may be sure that the study of China's long and complex history could yield useful insight into that country's current problems and potentialities" (Liu, 1, 1, p. 93). Here is a controversial hypothesis stated with almost unqualified emphasis on the study of history as the cognitive union card for comprehension of the present.

What has been the effect of these subliminal influences on the development of Chinese studies? In the first place, I would suggest that there has been a failure within this field, and particularly in its social

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science component, to expand in proportion to both need and opportunity. To some extent this failure is due to the long and arduous process of learning required to become a specialist on China. Second, and related to my first point, there has been a bias toward historical studies; this bias is directly related to a frequently articulated need on the part of many scholars of China to be intellectually acceptable to the non-social science reference group within Chinese studies. The number of political scientists, sociologists, etc., who do essentially historical studies is greater, I would maintain, than is justified by our admitted need for careful social scientific inquiry into China's past. But most disappointing is my suspicion that much—although not all—of the work being produced is of lower quality than that put forth in other and comparable areas of scholarship. Beyond the rather general emphasis on data collection as such is a heavy concentration on topic-oriented research resulting in an all too noticeable theoretical lacuna. Even lists of recent Ph.D. dissertations, where we might expect to perceive an increased use of new techniques of inquiry and an integration of knowledge, too frequently exhibit little sense of the impact of Chinese studies upon general knowledge and of the potential implications for a deeper appreciation of men in societies generally. There is, in fact, a plethora of narrow studies narrowly conceived and narrowly carried out.

In short, we sense isolation and because of it impoverishment. The results can be summed up in the unfortunate comments following Chalmers Johnson's article, "Chinese Communist Leadership and Mass Response: The Yenan Period and the Socialist Education Campaign Period." Johnson's aim, achieved with only limited success, was "to generate hypotheses about the nature of the Chinese social system" (Johnson, 1, 1, p. 397) in order, we are told, to help in understanding Chinese society, to help make comparisons with other social systems, and to provide a broad framework for analyzing particular policies. In commenting on this paper, Teng Ssu-yu saw Johnson's description of the factors involved in gaining popular support as very different from the bold objectives Johnson set forth. Teng perceived these factors rather as three aspects of political tradition in China—the "mandate of heaven," the dynastic cycle, and the concept that a government's destiny is determined more by internal forces than by external factors (Teng, 1, 1, p. 438). Heaven, he says, is "almost a symbol of the people," and "the Socialist Education Movement can be seen as an attempt to arrest the 'dynastic cycle'" (Teng, 1, 1, pp. 438-42). Toward the end Teng provides a comment that might well serve as a potential epitaph for

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FREDERICK F. RITSCH—Origins of the Council of Europe. The Governments Take Action 201
ALBERTO CAMPOLONGO—C.E.E. élargie et pondération par pays 235
ANGELO GRISOLI—Evaluation juridique de l'entrée de la Grande Bretagne dans le Marché Commun 253
D. A. STRICKLAND—Is there a Group Theory of Politics? 269
PAOLO MARANINI—Il contributo di Barrington Moore jr. alla teoria della struttura sociale 287
FRANCESCO ROSSOLILLO—Note sulla coscienza rivoluzionaria 317
JUSTUS M. VAN DER KROEF—Indonesian Foreign Policy since Sukarno 339
MARIO GALIZIA—Aspetti dell'organizzazione regionale. Note preliminari 335
GIAMPIERO AZZALI—Libertà e segretezza della corrispondenza e poteri di vigilanza 389

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Chinese studies: "From history I have learned that many Chinese problems are solved from within, not from without, or from both within and without" (Teng, 1, 1, p. 446).

The Area Studies Problem

Area studies programs grew slowly following the Second World War and reached full flower a little over a decade ago. Growth of international programs generally, of which Asian studies were a part, largely coincided with massive government support; 106 area centers—of which over 40 have been in Asian studies—in 59 universities and colleges have been supported by Title VI of the National Defense Education Act.[7] Moreover, Title VI "has also provided some millions annually for specific research projects, primarily involving the preparation of materials for the teaching of non-Western languages. Over the past year it has provided fellowship support for some 2,361 National Defense fellows. The Fulbright-Hays program sent 151 graduate and 73 faculty fellows abroad for a year of research."[8]

For a variety of complex and interlocking reasons the government (and also many private foundations) has formulated plans for a reduction in budgetary support for "outdated and less productive programs." The International Education Act, which at one time held the promise of long-range financial support, is now a dead letter. Also, although the long-term prospect for the categorical grants program for Foreign Language and Area Studies remains fluid, financial support for the academic year 1971-72 will be reduced nearly 50 percent from the 1970-71 level. In short, the outlook for the fall of 1971 is bleak, for government-supported programs can expect a reduction by one-half in funding. Centers with well-developed and entrenched administrations face a crisis, for their operations have been big business with fairly easy access to money and a prestige that justified language and linguistics programs, the development of language laboratories, and the establishment of schools of international studies.

It is neither necessary nor wise to accept the government's judgment concerning area studies. In this short essay I have laid greater stress on the deficiencies in Chinese studies than on the clear successes. Despite this one-sidedness and the fact that my comments have been largely about Chinese studies, my criticisms refer (in a less specific way, to be sure) to all area programs. It should also be remembered that although

[7] From correspondence to the membership of the Association for Asian Studies, Inc., from David Joel Steinberg, Secretary, on March 13, 1970.
[8] *Ibid.*

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support for *international* studies as such now appears on the wane, there is a new enthusiasm in academic, government, and foundation circles for "inner"-area programs such as urban studies and Afro-American studies.

Whether area programs should exist or not is becoming an increasingly debated question. As interdisciplinary foci they appear to have had only limited success. More fundamental, however, is whether the intellectual output of such programs can justify continuing support for what must increasingly become a university commitment. The answer, I think, must be a qualified yes. Fields like Chinese studies, however, need deep re-examination if we are to move beyond some of the limitations that a work like *China in Crisis* reveals. The search for answers will involve a critical self-perception with regard to values.

In an age when funds will increasingly come from nongovernmental sources, what is the proper mix of "theoretically" oriented versus "data"-oriented analysis, of policy and non-policy studies, etc.? In the matter of language competence, is more flexibility not called for and should not language training be cast in a more supportive rather than central position? Most important, a new focus for and a new conception of scholarly inquiry is called for. In Chinese studies, for instance, the computer is still largely an esoteric device. This is no accident. The types of problem-oriented research for which the computer is most helpful have been too frequently pushed to one side in favor of topic-centered studies. The result, in part, is theoretical impoverishment and a seeming lack of coordination even among scholars in the same general field. Perhaps the time has come, now that China as a field is established, to begin the less glamorous effort of filling in the muscle that will make the skeleton begin to walk.

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This reader presents articles representing distinct points of view which have been exceptional in clarifying the nature of international politics. All of the articles are reprinted in their entirety and have been chosen because of their sophistication and substantive depth. The book is organized to cover most aspects of international relations: relations between domestic and foreign policy, the relations between states, modes of historical analysis, international law, and military policy. The articles are important not only for what they say but also for what they show as superior political science analysis. Each section is preceded by an introduction by the author.

CONTENTS

I. NATIONAL ACTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
Henry A. Kissinger, *Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy*
Dean Rusk, *The President*
Hans Morgenthau, *Another "Great Debate:" The National Interest of the United States*
Thomas Schelling, *Bargaining, Communciation, and Limited War*
Robert Jervis, *Hypotheses on Misperception*
II. NATIONAL INTERACTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
Arnold Wolfers, *The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference*
John Herz, *The Rise and Demise of the Territorial State*
Arthur Lee Burns, *From Balance to Deterrence: A Theoretical Analysis*
Kenneth Waltz, *The Stability of a Bipolar World*
III. THE RELEVANCE OF HISTORY
Ernst Haas, *The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda?*
F. H. Hinsley, *The Development of the European States System Since the Eighteenth Century*
William Langer, *Farewell to Empire*
Evan Luard, *Conciliation and Deterrence*
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND STRUCTURE
Stanley Hoffmann, *International Systems and International Law*
Robert Friedheim, *The "Satisfied" and "Dissatisfied" States Negotiate International Law*
Leland Goodrich, *From League of Nations to United Nations*
Bruce Russett, *Toward a Model of Competitive International Politics*
Inis Claude, *United Nations Use of Military Force*
V. MILITARY POWER
Glenn Snyder, *Balance of Power in the Missile Age*
Albert Wohlstetter, *The Delicate Balance of Terror*
Samuel Huntington, *Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results*
Carl Kaysen, *Keeping the Strategic Balance*
Robert Levine, *Facts and Morals in the Arms Debate*

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